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In this dissertation, I contribute to three strands of the environmental economics liter-
ature: (1) regulation of air pollution from stationary sources, (2) interaction between
behavioral biases and consumer demand for energy, and (3) long-term distributional out-
comes of policies that seek to mitigate climate damages from the housing sector.
The first paper looks at how environmental regulations work in practice – assessing ex-
post the causal consequences of a specific policy, the Large Combustion Plant Directive.
The Large Combustion Plant Directive was a key policy instrument to limit air pollu-
tion from power stations in the European Union. The Directive set limits on emissions of
harmful sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and particle dust from combustion plants with total
capacity of at least 50 MWth. A fundamental empirical problem is to create a valid coun-
terfactual, to understand what would have happened in the absence of such a regulation.
As is the case with most command and control policies, all plants fell under regulation,
but the stringency was vintage-differentiated. More crucially, a group of plants chose to
opt-out of emissions performance standards but were instead required to gradually cease
operations. I exploit the structure of the directive to construct valid control groups to
assess the effectiveness of emission performance standards. Evidence from this empirical
study suggests that EU-wide emission performance standards, when sufficiently stringent,
are an effective instrument for pollution abatement at the plant stack-level. However, the
regulation was not ambitious enough and in fact allowed business-as-usual operations for
some of the most carbon-intensive power plants operating in the European Union.
In the second paper, I exploit a large-scale natural experiment in utility billing cycles at
the building level to identify the salience effect of costs on energy consumption. By ex-
ploiting variation in billing cycles, I find new evidence for consumer inattention to energy
costs: consumers that are billed for heating during off-winter months demand more heat
10
energy annually. Results show that households are paying attention to their heating costs
in the first three months of the 12-month billing period. As a result, bills immediately
before the winter heating season are most effective, allowing ample opportunity to adjust
consumption. I show that salience bias in annual heat energy demand is persistent and
pervasive – affecting households in all regions and building/technology type. Enduring
differences in consumer inattention to energy costs led to significantly higher heating
expenditures for buildings treated with summer billing cycles. Differences in efficiency
investments across billing cycles highlight that, at least for multi-apartment buildings,
owners of buildings did invest towards closing any perceived energy-efficiency gaps, which
were driven by consumer misoptimization by tenants, treated with low salience of energy
bills.
In the third paper, which is joint work with Andrew Hobbs, we examine the effect of tem-
perature on residential heat demand and the spatial distribution of energy (in)efficient
buildings in Germany. To uncover the underlying thermal efficiency of buildings, we es-
timate the causal response of building-level heat demand to variability in heating degree
days. We examine heterogeneity in temperature response using both standard econo-
metrics and causal forests to identify differences in energy-efficiency between buildings
and regions. Without making any functional form assumptions, we are able to account
for observable and unobservable characteristics that are likely drivers of the realized
energy-efficiency outcomes. Results show that the distribution of energy-efficiency is not
equitable in the West of Germany, with buildings located in Bavaria and Baden Würt-
temberg attaining the best energy performance standards nationwide. Compared to the
West, the East of Germany is home to a significantly higher share of older buildings that
were not subject to building codes. Notwithstanding, they perform better than the West
counterpart, likely as a result of large investments in retrofitting post-reunification. We
highlight that the highest untapped potential for gains in energy-efficiency is located in
the North-West of Germany.
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1.1 Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus drei empirische Kapiteln, die zur umweltökonomis-
chen Literatur beitragen: (1) Regulierung der Luftverschmutzung durch stationäre Quellen,
(2) die Interaktion zwischen Verhaltensverzerrungen und Verbrauchernachfrage nach En-
ergie sowie, (3) langfristige Verteilungswirkungen von Maßnahmen zur Minderung von
Klimaschäden durch den Wohnungssektor.
Das erste Kapitel bewertet ex post die kausalen Effekte einer bestimmten umweltpoli-
tischen Maßnahme, nämlich der Großfeuerungsanlagenverordnung. Die Richtlinie Large
Combustion Plant Directive ist ein wichtiges politisches Instrument zur Begrenzung der
Luftverschmutzung durch Kraftwerke in der Europäischen Union. Die Verordnung legt
Grenzwerte für die Emissionen von schädlichem Schwefeldioxid, Stickoxid und Partikel-
staub aus Feuerungsanlagen mit einer Gesamtkapazität von mindestens 50 MWth fest.
Ein grundlegendes empirisches Problem besteht darin, ein gültiges Kontrafaktum zu
schaffen, um zu verstehen, was ohne eine solche Regelung geschehen wäre. Wie bei den
meisten command-and-control fielen alle Anlagen unter die Regulierung, aber die Strin-
genz war vintage-differenziert. Entscheidender ist an dieser Stelle, dass einige Anlagenbe-
treiber die Emissionsgrenzwerte ablehnten und daher den Betrieb schrittweise einstellen
mussten. Ich nutze diese Struktur der Richtlinie, um gültige Kontrollgruppen zur Bewer-
tung der Wirksamkeit von Emissionsgrenzwerten zu untersuchen. Aus dieser empirischen
Studie geht hervor, dass EU-weite Emissionsgrenzwerte, wenn sie ausreichend streng sind,
ein wirksames Instrument zur Verringerung der Umweltverschmutzung darstellen. Die
Verordnung war jedoch nicht ehrgeizig genug und erlaubte sogar einigen der kohlen-
stoffintensivsten Kraftwerke in der Europäischen Union den normalen Betrieb.
Im zweiten Kapitel nutze ich Varianz in den Abrechnungszeiträumen von Versorgung-
sunternehmen auf Gebäudeebene in einem natürlichen Experiment, um den Salienzeffekt
der Kosten auf den Energieverbrauch zu ermitteln. Ich finde neue empirische Evidenz
für einen Mangel an Aufmerksamkeit von Verbrauchern gegenüber den Kosten ihres En-
ergieverbrauchs: Verbraucher, denen ihr Wärmeverbrauch in den Monaten außerhalb der
Wintermonate in Rechnung gestellt wird, verbrauchen jährlich mehr Wärmeenergie. Die
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Haushalte in den ersten drei Monaten des 12-monatigen Abrech-
nungszeitraums auf ihre Heizkosten achten. Infolgedessen sind Rechnungen unmittelbar
vor der Heizsaison im Winter am effektivsten, was reichlich Gelegenheit zur Anpassung
des Energieverbrauchs bietet. Ich zeige, dass der Salienz-Bias des jährlichen Heizen-
ergiebedarfs persistent ist und Haushalte in allen Regionen und Gebäude- und Technolo-
gietypen betrifft. Anhaltende Unterschiede in der Unaufmerksamkeit der Verbraucher
in Bezug auf ihre Energiekosten führten zu erheblich höheren Heizkosten für Wohnge-
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bäude mit Abrechnungsdatum im Sommer. Unterschiede bei den Effizienzinvestitionen
über die Abrechnungszeiträume hinweg machen deutlich, dass zumindest bei Gebäuden
mit mehreren Wohnungen, die Eigentümer zur Schließung von Lücken in der Energieef-
fizienz investierten, die durch einen Mangel an Verbrauchsoptimierung durch die Mieter
verursacht wurden.
Im dritten Artikel, den ich gemeinsam mit Andrew Hobbs verfasst habe, untersuchen wir
den Einfluss der Temperatur auf den Wärmebedarf von Wohngebäuden und die regionale
Verteilung von energie(in)effizienten Wohngebäuden in Deutschland. Um die zugrunde
liegende thermische Effizienz von Gebäuden aufzudecken, schätzen wir die kausale Reak-
tion des gebäudebezogenen Wärmebedarfs auf die Variabilität der Heizgradtage. Wir
untersuchen Effektheterogenitäten sowohl mittels ökonometrischer Standardmethoden als
auch mit Hilfe von "Causal Forests", um Unterschiede in der Energieeffizienz zwischen
Gebäuden und Regionen zu identifizieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Verteilung der
Energieeffizienz in Westdeutschland ungleich verteilt ist, wobei Wohngebäude in Bay-
ern und Baden Württemberg bundesweit die besten Energieeffizienzstandards erreichen.
Im Vergleich zum Westen weist der Osten Deutschlands einen deutlich höheren Anteil
an älteren Wohngebäuden auf, die nicht der Wärmeschutzverordnung unterlagen. Den-
noch schneiden sie im Schnitt besser ab als ihre westlichen Pendants, was wahrscheinlich
auf die hohen Investitionen in die Sanierung nach der Wiedervereinigung zurückzuführen
ist. Wir weisen darauf hin, dass das höchste ungenutzte Potenzial zur Steigerung der
Energieeffizienz im Nordwesten Deutschlands liegt.
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Chapter 2
Pollution Control Using Emission
Performance Standards: Evidence from
the Large Combustion Plant Directive
2.1 Introduction
Fossil-fuel combustion for power generation is the largest source of global greenhouse gas
emissions, but also a significant common source of local air pollution. In the European
Union (EU), the energy production and distribution sector is one of the major emitters of
toxic pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which are known
to damage ecosystems and detrimental to human health (EEA, 2017). To regulate en-
vironmental and health damages by thermal power plants, the European Commission
adopted a number of policy instruments1, including the Large Combustion Plant (LCP)
Directive, a command-and-control (CAC) regulation2 intended to control emission inten-
sities of SO2, NOx, and particulate matter (dust) from large power stations in both the
energy and industrial sectors.
The negative impact of air pollution on human health is of increasing concern and the
LCP directive was a major environmental regulation to control pollutants from EU com-
1The EU community also established its first cap-and-trade program in 2005, a multinational emissions
trading scheme (EU ETS) to control carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, along with country-level caps on
CO2 emissions from all thermal combustion plants generating electricity larger than 20 MWth (Martin
et al. 2016).
2CAC instruments are a direct form of regulation in which the regulator specifies a target or a standard
that a firm, plant, or locality must achieve – or face non-compliance penalties. Between 1970 and 2011,
over 50% of EU environmental policy instruments used were of the CAC type (regulatory, interventionist,
and topdown), with emission limits and technical requirements playing the role of the top two (Schmitt
and Schulze, 2011).
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bustion plants. In contrast to a large body of literature on air pollution regulation in
other countries (see Section 2.2), we know considerably little about the policy impact
of command-and-control policies in the EU which have been used for decades in con-
trolling local pollution from fossil-fuel power plants. Quantifying the causal effects of
conventional regulation such as the LCP directive is essential to accurately evaluating
the benefits of overlapping environmental instruments and (re-)designing them to meet
the increasingly challenging public health and climate policy goals in the future. For ex-
ample, the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED 2010/75/EU) succeeds and tightens the
provisions in the LCP directive and the corresponding emission performance standards
(EPS) were applicable to all existing combustion plants, effective in 2016.
This paper offers the first impact assessment of the Large Combustion Plant directive
on flue emissions rates from thermal combustion plants in the European Union3. The
LCP directive set mandatory minimum EPS for SO2, NOx, and total particulate matter,
which applied to all combustion plants with a rated thermal input of 50 MW or more.
I examine the following research questions in this paper: 1) How effective were the EPS
under the LCP Directive in cleaning up emissions from the oldest existing stock of EU
combustion plants? 2) To what extent did stricter standards prompt the newest plants
towards cleaner technology choices for fuel combustion? 3) Did the opt-out policy actually
encourage the old, large, and dirty combustion units to eventually close operations?
The key challenges in answering these questions are separating the effects of the LCP Di-
rective from the 2008 economic crisis, the EU ETS, the National Emission Ceilings (NEC)
Directive, the policy interaction with the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
(IPPC) Directive, along with time-varying confounding factors leading to selection bias
in estimating treatment effects. Notwithstanding, a number of regulation-specific factors
makes the LCP Directive an ideal policy to study in order to understand the effectiveness
of emission performance standards on the full population of combustion plants in the EU.
First, the directive had three distinct regulation arms: Articles 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3. Regu-
lation intensity was differentiated across plants based on the operation licensing dates –
this allowed us to construct plausible counterfactuals and evaluate the effect of emission
performance standards at both the extensive and intensive margins.
Second, the LCP directive differed from the usual vintage-differentiated regulation in the
United States (see Stavins 2006), because it did not exempt older plants from any form of
regulatory intervention. This allowed us to investigate the environmental performance of
3This paper does not assess the (incomplete) compliance rate across combustion plants, industries, or
Member States covered under the LCP regulation. For a useful report on the subject of compliance, see
Wynn and Coghe (2017). They assess emission concentrations from the dirtiest non-compliant coal-fired
power plants in Europe and discuss the implications that the new round of emission limits under the
EU’s Industrial Emission Directive have on their operation decisions.
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the oldest combustion plants in the European Union. All plants licensed before July 1987
were required under the provisions of Article 4-3 to either 1) take appropriate measures
to achieve annual emissions concentrations established under Article 4-1, 2) be included
under a national emission reduction plan (NERP), or 3) opt-out from emission limits
values (ELV) to instead limit operation hours to 20,000 and be required to shut down by
the end of 2015. I treat opt-out plants as the control group to estimate the effect on stack-
level emission concentrations of older plants (Article 4-3) that chose to comply with new
environmental standards (ELV treatment). Using difference-in-differences, I find that
average SO2, NOx, and dust emission concentrations were 39%, 10%, and 25% lower
respectively after the policy deadline. Furthermore, keeping the same counterfactual of
opt-out plants, I find that emissions intensity of relatively newer plants under Article 4-1
did not change significantly (with the exception of SO2 concentrations). Consequently, I
argue that the response of the oldest fleet under Article 4(3) to emission standards was
much stronger than that from Article 4(1) plants.
Third, the directive took the form of a typical CAC regulation in which the prescribed
emission limits are more stringent for newly built plants than for existing plants. Com-
bustion plants that were brought into operation between July 1987 and November 2003
were subject to lenient emission standards laid down in Article 4(1). Meanwhile, newer
plants that started to operate post November 2002 were subject to significantly tighter
emission limits values under Article 4(2). I am unable to apply the core D-i-D empirical
model, used to evaluate the response to standards applied under Articles 4-3 and 4-1,
because new plant operators could have anticipated the regulation before the compliance
deadline of 2008. There are strong reasons for this. There is a time gap between when
the directive was issued (2001) and the effective date of compliance (2008), possibly giv-
ing rise to anticipation effects for plants built after LCPD was issued. Anticipation of
standards is much more plausible for new plants than old plants because upgrading or
retrofitting older combustion units is costlier and takes more time. New plant opera-
tors had perfect foresight of the EPS required under the LCP directive before the policy
deadline of 2008, therefore pre-trends in emissions concentrations could be potentially
contaminated if operators made early clean investments in anticipation.
Another reason for anticipation is the policy interaction with the IPPC directive - which
required permits to operate new combustion plants or make changes to existing instal-
lations since 30 October 1999. The IPPC necessitated compliance with emission per-
formance standards under the LCP directive. Unfortunately, I only observe emissions
and plant-level operations starting in 2004 and therefore am unable to observe the full
impact of the directive pre-deadline. Nevertheless, I take into account that plants were
not completely myopic and investigate the difference in response to standards of plants
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that were licensed close to the date of 2003, starting when plants were subject to Article
(2). The variation in performance standards across plants (near the 2003 cutoff date)
offers us a natural experiment that mitigates selection bias. I treat plants subject to the
provisions under Article 4-1 as baseline, against which I compare emissions intensity of
plants under Article 4(2), to answer whether combustion plants subject to more strin-
gent EPS were progressively cleaner due to the policy. I find strong evidence that tighter
standards prompted newer plants to reduce emission concentrations of local pollutants
from 2004 to 2015.
To my knowledge, Meyer and Pac (2017) is the only paper to empirically explore the
consequences of the LCPD regulation in the European Union. It focus on correlation
rather than causation, however. The main result suggests that higher coal or lignite fuel
input at power-generating plants was associated with a lower probability of opting out
of the emission-rate standards applied to all combustion plants operating before 1987.4
I seek to go beyond the analysis found in Meyer and Pac (2017) and analyze the LCP
directive comprehensively. In this paper, I pay critical attention to the performance of
the oldest thermal combustion fleet (older than 1987) in the EU by comparing emissions
concentrations of installations that opted-out to those that chose to comply with perfor-
mance standards. I further explore that whether the LCPD created a perverse incentive
for older stations to continue highly polluting operations without requiring performance
standards. Those that opted out of the emission rate standards and eventually shutdown
by the end of 2015 were more likely to be coal and lignite power plants. More impor-
tantly, these plants were not more likely to shutdown (as intended by the Article 4(3)
requirements) than similar plants that chose to comply. This gives us some evidence that
the LCP directive gave rise to the “old-plant” effect, deferring dirty plant shutdowns or
replacements.
In the next section, I briefly review some empirical literature concerning air quality con-
trol using emission-rate standards. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2.3 provides a detailed description of the Large Combustion Plant Directive and
other overlapping policies that were in force during the same regulation period. Section
3.3 describes the data from the EEA. Section 2.5 estimates the causal effect of emis-
sion standards under Articles 4(3) and 4(1), along with falsification tests. Section 2.6
4I have reason to be wary of this result: Considering that many of these combustion plants had
multi-fuel input, I redo their analysis using plant-level input shares of fuel type (solid fuels, natural gas,
liquid fuels, other gases, biomass) as predictor variables instead of absolute fuel inputs in petajoules. I
find that relative to natural gas combustion, a higher share of coal, lignite, or liquid fuel was associated
with an increased likelihood of being opted out of emission limits values - which is opposite of the result
found in Meyer and Pac (2017). This may imply that some operators of coal and lignite plants found
that returns to eventual shutdown by the end of 2015 were higher than investing in costly retrofits to
comply with the emission limits values in the LCPD.
17
investigates the policy impact of tighter standards under Article 4(2) taking potential
anticipation effects seriously in the identification strategy. In Section 3.7, I conduct more
robustness checks. Section 2.8 investigates whether the old opt-out combustion plants
were more likely to close than plants under different regulation regimes. Lastly, Section
3.11 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
In the last two decades, there has been a notable increase in research evaluating policies
for environmental protection. The design of empirical studies emphasizes causal inference
by comparing a group of regulated (treated) firms with a comparable (control) group of
firms that were not subject to the treatment. As a result, we now have an improved
perspective on the causal effects of environmental regulations that target industrial pol-
lution. The literature evaluating the effectiveness of emission performance standards in
non-EU countries, notably the United States, has been extensive.
A large majority of these studies use the spatial variation in the implementation of the
US Clean Air Act (CAA) to evaluate the effect of air quality regulation under the CAA
framework. As a result, many regulation categories of the Clean Air Act have come
under empirical evaluation. Greenstone (2004) shows that by the end of 1970s most of
the US counties were in compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for SO2 concentrations. But the author finds that whether a county came
under SO2 regulation (nonattainment status) under the Clean Air Act did not play a
major role in the improvement of ambient air quality for sulfur dioxide. While Chay and
Greenstone (2003) demonstrate that total suspended particles (TSPs) pollution fell dra-
matically in the early 1970s and that these large changes in ambient TSPs concentrations
were regulation induced. Henderson (1996) documents that nonattainment counties suc-
cessfully reduced ozone concentrations relative to attainment counties. Nevertheless, the
regulation may have had unintended and costly consequences due the non-uniform imple-
mentation of the environmental regulation across the US. Becker and Henderson (2000)
and Henderson (1996) find evidence of a reduction in the number of polluting plants in
regulated counties and a shift over time of industrial plants to unregulated counties. That
is, the industries affected by the regulation slowly relocated their activities to areas that
were less polluted (attainment counties) and therefore evaded regulation requirements to
install the cleanest available technology.
Harrison et al. (2015) investigate the effectiveness of the Indian Supreme Court Action
Plans (SCAP) and price incentives via fuel taxes to reduce coal use and promote SO2
pollution abatement technology. Using a comprehensive industrial plant-level dataset,
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they find that higher coal prices led to a significant reduction in coal use as an input
into production across plants. However, they further find that the SCAP were only
successful in targeting large highly polluting installations. Greenstone and Hanna (2014)
use city-level data to evaluate the impact of the SCAP and the Mandated Catalytic
Converters. They provide evidence that air pollution regulation resulted in observable
improvements in air quality. Another recent paper looks at the extent to which Chinese
power plants react to tighter SO2 emission-rate standards and find that the response to
the regulation was swift, with average SO2 stack concentrations (in mg per Nm3) falling
by 13.9% (Karplus et al., 2018).
Wätzold (2004) assesses the success of the highly ambitious SO2 emissions limits (for
both new and existing large combustion plants) of the Ordinance on Large Combustion
Plants in 1983 (GFA-VO) in Germany5. Along with the regulatory provisions of the
GFA-VO, the government of North Rhein Westfalen (NRW, the largest German state)
was able to negotiate a voluntary agreement with the electricity suppliers in NRW to
limit SO2 and NOx emissions from new and existing plants. Wätzold documents that
these policy initiatives led to the installation of flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) technology
in the entire fleet of combustion plants regulated in Germany. That, is the policy was
successful in the quick and uniform diffusion of state-of-the-art abatement technology.
For the purposes of policy design, if the emission-rate or technology standards for reg-
ulated pollutants only apply to new rather than existing polluting sources, there is a
concern that such a policy-exemption rule, often referred to as “grandfathering”, could
encourage the operation of plants that are older and dirtier over the longer run. One
such policy is the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) introduced under the 1970
Clean Air Act in the US. The NSPS featured emission-based standards for only new
sources and mandated up to a 90% reduction in SO2 emissions from earlier pre-regulated
levels. Empirical studies validate that the mandated investment in scrubbers increased
operation costs of new plants, which led the operators to utilize older unregulated plants
at higher capacity (Stavins, 2006), and delayed re-investment in existing plants to avoid
triggering the Clean Air Act requirements (Bushnell and Wolfram, 2012). Although the
LCP directive did not require stringent desulfurization or denitrification from the (older)
existing polluting plants, it did nevertheless impose either lenient standards on the stack
concentrations or limited operations. I will investigate the effectiveness of this specific
design feature of the LCP directive in this paper.
5The GFA-VO and a comparable program in Netherlands (Dutch Bees WLV 1987) are considered to
be model initiatives for the LCP directive.
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2.3 Policy Context
2.3.1 Large Combustion Plant Directive
The LCP directive was first adopted by the European Council in 19886, subsequently
amended in 19947, and then revised on the 23th October of 20018. While the structure
of regulation has more or less remained the same since initial implementation, the per-
formance standards are stricter with each revision. The directive specifies upper limits
for the emission intensity of SO2, NOx and particulate matter (dust) that each regulated
combustion plant could emit on average each year. Until January 2005, installations had
to comply with the 1988 directive, while the 2001 Large Combustion Plant Directive
kicked into effect starting January 2008 and its validity ended on 31st December 2015.
Figure 2.1 is a pictorial description of regulatory provisions under the LCP directive.
A plant that could prove that the construction licence was granted before 27.11.2002
and that the plant went into operation before 27.11.2003 is referred to as an “old-new”
plant and was subject to provisions under article 4(1) of the directive. Plants that
came into operation after 27.11.2003 are referred to as “new-new” plants, subject to
provisions under article 4(2) of the directive, and exposed to significantly more stringent
regulations than the “old-new” plants or “existing” plants. Significant emission reductions
were required from “existing plants” that were licensed before 1 July 1987 via either the
national emission reduction plan (NERP) or meeting the emission limit values set for
“old-new” plants under article 4(1). Existing power stations (older than 1987) could “opt-
in” and be subject to lenient emission standards or “opt-out” and instead reduce their
operation hours and eventually shutdown by 2015.9 In the analysis that follows, I seek
to quantify the impact of emission rules on polluting behavior at the stack/plant level.
Tables 2.1 to 2.3 summarize the performance standards stated as emission limit values
for SO2, NOx, and particulates that were set to be achieved by January of 2008. The
regulation intensity for each controlled pollutants varied depending on whether the plant
would be eventually subject to article 4(1) or article 4(2) of the directive. As evident
from the tables, new combustion plants regulated under article 4(2) have considerably
6Directive on limitation of emissions of certain pollutants in to the air from large combustion plants,
88/609/EEC, Official Journal L336, 7.12.1988.
7Amending Directive 88/609/EEC on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air
from large combustion plants, 94/66/EC, Official Journal L337, 24.12.1994.
8Directive on limitation of emissions of certain pollutants in to the air from large combustion plants,
94/66/EC, Official Journal L309, 27.11.2001.
9Note that there were comparable national programs (e.g. GFA-VO 1983 in Germany, and Dutch
Bees WLV 1987 in Netherlands) in place, before the EU level LCP directive. I do not expect these older
policies to bias the results as I have no reason to believe that they affect article 4-1 and article 4-1 plants
differentially post-2007.
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tighter emission limit values (stricter compliance standards) than do older plants under
article 4(1). Moreover, these performance standards varied by the type of fuel input (e.g.
solid, liquid, or gaseous) and capacity of the plant as measured by thermal megawatt
(MWth) input.
It is important to note that the directive applied not only to the electricity and heating
sectors, but all thermal generation from large combustion units, irrespective of the sector.
This included, as a result, firms in the iron, steel, paper, sugar, chemicals, and rubber
sectors generating power and heat onsite.
2.3.2 Potential Compliance Mechanisms
To comply with the directive, plant operators have a number of compliance options. In
order to reduce emissions intensity, there could be (1) a change in the fuel-mix used, e.g.
increase the share of emission compliant fuels like natural gas, (2) installing and using
pollutant abatement technology - e.g. retrofitting the plant with scrubber technology
designed for each pollutant type to clean the flue gases, (3) increases in operational or
fuel efficiency, (4) closure of non-compliant units or a change in the merit order (e.g.
temporary production status or peak-use only). In the analysis, I find some evidence
on what share of the compliance mechanism for old plants could be attributed to fuel-
switching.
2.3.3 NEC targets & 2008
During the same (observable) regulation period, the European Parliament set national
emission ceilings (NEC) for absolute emissions in kilotonnes for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, volatile organic compounds and ammonia for each of 15 EU member states10.
These targets were to be achieved between 1990 and 2010. However, these emissions
targets were not sector-specific: that is, they could have been achieved cumulatively
by reductions in the transport, agriculture, waste, commercial, energy production, and
industrial sectors.
The analysis in this paper focuses only on the energy production and distribution sector,
so it is likely that the threat to identification due to the NEC targets is low. Nevertheless,
the reader may have residual concern that the NEC targets could bias the estimates for the
LCP directive. This may be true if I have reason to believe that the NEC targets affected
plants regulated under Articles 4(1) and 4(2) differentially. Similarly, NEC targets are
a concern if opt-out plants reacted differently from plants that chose to comply with
10Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the U.K.
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ELVs. I will seek to explain the impact of the LCP directive on stack-level emissions
concentrations rather than absolute emissions, so NEC targets should not be a concern.
Figure 2.2 shows that absolute emissions from the energy production and distribution
sector fell at a much higher rate in 2008 and 2009, likely due to the great recession. It is
all the more important therefore to focus the analysis on emissions intensity rather than
absolute emissions to correctly estimate the impact of the LCP directive. To allay still
any residual concerns, I will impose country-specific fixed effects on emissions intensity
to capture possible confounding effects of the NEC regulation targets and year-specific
fixed effects to pick up time-specific unobservable shocks that were common at all power
stations.
2.3.4 EU ETS
Generally, threats to identification exist if an event or unobservable factor affect emission
concentrations from plants in the selected treatment and controls groups in a systemati-
cally different way and I am unable to control for it. Take for example the EU ETS: all
thermal combustion plants regulated as a large combustion plant (of at least 50 MWth
capacity) under the directive were also regulated under the EU ETS, covering all instal-
lations generating electricity larger than 20 MWth. Presumably, all large combustion
plants considered in this paper received free emission allowances in the first two trading
periods, resulting in low compliance costs under the EU ETS.
Despite the ensuing low carbon-price environment, the carbon market could potentially
bias treatment estimates if the significant over-allocation of allowances distorted incen-
tives to abate co-pollutants regulated under the LCPD. Free allowances were based on
estimates of historical carbon emissions, which are strongly correlated with the size of
each installation or plant. To address any bias due to interactions with the EU ETS, I
condition on the size of the plant (MWth) in all specifications. Notwithstanding, both
treatment and control groups were subject to the EU ETS and the effect (if any) should
be differenced out in the empirical strategy.
Since the carbon trading market would most affect power generators using carbon-
intensive fuels, I further show that the treatment effects are largely driven by combustion
plants without any coal or lignite in the fuel mix in pre-treatment years. This an im-
portant result and should reassure the reader about the identification strategy – the EU
ETS is unlikely to confound the estimated effects of the LCP directive.
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2.3.5 IPPC Directive
The IPPC directive (Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996) is a major threat to
identifying the response of new plants to lower pollutant limits values or stricter emission
standards at the stack-level. This is because the IPPC directive required operating per-
mits in compliance with best available techniques, including the standards in the LCP
directive, for all new plants or those undergoing major changes starting 30 October 1999.
I therefore have strong reason to expect that the policy interaction between the LCP and
IPPC directives made it harder to avoid compliance with emission performance standards
under Article 4(1) or Article 4(2) for plants with operation dates starting 1999. I am
still interested in quantifying the effect of more stringent environmental standards under
Article 4(2) and will take anticipation into account in the research design.
Note that IPPC was not a requirement for units that started operating pre-1987 and
therefore older plants had no incentive to comply pre-deadline of 2008. Moving forward,
the Industrial Emissions Directive integrates the LCPD and the IPPC, along with other
directives, in one comprehensive regulation.
2.4 Data
The data on all large combustion activities come from the European Environment Agency
(EEA), which had started an inventory of reported emissions from large combustion plants
starting in 200411. This database covers all plants with a rated thermal input of at least
50 MW operating in the European Union, covering 27 countries in 2004 and reaching 29
countries by 2015. For each plant, the database reports detailed information on operations
including capacity, energy input, fuel input by type, emissions of local pollutants, date
plant started operations, and regulation status under the LCPD, including whether the
plant opted-out or was part of the NERP. In addition, the inventory also collects plant
identifiers (e.g. name, parent company, location, address) and also classifies the industrial
sector in which the plant operates12. There are six industry classifications provided:
Electricity Supply Industry, Combined Heat and Power, District Heating, Iron and Steel,
Refineries, and Other (Paper, Sugar, Chemicals, Rubber, etc). See Table 2.6 for the
industries covered.
11The databases were retrieved from one common public source, the EEA. Updated and improved
versions were published as new data from regulated countries became available, checks for inconsistencies
performed, and corrections were made (EEA 2016, EEA 2018a, and EEA 2018b).
12In the raw data there were many plants unidentified in terms of industry. I used reported information
online from the the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) to improve the precision
and coverage of the industry classification. There remain still combustion units for which the industrial
sector in unknown.
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The status of the plant under the LCP directive is central to the assessment of whether a
combustion plant is in compliance with the regulation. However, Germany and Sweden
do not report the regulation status of their combustion plants to the EEA. To circumvent
this lack of information, I impute the regulation status using the start date of operation.
Still, the information on the start date of operation is unavailable for all plants in the
sample, and therefore I am unable to use all available data for Germany and Sweden in
the estimations. Table 2.4 shows the breakdown of the number of plants by regulation
status in each EU country, including where unknown.
Note that there were no combustion units that opted-out of emission-rate standards
from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Croatia, Kosovo, Ireland,
Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, and Sweden. Due to lack of control plants, I exclude these
countries from the estimation sample when exploring the impact of emission standards
on units regulated under Articles 4-3 and 4-1. Table 2.5 shows the breakdown of plants
by regulation status for each member state with at least one opt-out combustion plant.
2.4.1 From Absolute Emissions to Emissions Intensity
The LCP regulation expresses the emission limit values in milligrams per cubic meter (mg
per Nm3). Since the EEA only provides absolute emissions of NOx, SO2, and particulate
matter, as reported by the plants, I convert tonnes emissions into flow rates (mg per Nm3).
For the dependent variable, I combine information on raw fuel usage (in petajoules) with
tonnes emissions to construct the outcome variable of interest, emissions intensity. To
do this I need estimates of the flue rates associated with specific fuel types. I start
with using flue rates assumptions provided in the study by Wynn et al. (2017). I check
whether the estimates are sensitive to assumptions involved in the calculation of the flue
rates and this is not the case. I also conduct sensitivity analysis by defining emissions
intensity as emissions divided by total fuel input - the results are strongly robust to this
and quantitative conclusions remain the same.
2.4.2 Historic Trends in Emissions Intensity
Figure 2.3 graphs the emissions intensity grouped by concentration intensity from very
high to low for all large combustion plants reported in the EEA database. Emissions
intensity of regulated pollutants were on a declining trend - the combustion activities
are cleaner in 2015 as compared to 2004. But I can also see that emission intensities
have not come down much further since 2012. The darkest grey area represents the share
of total capacity (measured by summing all plant-level MWth) that emitted pollutant
concentrations above the tightest standards for solid fuels in Article 4(2). The graphs
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show that close to a quarter of the system in 2015 was still emitting concentrations of
regulated local pollutants that are likely to not comply with even tighter standards in
the future (under the Industrial Emissions Directive).
The emission concentrations follow similar trends for NOx, SO2, and dust, including the
noticeable drop post-2007, same as the policy deadline for the LCP directive. Based on
such observations of trends, it is hard to know the cause of the correlated declines in
these key air pollutants concentrations.
2.4.3 Pre-treatment Statistics
Table 2.7 shows pre-treatment differences in means for the key variables between those
plants that opted-out versus those that chose to comply with emission limits under Article
4-3. and Article 4-1. The table suggests that on average opt-out plants were much larger
in size (as measured by MWth), used boilers to combust, and used more solid fuels
(excluding biomass) and liquid fuels as a share of the total energy input. On the other
hand, plants that chose to comply with the emission limit values were on average using
more gaseous fuels and biomass as a share of total energy input, and used gas turbine as
combustion type.
I will control for the size of the plant and construct emission intensity using information
on specific-fuel input and their associated flue rates. Using emissions intensity in mg/nM3
as the dependent variable will allow us to capture the differences in the fuel mixes. Fuel-
switching is one of the mechanisms using which plants seek to comply with emission-
performance standards. For this reason, I want to avoid controlling for time-varying
plant-level fuel input such as fuel type shares to avoid post-treatment bias. Nevertheless,
controlling for fuel input shares could inform us about how much of the compliance
mechanism adopted by plants was due to fuel-switching.
Table 2.8 presents pre-treatment differences in means for the key variables between plants
regulated under Article 4(1) Article 4(2). The variables shown appear to be similar in
distribution. Moreover, pre-treatment differences of these key variables are relatively
stable across years as well (not shown here).
2.5 Emissions Control Under Articles 4(3) and 4(1)
2.5.1 Research Design
In an ideal research setting I would have that the policy treatment was randomly assigned
to plants such that regulatory status was independent of all possible factors affecting
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plant-level emissions - this is not the case. Moreover, I do not have emissions data on
plants that were not regulated under the directive, i.e. all combustion plants with a
capacity less than 50MWth.
To construct plausible counterfactuals, I look in the implementation details of the regula-
tion across the set of plants under regulation. I take advantage of the variation across the
three vintage-differentiated regulatory arms of the directive to assess the impact of emis-
sion performance standards. To investigate the effect of EPS on EU combustion plants
(extensive margin), I use a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework. I treat plants that
opted-out as the control group and plants that chose to meet the emission-rates under
Article 4-3 and Article 4-1 as the treatment groups.
Note that the EPS under Article 4(3) are identical to those under Article 4(1). The
only difference is that Article 4(3) plants are older and could choose not to come under
performance standards - which were mandatory for Article 4(1) plants. The opt-out
decision is indeed endogenous and likely correlated with a plant’s emission trajectories.
Using the difference in difference framework, I seek to control with this endogeneity
concern. Moreover, this is likely not a serious problem given that emissions from opt-
out plants were monitored throughout – they were allowed to opt-out from pollution
abatement under the condition that emissions do not rise. To the extent that there may
be differences in monitoring and enforcement across industries and countries, I control
for this in the preferred specification.
The base specification is a DiD equation, which uses the reported emissions before the
policy deadline (2004 to 2007) for pre-treatment data. Preferred estimation equation is
the following:
ypt = αp + ηt + β0 Dpt + θct + γ ·Xpt + φit + λrc · (δrc × t) + εpt (2.1)
where I expect the regulation to be in effect during the period from 2008 to 2015 for
units subject to Articles 4(3) and 4(1). ypt is the log of emissions intensity at plant p in
year t. β captures the regulatory effect on emission concentrations at the stack level. All
time-invariant confounders that capture plant-level features such as plant vintage and
fuel-related combustion technology are captured by the plant-level fixed effects αp. ηt
absorbs year-specific shocks that are common across plants. θct and φit are country-year
and industry-year fixed effects respectively to control for time-varying unobservables. Xpt
includes time-varying control for plant size or capacity (GWth).
To account for the considerable heterogeneity (unevenness) in the implementation of the
LCPD policy across countries (for example, compliance stringency was left to the member
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states), I use regulation-specific linear trends (δrc×t) that are allowed to vary by country.
This is in addition to the country-specific fixed effects to allow for time-varying differences
in the policy environments across countries. Note that I do not control for fuel-type
shares in my preferred specification, because it would lead to post-treatment estimation
bias. This is because fuel-switching (e.g. substituting natural gas for other fossil-fuels,
particularly coal) is an important option for thermal operators to meet the requirements
of the LCP directive.
2.5.2 Identifying Assumptions
Here I will address the main identifying assumptions. Due to the fixed effects, the iden-
tification in the core empirical model comes from within-plant variation. For difference-
in-differences specifications, I require that the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
(SUTVA) is met: that the treatment status of a regulated unit p does not impact the
outcome of units other than p. Although it is in the operator’s interest to minimize cost of
operations, SUTVA could be violated if the parent company that owns multiple combus-
tion units chooses to retrofit all plants irrespective of regulation status13. The potential
biases due to such regulation spillovers can be signed. Namely, I provide lower-bounds of
the true impact of EPS under the LCP directive.
It is absolutely necessary that the control and treated groups have common trends in
emissions intensity, before the policy deadline. For us to interpret β as the causal effect
of emission performance standards, I require that the emissions intensity outcomes of
treated plants would have followed identical trends to those of the control plants in
absence of treatment. It is not possible to test this directly, but I provide graphs and
placebo tests to show that this condition is satisfied. Figure 2.4 demonstrates a favorable
pictures for pre-treatment trends in outcomes for opt-out plants versus those that chose
lenient emission limit values under Article 4(3) and Article 4(1). Note that these graphs
are limited to those member states that had opt-out plants.
2.5.3 Results - EPS for Article 4(3) Plants
I estimate the effect of emission-rate standards under Article 4(3) in Tables 2.9 to 2.11.
For identification I limit the sample to countries that had at any opt-out plants - I call
them opt-out member states. These are 17 EU countries, with a total of 241 plants opting
out of emission standards (see Table 2.5). I also exclude plants that were using a gas or
diesel engine because the LCP directive did not apply to them.
13I am unable to test the strength of SUTVA by comparing the performance of thermal plants that
are owned by the same firm, but are under different regulation regimes.
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Table 2.9 quantifies the average impact of ELV on emission-intensity of NOx at the
plant level. Column (1) is the simplest model, including only the interaction term of
interest (Post 2007)*(4-3 ELV), time and plant fixed effects, and size control using plant
capacity in GWth. Column (2) introduces industry by year fixed effects to capture any
developments that may be unique to the industry. From Columns (3) and (4), I can
see that the estimates for NOx are sensitive to the inclusion of any country-related fixed
effects or trends. This is not as apparent in Tables 2.10 and 2.11, where I run the same
models for SO2 and particulate matter. Columns (4) shows estimates of equation 2.1,
which is the preferred specification, and further controls for regulation-specific linear
trends that are common to each member state. In Table 2.9, I see a negative change in
NOx emission concentrations of about 11%, but the estimate is significant only at the
10% significance level.
To allay concerns that the differences in the distribution of covariates concerning fuel
usage are driving the results, I add fuel controls in Column 5. The difference in the
estimates from Columns 4 to 5 provide some indication of the importance of fuel-switching
for older plants due to the emission-rate standards. In Table 2.9, after controlling for fuel
input shares in Column 5, the coefficient on 4(3) ELV treatment is four percentage points
(or 38%) lower than in Column 4. And this estimate is no longer statistically significant
- suggesting that fuel-switching was on average a strong compliance mechanism for NOx
abatement, than say retrofitting.
In Tables 2.10 and 2.11, I find that emission rate standards prompted plants under Article
4-3 to reduce SO2 emission concentrations by close to 39% and dust concentrations by
26% relative to opt-out plants. Moreover, based on the differences between Columns 4
and 5, I can attribute about 30% of the reductions in SO2 concentrations and about 25%
of the reductions in dust concentrations to fuel-switching.
2.5.4 Effect Heterogeneity
In this subsection, I examine the heterogeneity in the causal impact. Specifically, I show
how the effect on emission concentrations varied with the size of the combustion plant
and whether the plant used any coal or lignite.
Combustion plants can be divided in size categories in terms of installed capacity: small
(less than 100 MWth), medium (101-300 MWth), large (301-500), and very large (larger
than 500 MWth). Along with fixed effects for capacity categories, I add additional
interaction terms to capture treatment effect differentials by size of combustion plant.
Table 2.12 shows convincingly that the large and very large combustion plants were
most responsive to the emission performance standards. Interestingly, we also estimates
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significant declines in SO2 concentrations for small- and medium-sized combustion plants.
These results are consistent with the fact that relatively larger plants, using dirtier fuels
in the total fuel-mix, faced stricter emission performance standards (see Tables 2.1, 2.2,
and 2.3).
To give a visual representation of the strongest effects, Figure 2.6 shows the temporal
disaggregation of the heterogeneity in treatment effects. Taken together, the graphs
show that the effect of the directive started in 2008 and was not transitory or limited
to specific years after the regulation went into effect. More crucially, the graphs provide
strong evidence that the directive was particularly effective for the subgroups of plants
that are most responsible for air pollution – very large combustion plants that dominate
with high levels of installed capacity.
I further investigate any heterogeneity in the effect of EPS on the subgroup of combustion
plants that had any coal or lignite in the total fuel-mix in the pre-treatment years of 2004
to 2007. Table 2.13 shows the results. Interestingly, I find strong evidence that the
response of coal power stations was muted, in comparison with combustion plants using
other fuel types.
2.5.5 Falsification Test
To conduct falsification tests, I use years 2006 and 2007 as hypothetical policy deadlines
for compliance to the LCP directive. I do not expect anticipation to play any significant
role for old plants complying with the emission standards: (1) because of high costs for
plant operators to retrofit older plants or enhance operational efficiency, and (2) because
IPPC was not a requirement for combustion units that started operating pre-1999 and
therefore majority of older plants had no incentive to comply before the 2008 compliance
deadline.
Since all plants regulated under Article 4(3) and most under Article did not have any
other regulatory requirements (e.g. in the IPPC directive), I assume away the possibility
of detecting anticipation prior to 2008. I consider therefore this to be a strong test for
common trends, in addition to the visual checks in Figure 2.4. I stick to the preferred
specification in equation 2.1 - the inclusion of fuel controls do not change the result - and
the results are presented in Table 2.14.
As expected, the estimated effects on plant-level emission concentrations before the com-
pliance deadline of 2008, for all three pollutants, are statistically insignificant. On the
other hand, estimates in the second row could be an indication that the response was
already taking effect after 2006 - inconclusive, however.
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2.5.6 Results - EPS for Article 4(1) Plants
I conduct the identical exercise to estimate the effect of emission-rate standards un-
der Article 4(1) in Table 2.15. Again, for identification I have limited the sample to
opt-out member states only. I find that combustion units regulated under Article 4(1)
were prompted to reduce SO2 emission intensity by 31% under the lenient performance
standards. For the other two pollutants under consideration, the effect was statistically
insignificant.
In contrast to the observed response by Article 4(3) seen in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 suggests
that the emission limits values under Article 4(1) were perhaps too lenient. This is not
surprising as I see in the right column of Figure 2.4, the combustion units were on average
already relatively clean in 2004. Imposing the same emission performance standards for
Article 4(3) and 4(1) plants seems to have fallen short of environmental progress on
emissions abatement.
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 give us assurance that the post-2007 treatment effects observed are
prompted by the emission performance standards under Articles 4(3) and 4(1), rather
than something else unobserved.
2.6 Emissions Control Under Article 4(2)
2.6.1 Research Design
Now I turn to estimating the effect of tighter emission limits imposed under the LCP
directive. I would like to identify the effect of tighter standards on new plants from the
change in emission intensities of Article 4(2) units compared with the change in emission
intensities of Article 4(1) units. I am unable to exploit the D-I-D framework applied thus
far because I expect anticipation to play a role for the following reasons:
• Plants getting operation permits after the LCP directive was announced in 2001
would be already aware of the emission standards required. If plant operators have
prior access to information on future compliance requirements and are reasonably
forward-looking - I expect them to invest early.
• New plants, as opposed to old existing plants, using newer combustion technology
would find it relatively cheaper to invest early (possibly also costly to delay).
• As discussed in Section 2.3.5, the IPPC directive required new units and those
undergoing “substantial changes” to meet technology standards starting 30 October
1999. I expect therefore plants starting operations after 1998 to be more forward-
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looking (less myopic) in adhering to EPS requirements.
Figure 2.5 shows that the requirement of common trends does not hold because trends
in emissions intensity of article 4(1) plants differ significantly from that of article 4(2)
plants during the pre-treatment period, most notably for NOx. In light of the policy
interaction between IPPC and LCP directives, I find it difficult to rule out anticipation
as one of the explanations for the significant declines in emission intensities of NOx and
SO2 by all plants affected by IPPC before the LCPD deadline - see the right column of
Figure 2.2.
To circumvent the problem of anticipation, I do the following:
• I assume that the regulation assignment rule was arbitrary (plants staring operation
after 2002 came under Article 4(2)) and that it was difficult for operators to “game
the system” or to expedite the issuance process of an operation permit. Given
this assumption, the regulation status for plants just before and after 2003 is as
good as random. Therefore, plants near the cutoff date are similar in unobservable
characteristics that affect emission concentrations at the stack-level. The closer to
the cutoff date, the stronger my identification assumption - although not rigorously
testable in this study. Nonetheless, I will control for all possible observable time-
varying plant-level characteristics and also impose combustion type fixed effects.
• I do not impose any policy deadline for compliance with emission standards in this
setting. I compare the performance of the treated versus control plants during the
full observed period from 2004 to 2015.
I estimate the following equation for plants near the cutoff date of 2003:
ypt = α0 + βSp + γ ·Xpt + λm + θct + φit + εpt (2.2)
where ypt is the log emission intensity of pollutant of interest. Sp = 1 indicates whether
the plant came under stringent EPS under Article 4(2). The base category is EPS under
Article 4(1). Xpt captures plant-level operations such as fuel input shares by fuel type
and plant capacity in GWth. ηm are fixed effects for combustion type. θct and φit country
and industry fixed effects allowed to vary by year.
2.6.2 Results
Tables 2.16, 2.17, and 2.18 estimate equation 2.2 for emission intensities of NOx, ceSO2,
and dust respectively. I use plants that started operations either 2003 and 2004 as the
treated group. Columns (1) and (2) use all plants that started operations 1999 to 2002
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as the control group, while Columns (3) and (4) limits the control group further to only
those with 2000 and 2001 as operation start-dates.
Relative to emission limits values under 4(1), stricter emission performance standards
caused average NOx concentrations to drop further between 7-16%, SO2 concentrations
to fall by 27-28%, and dust concentrations by 30-40%. These results are robust to re-
defining emission intensity as kilotonnes of emissions per petajoule of input do not change
the results.
2.7 Further Robustness Checks
Here I address the possibility that results discussed in the previous sections are due to
another factor that I may have not considered.
2.7.1 Alternative Treatment and Control Groups
It is important to show that the results are robust to alternative treatment and control
groups. The reader might be worried that it is simply that newer plants are cleaner than
the older ones - that a remaining confounding factor might be newer technology. I expect
that plant vintage or time-invariant fuel-technology should be captured by the plant-fixed
effects and time variables already. Nevertheless, I rerun the estimations using Article 4-1
as the treatment regulation, and for the control group I use Article 4-3 plants that chose
to comply with Article 4-1 standards. Both groups were subject to identical emission
limit values. Then the difference between these two groups should not be the regulation,
but rather improvements in technology over time. Once I control for plant-fixed effects,
I do not expect to find Article 4(1) plants to respond on average more than those under
Article 4(3) - especially since Article 4(1) plants were already on average cleaner than
the older plants. Table 2.19 confirms this and demonstrates that there are no significant
differences in emission intensities of local pollutants between the treatment and control
groups. These results provide further assurance that I am correctly attributing the effects
I find to emission performance standards under the LCP directive.
2.8 Shutdown of Grandfathered Plants
In this section I will explore whether the old and dirty opt-out plants were “grandfathered”
under the LCP directive. Under Article 4(3), opt-out plants avoided environmental stan-
dards, but were supposed to limit operating hours to 20,000 and close by the end of 2015.
Did this happen?
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Table 2.20 shows that a large share of the 241 opt-out plants did not actually close down
by the initial required date of 2015. I still observed 60% of the combustion units operat-
ing in 2016. More interestingly, I observe that plants which were subject to emission-rate
standards were shutting down in large numbers during the same period. About 82 com-
bustion units under Article 4(3) that chose to comply with emission standards were closed
by the end of 2007. Generally, I observe a high number of Article 4(3) ELV plants closing
operations in the LCPD policy-active period.
A natural question arises: did the LCP directive indeed promise the closure of opt-out
plants or did it offer non-compliant plants a perverse incentive to continue dirty operations
relative to those complying with ELV? I investigate the determinants of the (endogenous)
shutdown decision using the full EEA dataset in a linear probability model:
shutdownpt = α0 + α34(3)p + α14(1)p + α24(2)p + γX ·Xpt + λm + θct + φit + εpt (2.3)
where 4(3)p = 1, 4(1)p = 1, and 4(2)p = 1 indicate that the combustion unit was subject
to EPS under Articles 4(3), 4(1), and 4(2) respectively. Here the base category is opt-out
status under Article 4(3). Xpt capture a host of plant-level operations and outcomes such
as fuel input shares by fuel type, emissions intensities of NOx, SO2, particulate matter,
whether the plant was part of NERP, and plant capacity in GWth and absolute energy
input in petajoules. ηm are fixed effects for combustion type. θct and φit country and
industry fixed effects allowed to vary by year. shutdownpt is a binary (0 or 1) dependent
variable indicating whether the plant closed at the end of the reporting year. I assume
that the plant was shutdown if I do not observe it the next reporting year.
I estimate this linear probability model by ordinary least squares in Table 2.21 for both
the full sample and then again limiting the estimation sample to only opt-out member
states. The results reveal that opt-out plants were more likely to shutdown during the
policy period than newer combustion plants complying to emission rate standards under
Article 4(1) and 4(2). But surprisingly opt-out plants did not close more often than those
of similar age under Article 4(3). Given the estimates are stable across the two samples,
I have confidence about the robustness of the qualitative findings. I find evidence in this
section that the LCP directive “grandfathered” the oldest and dirtiest power stations and
allowed them to keep running over the long run.
2.9 Conclusion
Effective pollution control in the complex regulatory context of the European Union is
an important policy objective. The Large Combustion Plant Directive was a major EU
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environmental policy. This paper offers the first impact assessment of this policy and uses
micro data for the full population of regulated large combustion plants to estimate causal
changes in emissions intensity at the plant-level. I evaluate whether the policy instrument
succeeded in pollution control by the oldest thermal power generators and whether stricter
emission standards were a significant catalyst for improved environmental performance.
I use combustion plants that opted-out of lenient emission limit values as the counterfac-
tual and demonstrate that older units under Article 4-3 (licensed before 1987) complying
with emission performance standards responded with significantly cleaner emission con-
centrations post compliance-deadline. The results are strongest for SO2 and total PM
concentrations, but also hold for NOx for larger combustion plants. Moreover, emission
performance standards imposed on newer units (under Article 4-1, licensed after 1987
and before 2002) did not react as much as older units - most likely, because the standards
imposed were too lenient.
Given the policy interaction between the LCP directive and the IPPC directive, which
required new units and those undergoing “substantial changes” to meet technology stan-
dards starting 30 October 1999, I have strong priors that combustion plants with op-
eration permits starting 1999 were not as myopic in complying with the directive. To
evaluate the effect of tighter emission performance standards under Article 4-2 on new
plants I take this policy interaction between the LCP and IPPC directives and limit the
estimation sample to those combustion plants that started operation after 1998. Then I
measure the change in emissions intensity of new plants licensed just after 2002 relative
to those licensed just before 2002 - allowing us to estimate the local treatment effect near
the applicable cut-off date for tighter emission limits values. The result indicate that
tighter standards applied to new plants had an economically meaningful impact on all
measures of local pollutant emission concentrations.
The results are robust to a range of specifications and falsification tests, so that I can
be confident that I am accurately attributing the findings to variations in emission limits
values under the Large Combustion Plant directive. Taken together, evidence from this
empirical study suggests that EU-wide emission performance standards, when sufficiently
stringent, are an effective instrument for pollution abatement at the plant stack-level.
Whether the LCP directive, written as a vintage-differentiated regulation, created a per-
verse incentive for older power stations to continue highly polluting operations remains
an empirical question, however.
A uniform policy with respect to plant vintage is more likely to encourage investment
by incumbents towards cleaner equipment earlier in the regulation period. The “grandfa-
thering” convention was partially present in the LCP directive, because it allowed a large
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share of older installations to continue operations without requiring stringent emission-
rate standards. Although politically more feasible, this had the potential to worsens pol-
lution over the longer-run by encouraging the operation of power stations that are older
and dirtier. Those that opted out of emission rate standards and eventually shutdown by
the end of 2015 were more likely to be coal and lignite power plants. Furthermore, these
plants were not more likely to shutdown (as intended by the Article 4(3) requirements)
than similar plants that chose to comply with standards. This gives us some evidence that
the LCP directive gave rise to the “old-plant” effect, deferring plant shutdowns or replace-
ments that would otherwise be important for environment protection. Crucially, positive
emissions during the increased lifespan of these older plants may have more than offset
the increase in pollution abatement from plants complying with emission performance
standards.
Given that I find that plants under Article 4(1) did not respond significantly to the Large
Combustion Plant Directive, future research should investigate whether the additional
requirements and more stringent standards under the Industrial Emissions Directive en-
couraged these existing plants to reduce emissions concentrations further or shutdown.
To maximize pollution abatement, limits on emission intensities should be uniformly ap-
plied and sufficiently stringent for all regulated units to protect public health and the
environment.
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Figure 2.1: Licensing Date and Plant Status under the LCP Directive
Notes: Own illustration.
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(e) PM10 emissions in Western EU (f) PM10 emissions in Eastern EU
Notes: Data come from the air emission inventories (EEA, Eurostat), which provides annual data on air pollutants
by source sector. The figures plot the trends in absolute emissions from the energy production and distribution sector.
Eastern EU region consists of Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Estonia, Malta, Latvia. Western EU region consists of the remaining 16 EU countries. The vertical black line is to mark
year 2008.
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All LCP: Dust concentrations
Notes: The graphs show the emissions intensity grouped by concentration intensity from very high to low for all EU
large combustion plants reported in the EEA database.
38
Table 2.1: Emission Limit Values for SO2 by Regulation Status under LCPD
Size of the Plant (MWth)
50 - 100 100 - 300 > 300
Under article 4(1) 4(2) 4(1) 4(2) 4(1) 4(2)
Solid Fuels 2000 850 2000 to 400 200 400 200
(linear decline)
Liquid Fuels 1700 850 1700 to 400 400 to 200 400 200
(linear decline) (linear decline)
Biomass n.a. 200 n.a. 200 n.a. 200
Gaseous Fuels in general 35 35 35 35 35 35
Liquefied Gas 5 5 5 5 5 5
Low calorific gas from coke oven 800 400 800 400 800 400
Low calorific gas from blast furnace 800 200 800 200 800 200
Notes: The emission limit values are expressed in milligrams per normal cubic meter (mg/Nm3).
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Table 2.2: Emission Limit Values for NOx by Regulation Status under LCPD
Under article 4(1) Size of the Plant (MWth)
50 - 500 > 500
Solid Fuels 600 500
Liquid Fuels 450 400
Gaseous Fuels in general 300 200
Under article 4(2) Size of the Plant (MWth)
50 - 100 100 - 300 > 300
Solid Fuels 400 300 200
Liquid Fuels 400 200 200
Natural gas 150 150 100
Other gas 200 200 200
Biomass 400 300 200
Notes: The emission limit values are expressed in milligrams per normal cubic meter (mg/Nm3).
Table 2.3: Emission Limit Values for Particle Dust by Regulation Status under LCPD
Under article 4(1) Size of the Plant (MWth)
< 500 ≥ 500
Solid Fuels 100 50
Liquid Fuels 50 50
Gaseous Fuels
general rule 5
blast furnace gas 10
gases produced by steel industry 50
Under article 4(2) Size of the Plant (MWth)
50 to 100 > 100
Solid Fuels 50 30
Liquid Fuels 50 30
Gaseous Fuels
general rule 5
blast furnace gas 10
gases produced by steel industry 30
Notes: The emission limit values are expressed in milligrams per normal cubic meter (mg/Nm3).
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Table 2.4: Regulation Status by All Member States
4-3 Opt out 4-3 ELV 4-1 ELV 4-2 ELV Unknown Total
Austria 0 58 42 29 28 157
Belgium 3 72 35 33 4 147
Bulgaria 3 27 0 1 3 34
Cyprus 7 4 11 3 0 25
Czech Republic 0 93 26 3 7 129
Germany 0 315 197 59 228 797
Denmark 2 59 53 17 21 152
Estonia 3 12 1 8 2 26
Spain 23 73 30 129 4 259
Finland 23 106 61 44 9 243
France 29 134 85 54 53 355
Greece 4 34 15 27 0 80
Croatia 0 15 3 2 0 20
Hungary 0 31 11 19 9 70
Ireland 0 17 10 8 3 38
Italy 20 176 178 156 66 596
Lithuania 0 29 3 3 12 47
Luxembourg 0 0 1 0 0 1
Latvia 0 23 1 13 6 43
Malta 4 0 6 1 0 11
Netherlands 0 106 81 45 36 268
Poland 39 50 10 12 26 137
Portugal 6 9 13 20 2 50
Romania 41 116 13 15 8 193
Sweden 0 76 21 8 129 234
Slovenia 5 9 2 3 0 19
Slovakia 11 40 26 14 0 91
United Kingdom 18 207 182 60 27 494
Kosovo 0 5 0 0 0 5
Total 241 1896 1117 786 683 4721
Notes: The table shows the number of plants regulated under each regulation arm of the LCPD.
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Table 2.5: Regulation Status by Opt-Out Member States
4-3 Opt out 4-3 ELV 4-1 ELV 4-2 ELV Closed by 2015
Belgium 3 72 35 33 3
Bulgaria 3 27 0 1 1
Cyprus 7 4 11 3 1
Denmark 2 59 53 17 1
Estonia 3 12 1 8 2
Spain 23 73 30 129 0
Finland 23 106 61 44 21
France 29 134 85 54 11
Greece 4 34 15 27 0
Italy 20 176 178 156 14
Malta 4 0 6 1 4
Poland 39 50 10 12 7
Portugal 6 9 13 20 6
Romania 41 116 13 15 0
Slovenia 5 9 2 3 0
Slovakia 11 40 26 14 8
United Kingdom 18 207 182 60 16
Total 241 1128 721 597 95
Notes: The table shows the number of plants under each status category.
The last column identifies the number of opt-out plants that shutdown by 2015.
I assume that plant operations were closed, if I do not observe the plant in 2016.
Table 2.6: Distribution of EU Combustion Plants by Industry









Notes: The table shows the number of plants observed in each industrial sector
from 2004 to 2015, provided the regulation status is known.
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Table 2.7: Summary Statistics of Key Plant Features - Opt Out MS
Regulation Status
Article 4(3) - Opt out Article 4(3) - ELV Article 4(1) - ELV
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Size (MWth) 719.87 1140.92 50 7889 465.36 938.55 0 12600 328.99 471.14 0 5500
Energy Input (pt) 7.14 14.40 0 122.71 6.53 17.56 0 280.97 5.58 9.61 0 92.69
Solid Fuel % 41.66 47.07 0 100 25.14 41.25 0 100 10.83 29.13 0 100
Liquid Fuel % 34.16 44.88 0 100 23.65 36.15 0 100 12.65 29.93 0 100
Natural Gas % 20.62 37.20 0 100 35.28 44.41 0 100 62.83 46.47 0 100
Other Gases % 3.07 15.10 0 100 13.51 28.93 0 100 8.87 25.93 0 100
Biomass % 0.50 2.78 0 30.56 2.43 12.78 0 99.86 4.83 18.80 0 100
Boiler 0.78 0.42 0 1 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.37 0.48 0 1
Gas Turbine 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.51 0.50 0 1
Notes: The table reports average values from pre-treatment years (2004 - 2007)
and the sample is limited to opt-out member states.
Table 2.8: Summary Statistics of Key Plant Features - All EU28
Regulation Status
Article 4(1) - ELV Article 4(2) - ELV
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Size (MWth) 324.71 486.09 0 5500 391.95 369.12 0 2400
Energy Input (pt) 5.26 9.76 0 121.25 5.52 6.63 0 38.99
Solid Fuel % 12.53 31.43 0 100 5.90 20.79 0 100
Liquid Fuel % 10.94 28.27 0 100 10.91 29.28 0 100
Natural Gas % 61.08 46.83 0 100 71.27 43.80 0 100
Other Gases % 11.24 29.67 0 100 5.42 21.10 0 100
Biomass % 4.20 17.84 0 100 6.50 21.82 0 100
Boiler 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
Gas Turbine 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.57 0.50 0 1
Notes: The table reports average values from pre-treatment years (2004 - 2007).
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(e) Dust - Opt Out MS (f) Dust - Opt Out MS
Notes: The LHS column plots the trends in emission intensities from Article 4(3) plants against opt-out combustion
plants. The RHS column plots the trends in emission intensities from Article 4(1) plants against opt-out combustion plants.
The samples are limited to those countries with opt-out combustion plants.
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Notes: The RHS column plots emission intensities for all plants that starting operating after 1998. The RHS sample
gets limited to those combustion units for which I have information on the operation date. LHS plots the trends for all
large combustion plants in the full database and reveal similar trend differences between 4(1) ELV and 4(2) ELV plants.
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Table 2.9: Effect on NOx of EPS Under Article 4(3) Regulation
Dependent variable: ln (NOx)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Post 2007)*(4-3 ELVs) -0.110*** -0.105*** -0.072 -0.105* -0.065
(0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.058) (0.052)
Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fuel Control Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regulation-Country Specific Trend Yes Yes
N 11,361 11,361 11,361 11,361 11,361
R2 0.7636 0.7664 0.7764 0.7774 0.8193
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM3). I use the date of starting
operation to impute the regulation status of DE and SE combustion plants. The sample is limited to EU
countries with opt-out plants under Article 4(3). Combustion plants that were licensed post-January
1987 are not included in the analysis. I also exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size
control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass,
liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). The total number of clusters/plants used in estimation were
1283. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.10: Effect on SO2 of EPS Under Article 4(3) Regulation
Dependent variable: ln (SO2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Post 2007)*(4-3 ELV) -0.270** -0.289** -0.218* -0.394*** -0.276***
(0.113) (0.117) (0.122) (0.104) (0.083)
Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fuel Control Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regulation-Country Specific Trend Yes Yes
N 9,765 9,765 9,765 9,765 9,765
R2 0.8606 0.8642 0.8725 0.8737 0.9140
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM3). I use the date of starting
operation to impute the regulation status of DE and SE combustion plants. The sample is limited to EU
countries with opt-out plants under Article 4(3). Combustion plants that were licensed post-January
1987 are not included in the analysis. I also exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size
control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass,
liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). The total number of clusters/plants used in estimation were
1170. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11: Effect on Dust of EPS Under Article 4(3) Regulation
Dependent variable: ln (Dust)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Post 2007)*(4-3 ELV) -0.319*** -0.258*** -0.240*** -0.256** -0.192**
(0.087) (0.088) (0.086) (0.103) (0.089)
Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fuel Control Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regulation-Country Specific Trend Yes Yes
N 9,274 9,274 9,274 9,274 9,274
R2 0.7945 0.7980 0.8104 0.8117 0.8481
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM3). I use the date of starting
operation to impute the regulation status of DE and SE combustion plants. The sample is limited to EU
countries with opt-out plants under Article 4(3). Combustion plants that were licensed post-January
1987 are not included in the analysis. I also exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size
control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass,
liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). The total number of clusters/plants used in estimation were
1107. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12: Heterogeneity by Size of Plant
Dependent variable: ln (mg/nM3)
NOx SO2 Dust
(Treatment)*(MWth< 100) -0.0588 -0.362** -0.102
(0.0716) (0.159) (0.138)
(Treatment)*(100 ≤MWth< 300) -0.0385 -0.342*** -0.150
(0.0652) (0.130) (0.121)
(Treatment)*(300 ≤MWth< 500) -0.124* -0.473*** -0.261*
(0.0729) (0.163) (0.138)
(Treatment)*(500 ≤MWth) -0.173*** -0.390*** -0.371***
(0.0639) (0.130) (0.120)
N 11,361 9,765 9,274
Adj R2 0.746 0.853 0.782
Notes: Table reports coefficients on the interaction terms with size capacity classes of combustion
plants. The regressions include control for MWth, fixed effects for capacity class, plant, year, industry
by year, country by year, and linear time trends for regulatory differences between countries. The
dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM3). The sample is limited to EU countries
with opt-out plants under Article 4(3). Combustion plants that were licensed post-January 1987 are
not included in the analysis. I exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Treatment is
defined as (Post 2007)*(4-3 ELV). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level for all
regressions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.13: Coal Power Stations
Dependent variable: ln (mg/nM3)
NOx SO2 Dust
(Treatment)*(Other) -0.0876 -0.632*** -0.314***
(0.0583) (0.129) (0.120)
(Treatment)*(Solid Fuel) -0.0992 -0.160 -0.204*
(0.0631) (0.117) (0.112)
N 10,513 9,057 8,723
Adj R2 0.754 0.853 0.784
Notes: Table reports coefficients on the interaction terms with an indicator for whether the observed
combustion plant used any solid fuel (mainly coal) in the total fuel mix before 2008. The regressions
include control for MWth, fixed effects for capacity class, plant, year, industry by year, country by year,
and linear time trends for regulatory differences between countries. The dependent variable is the log of
emissions intensity (mg/nM3). The sample is limited to EU countries with opt-out plants under Article
4(3). Combustion plants that were licensed post-January 1987 are not included in the analysis. I exclude
plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Treatment is defined as (Post 2007)*(4-3 ELV). Standard er-
rors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Effect of Article 4(3) on Dust Intensity
Notes: In this figure, I disaggregate the ATT to shows how pollution concentrations of treated versus control combus-
tion plants evolved for plants with thermal capacity greater than 300 MWth. 2007 is the reference year, the year before
the LCPD went into effect. The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM3). All regressions included
a control for MWth capacity and fixed effects for plant and year. 95% confidence intervals provided and standard errors
were clustered at the plant level.
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Table 2.14: Effects of EPS Under Article 4(3) Regulation - All Pollutants
Dependent variable: ln (mg/nM3)
NOx SO2 Dust NOx SO2 Dust NOx SO2 Dust
(Post 2007)*(4-3 ELV) -0.105* -0.394*** -0.256**
(0.058) (0.104) (0.103)
(Post 2006)*(4-3 ELV) -0.073 -0.133 -0.118
(0.061) (0.115) (0.110)
(Post 2005)*(4-3 ELV) -0.003 -0.032 0.022
(0.046) (0.104) (0.100)
N 11,361 9,765 9,274 11,361 9,765 9,274 11,361 9,765 9,274
R2 0.7774 0.8737 0.8117 0.7774 0.8735 0.8116 0.7773 0.0.8735 0.8116
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM3). All regressions included
a control of size and fixed effects for plant, year, industry-by-year, country-by-year, and regulation-by-
country linear time trends. I use the date of starting operation to impute the regulation status of DE
and SE combustion plants. The sample is limited to EU countries with opt-out plants under Article
4(3). Combustion plants that were licensed post-January 1987 are not included in the analysis. I exclude
plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls
include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Standard er-
rors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.15: Effects of EPS Under Article 4(1) Regulation - All Pollutants
Dependent variable: ln (mg/nM3)
NOx SO2 Dust NOx SO2 Dust NOx SO2 Dust
(Post 2007)*(4-1 ELV) -0.045 -0.307** -0.176
(0.068) (0.124) (0.126)
(Post 2006)*(4-1 ELV) -0.097 -0.197 0.026
(0.083) (0.138) (0.138)
(Post 2005)*(4-1 ELV) -0.045 -0.054 0.109
(0.062) (0.123) (0.130)
N 8,196 5,932 5,545 8,196 5,932 5,545 8,196 5,932 5,545
R2 0.7563 0.9058 0.8548 0.7564 0.9058 0.8547 0.7563 0.9058 0.8548
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM3). All regressions
included a control of size and fixed effects for plant, year, industry-by-year, country-by-year, and
regulation-by-country linear time trends. I use the date of starting operation to impute the regulation
status of DE and SE combustion plants. The sample is limited to EU countries with opt-out plants
under Article 4(3). I exclude plants that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of
the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and
natural gas (%). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level for all regressions. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.16: Effect of Article 4(2) versus Article 4(1) Regulation on NOx
Plants Affected by IPPC
Dependent variable: ln (NOx)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
kt/pt mg/nM3 kt/pt mg/nM3
1999-2004 1999-2004 2001-2004 2001-2004
4(2) ELV -0.162*** -0.160*** -0.070* -0.066
(0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042)
Fuel Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Combustion FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4(2) Treated Plants 130 130 130 130
4(1) Control Plants 240 240 103 103
No. of Clusters 213 213 177 177
N 3,525 3,525 2,183 2,183
R2 0.3584 0.5482 0.4167 0.6295
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity, defined either as emissions per
energy input unit (kilotonnes per petajoule) or mg/nM3. I exclude plants that were using a gas or
diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share
of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Combustion FE are capturing the type of
combustion plant (boiler, gas turbine, furnace, etc). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
country-by-year level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.17: Effect of Article 4(2) versus Article 4(1) Regulation on SO2
Plants Affected by IPPC
Dependent variable: ln (SO2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
kt/pt mg/nM3 kt/pt mg/nM3
1999-2004 1999-2004 2001-2004 2001-2004
4(2) ELV -0.276** -0.273** -0.284** -0.278**
(0.115) (0.115) (0.123) (0.123)
Fuel Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Combustion FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4(2) Treated Plants 104 104 104 104
4(1) Control Plants 204 204 88 88
No. of Clusters 201 201 144 144
N 2,412 2,412 1,489 1,489
R2 0.6312 0.6906 0.5738 0.6474
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity, defined either as emissions per
energy input unit (kilotonnes per petajoule) or mg/nM3. I exclude plants that were using a gas or
diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share
of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Combustion FE are capturing the type of
combustion plant (boiler, gas turbine, furnace, etc). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
country-by-year level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.18: Effect of Article 4(2) versus Article 4(1) Regulation on Dust
Plants Affected by IPPC
Dependent variable: ln (Dust)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
kt/pt mg/nM3 kt/pt mg/nM3
1999-2004 1999-2004 2001-2004 2001-2004
4(2) ELV -0.309*** -0.305*** -0.409*** -0.403***
(0.107) (0.106) (0.110) (0.109)
Fuel Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Combustion FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4(2) Treated Plants 94 94 94 94
4(1) Control Plants 191 191 82 82
No. of Clusters 196 196 149 149
N 2,116 2,116 1,297 1,297
R2 0.5127 0.6017 0.5157 0.6112
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity, defined either as emissions per
energy input unit (kilotonnes per petajoule) or mg/nM3. I exclude plants that were using a gas or
diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls include the fuel input share
of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Combustion FE are capturing the type of
combustion plant (boiler, gas turbine, furnace, etc). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
country-by-year level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.19: Alternative Treatment (Article 4-1) and Control Group (Article 4-3)
Robustness Check
Dependent variable: ln (mg/nM3)
NOx SO2 Dust
(Post 2007)*(ELV) 0.014 0.009 0.060 0.054 0.089 0.073
(0.034) (0.033) (0.077) (0.069) (0.072) (0.069)
Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fuel Control Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulation-Country Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 27,253 27,253 20,688 20,688 19,632 19,632
R2 0.7326 0.7587 0.8835 0.9127 0.8313 0.8534
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of emissions intensity (mg/nM3). I use the date of
starting operation to impute the regulation status of DE and SE combustion plants. I exclude plants
that were using a gas or diesel engine. Size control is the size of the plant in GWth. Fuel controls
include the fuel input share of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Standard er-
rors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.20: Plant Shutdowns by Last Reporting Year
Shutdown Year 4(3) Optout 4(3) ELV 4(1) ELV 4(2) ELV
2004 0 4 0 0
2005 0 6 0 0
2006 0 5 0 0
2007 0 82 15 8
2008 3 44 22 21
2009 9 47 9 8
2010 3 34 9 2
2011 4 27 9 1
2012 10 59 32 14
2013 19 66 30 7
2014 11 45 15 8
2015 35 134 62 40
Total 95 553 203 109
Notes: The table shows the number of plant shutdowns by regulation status.
I assume that plant was shutdown, if it was not reported to the EEA the next year.
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Table 2.21: Were Opt-out Plants More Likely to Shutdown?
Linear Probability Model
Dependent variable: Shutdown
(1) - All EU (2) - Optout MS
Article 4(3) -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Article 4(1) -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Article 4(2) -0.013*** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004)
Opt Out Omitted Omitted
Fuel Controls Yes Yes
Emissions Intensity Yes Yes
NERP Yes Yes
Operation Controls Yes Yes
Combustion FE Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes




Notes: This table reports estimates of Equation 2.2. The dependent variable is a binary variable (1
or 0) indicating whether the plant was closed by the end of the reporting year. I assume that plant was
shutdown, if it was not reported to the EEA the next year. Operation controls consist of the size of
the plant in GWth and absolute energy input in petajoules. Fuel controls include the fuel input share
of solid, biomass, liquid, other gases, and natural gas (%). Emissions intensity controls for emission
intensities of the three local pollutants considered in this paper. NERP is a dummy variable if the
plant was part of the National Emission Reduction Plan. Combustion FE are capturing the type of
combustion plant (boiler, gas turbine, furnace, etc). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
plant level for all regressions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
Inform Me When It Matters: Cost
Salience, Energy Consumption, and
Efficiency Investments
3.1 Introduction
Behavioural economic theory challenges standard assumptions that agents are fully atten-
tive to information when making economic decisions (DellaVigna, 2009). For boundedly
rational agents, the value of information may depend on when it is delivered to the deci-
sion maker. This is because the agent receiving the information has limited and varying
degrees of attention – a scarce resource.
A number of studies confirm the theoretical prediction of consumer inattention – con-
sumers react less to information that is relatively less salient. Effective attention to
information may simply be a function of receiving timely information when making the
consumption choices. Chetty et al. (2009) show using a field experiment that tax-inclusive
prices at the grocery store induced a stronger behavioral response than sales tax added at
the register. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that investor response to information on
stock earnings is stronger when the announcements are received during the weekday, when
attention is more likely. Empirical work demonstrates that automated payment technol-
ogy reduces price salience when agents do not need to view costs or prices, whether it
is during payment of road tolls (Finkelstein, 2009) or monthly electricity bills (Sexton,
2015). Consumers become less price elastic or do not perceive the full cost of consump-
tion, leading to an increase in consumption.
In the field of environmental economics, providing consumers real-time information on
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usage and prices has been shown to significantly reduce electricity and water demand
(Jessoe and Rapson 2014, Pon 2017, Tiefenbeck et al. 2018). But does more frequent
information have long-lasting effects and when or for whom is it more effective? Prest
(2020) demonstrates using machine learning methods that consumer awareness is most
predictive of heterogeneous demand response to time-of-use prices displayed on in-home
monitors. In the intermittent billing context, Wichman (2017) evaluates the response of
water use in response to an increase in the frequency of billing information (bi-monthly
to monthly) and finds that the intervention was ineffectual for inattentive consumers. In
contrast, more frequent billing improved the transparency of costs and increased con-
sumption for large water users during the summer. Even with routine monthly billing
for electricity consumption, Gilbert and Zivin (2014) show that households alter con-
sumption behaviour significantly only in the first week after the bill arrives and that this
response is stronger during the hotter months, when consumption is likely higher. These
studies demonstrate that the effectiveness of information treatments is largely driven by
high baseline users, during peak consumption periods, when usage costs are most salient.
Given that salience of information plays a prominent role in consumer attention to energy
costs, I consider in this paper whether the timing of bills is a factor in determining heat
energy demand by households. More specifically, I investigate the effect of (not) receiving
billing information when it matters the most for heat energy demand – during the heating
season. The delivery of heating bills in Germany is relatively unique compared to that
in other countries. Households receive energy bills once a year, as opposed to quarterly
or monthly, with information on annual usage, prices, and charges1. Moreover, the 12-
month billing period varies from building to building – that is, the closing date for billing
(meter reading date) is not always the end of December2.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first in the literature to exploit the unique natural
experiment in billing cycles to understand whether heat demand reacts to salience of
information (consumption, costs of energy, and payment settlement) on energy bills. For
households receiving heating bills during the summer or low usage months, misperceptions
of the true cost of heating energy are likely to be higher when winter comes along and
1The consumer makes monthly advance payments (in equal installments, called “Abschlag”) towards
the annual bill. At the end of the billing period, each consumer then receives an individualized-
consumption bill (since 1981 due to the Heat Cost Ordinance), a summary invoice with the actual
consumption and costs, along with the final sum to be refunded or due as payment after factoring in the
advance payments.
2The beginning or the end of the billing period largely depends on the type of energy with which
the billable building is heated. The distinction comes from whether the heating fuel is supplied directly
by a utility company or bought by the owner of the building. Thus, the billing cycle of the building is
determined by the purchase cycle of the owner (for oil, wood, pellets) or the supply cycle of the supplier
(for natural gas or district heating). For a significant share of buildings the heating bills end during the
summer months April to August.
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these misperceptions are increasing with consumer inattention to untimely bills. In other
words, salience of heating energy costs is arguably elevated during the winter months,
when most of the heating consumption takes place3. In this setting, inattention arises
simply because of the temporal distance between when heating costs are revealed and
when heating is used. Moreover, this temporal distance is exogenous to the decision of
households residing in a building – in terms of potential energy consumption outcomes.
I find new evidence for consumer inattention to energy bills and show that heat energy
demand is sensitive to time-varying salience of heating costs. Compared to buildings with
calendar year billing, I find that off-winter billing accounts cause residential buildings to
consume on average up to 9 percent more heat energy every year from 2008 to 2018, a pe-
riod of both increasing and decreasing, but relatively high fuel prices4. I provide evidence
that over-consumption due to lack of salience of heating costs and bills is pervasive and
applies to all building types and fuel sources. Moreover, these ATE estimates capture the
long-term effects – lingering behavioral bias after learning and compensating adjustments
have taken place on the part of consumers over time5. Most importantly, I show that
salience bias is sensitive to the 3-month sum of heating degree days post-billing, suggest-
ing that households are effectively adjusting consumption in the first three months of the
year-long billing cycle.
Unlike space heating, energy for water heating is consumed year-round and thus should
not be as sensitive to billing cycle treatments. I test the same mechanism on hot water
use and find consistent results, offering an interesting insight. Households billed during
the off-heating season cut back on water heating use to compensate for the lack of salience
and inability to adjust annual energy consumed for space heating. This provides evidence
that the results are driven by time-varying salience and consumer inattention to heating
costs.
This study also contributes to the understanding of any distributional concerns due to
consumer inattention to energy bills. I take advantage of regional inequality to explore
heterogeneous impacts. It is perhaps ambiguous how the rate of overconsumption should
vary with the socioeconomic status of households living in a given building6. I estimate
3The majority of the heating costs incurred by households in Germany are due to space heating, for
which the demand is practically zero during the summer season. See Table 3.1 for information on the
average temperature and heating degree days experienced each month of the year from 2003 to 2018.
4We expect households that are unable to react timely (during winter season) to billing information
to be less affected in response to price declines. But heating fuel prices were relatively high for most of
the sample time period. See Appendix: Figure 3.1.
5This is because the buildings in my sample do not change billing cycles, unless undergoing refurbish-
ments or change heating fuel. This is apparent in the data as the buildings (about 5% of total) drop out
from the panel, before I observe a change in the billing cycle. Results are robust to limiting the sample
to buildings that do not switch billing cycles from 2008 to 2018.
6I expect tighter budgets should cause households to be, cetris paribus, more attentive to energy
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average treatment effects by terciles of the unemployment rate distribution and find that
the timing of bills is just as important, if not more, for energy consumption by households
living in poorer socioeconomic zip codes.
Using complementary data on energy performance certificates for a subset of buildings,
I further investigate the potential long-term impact of salience bias (higher heating ex-
penditures) on thermal-efficiency investments by building owners. To this end, I find
novel evidence that non-salience of costs not only affected short-run yearly consumption
outcomes by residents, but also fed into long-run investment decisions by the landlord
or owner of the building. Specifically, I argue that higher heating expenditures over
time provided stronger financial incentives for buildings most prone to salience bias in
consumption to renovate and improve the thermal-insulation features of buildings. This
further implies that building owners were indeed paying attention to annual energy costs
and potential returns to energy efficiency investments. These differences in efficiency
investments across billing cycles highlight that, at least for multi-apartment buildings,
owners of buildings did invest towards closing any perceived energy-efficiency gaps, which
were driven by consumer misoptimization by tenants, treated with low salience of energy
bills.
The rest of the paper explains the findings in much more detail. The next section briefly
presents a simple model of cost-salience that would apply to the empirical setting. Section
3.3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 3.4 assesses whether the stratified
treatment assignment is as good as random and informs the research design. Section
3.5 presents the main empirical methodology and results, while Section 3.6 considers
heterogeneity in the ATE with respect to the unemployment rate. Section 3.7 presents
a battery of additional tests to check the robustness of the identification strategy and
results. Section 3.8 investigates whether salience bias in consumption had long-term
effects on energy-efficiency investments by building owners. In Section 3.9, I adapt the
empirical strategy to account for potential selection bias concerns when considering all
fuel sources and building types. Sections 3.10 and 3.11 conclude.
3.2 Theory
Here I use the model described in Sexton (2015) to capture diminished salience of energy
costs related to billing that takes place during the off-heating season.
Suppose individuals enjoy an energy-related activity M at home, which is produced using
an energy good X and technology α, according to m = αx. Let p be the exogenous price
costs and demonstrate better learning of price expectations and billing information – leading to lower
estimates of overconsumption.
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of good. Suppose further that individuals derive utility from consuming a numeraire good,
L. An individual’s utility function is quasi-linear U(l,m) = l+ θV (m) and θ represents a
taste parameter and function V is a twice differentiable and strictly concave function.
Consumer inattention related to diminished salience features in the model by assuming
that individuals receiving bills during the summer potentially misperceive costs and ob-
serve only δ ∈ (0, 1] of the true price of energy X - that is, p̃ = δp, where δ = 1 indicates
full attention.
We could also consider the receipt of a bill (“Abrechnung”) as a “true cost shock” that
makes the consumer more attentive and that the “true cost shock” is more salient during
the winter when consumption takes place.
The perceived optimization problem is then
max
x
U(l,m) = l + θV (αx) (3.1)
subject to
I = l + δpx (3.2)





The straightforward prediction, therefore, is that keeping technology, tastes, and prices
constant, greater inattention or reduced salience of the true cost of energy causes above-
optimal consumption levels.
3.3 Data
The analysis in this paper is based on data combined from three sources: (1) data on
building-level heating bills and energy performance certificates from a leading energy-
metering company, (2) weather station data from the GermanWeather Service (Deutscher
Wetterdienst), and (3) socio-demographic data from RWI-GEO-GRID (Breidenbach and
Eilers, 2018).
The primary data used in the analysis is based a large panel of building-level heating
bills for 420,573 residential buildings (3,215,800 bills) in Germany, with 12-month billing
cycles that start during January 2008 to June 20187. 12-month billing means that all
7The data is confidential and was received as part of a partnership between DIW Berlin and ista
Deutschland GmbH to produce the Heat Monitor (Singhal and Stede, 2019) at DIW Berlin.
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heating bills are for either 365 or 366 days, but the billing start and end dates vary.
The sample covers residential apartment buildings using all main fuel types, with 2 or
more apartment units, with very good regional coverage – over 7000 postal codes in all
sixteen states of Germany are represented. I observe a building on average 9 times and
a maximum number of 11 times.
The billing dataset provides information on the actual units of energy consumed for space
heating and water heating, along with yearly costs incurred. The billing data also contains
important building characteristics that help determine the energy requirements of build-
ings: living space (in square meters), building size (in number of apartments), location,
and heating fuel type. To complement this information, I further observe information
provided on energy performance certificates (EPC) issued from 2008 to 2018 (for about
40% of the buildings), on energy performance scores, year of construction, and the year of
construction or renovation of key building components such as the heating system, roof,
top floor or loft ceiling, outer wall, windows, and basement ceiling. For an even smaller
subgroup of buildings (about 15%), I further observe whether these key building com-
ponents met thermal-efficiency standards regulated under the 1995 Thermal Insulation
Ordinance (Wärmeschutzverordnung or WSVO 1995) at the time of certification.
The main dependent variable is calculated as the annual quantity of heating energy
consumed in relation to the heated living space of a building. This took several steps:
first, building-specific consumption values are limited to the amounts of energy used for
heating space (excluding warm water). Second, the consumption value is multiplied by
the heating value corresponding to the building’s energy fuel type, giving us the absolute
heating energy consumption in kilowatt-hours (kWh) for a building during the billing
period. Lastly, I divide total kilowatt-hours consumed by the amount of heated living
space in the building. The units for heat energy consumption are therefore, kilowatt-hours
per square meter of heated living space per year (kWh/sqm).
I calculate heating costs used for the heating energy consumed by first deducting costs of
heating water from the total energy costs reported in each bill. Then dividing total costs
for space heating by the total kWh units of heat energy consumed in the building gives
us the cost per kWh of heat energy billed.
I supplement the billing dataset with weather station data from the German meteorolog-
ical service (Deutscher Wetterdienst). I find the nearest available weather station to 8303
geocoded zip codes of Germany, provided that there is not more than one consecutive
daily observation record missing for mean temperature for each weather station from 2003
to 2019. For the few missing values, I impute using the average of mean temperatures
recorded for the previous and next day. This procedure amounts to using daily mean
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temperatures from 204 weather stations scattered across Germany to calculate heating
degree days corresponding to each billing month and cycle.
The socio-economic variables used in this paper are the unemployment rate and the
purchasing power8 per household computed using grid level (1x1 kilometer cells) data
from RWI and microm (2020), aggregated to the zip code level and matched to the
billing sample. Currently, this information is only available for 2005 and 2009 to 2017.
3.4 Billing Cycles – A Natural Experiment?
In this section, I explore whether the billing cycle assigned to a building is independent
of residing households’ consumption behaviour.
In general, the beginning or the end of the billing period depends on the type of energy
with which the billable building is heated9. The distinction is due to the supply of heating
fuel. Natural gas and district heating are supplied to the building directly through an
energy supplier and thus the billing cycle is determined by the billing cycle of the supplier.
On the other hand, non-wired supply of fuel types like oil, wood,and pellets are purchased
by the owner of the building. Nevertheless, it may be plausible that households choose
the main heating fuel source or energy provider based on which billing cycle they offer –
although I lack even anecdotal evidence to support this source of selection bias.
Table 3.2 summarizes the share of buildings observed to have billing accounts that end
during different months in 2008, in a data sample of over 250,000 buildings. With 59%
of properties using high calorific natural gas fuel for heating, natural gas is the most
common fuel type, and most of the bills are calendar year bills that start in January and
end in December. This is also the case for properties supplied with district heating.
The column indicating “August to February” in Table 3.2 reports the share of buildings
that were assigned to billing cycles that start billing during or the beginning of the
heating season. This column shows that the large majority of the bills are settled during
the heating season for all fuel types except heating oil. For properties using heating oil,
the billing cycle depends on the purchase of the fuel, which happens often during the
summer months. About 40% of the buildings receive their bills during or beginning of
8A measure of disposable income - “the variable purchasing power reflects the household income. It
comprises information on labour supply, capital wealth, rental and leasing income minus taxes and social
security contributions, including social transfers such as unemployment benefits, child-allowances and
pensions.” (Breidenbach and Eilers, 2018)
9This statement is based on an email exchange with the data provider. I show in the paper that the
assignment of billing cycles is further correlated with building size. For natural gas buildings, newer
buildings were more likely to have calendar year accounts.
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the non-heating summer months. Moreover, about half of the buildings using heating oil
are not on the calendar year billing cycle.
Although the billing cycle assigned to a building is largely a function of heating fuel type,
it may still be correlated with the building attributes and demographic composition that
affect energy consumption. Even though households do not choose the billing cycles and
are also not able to manipulate the assignment over time, households do choose where to
live. It may be that, for example:
• more energy-saving or poorer households choose to live in larger buildings (with
more apartment units), and
• the energy-efficiency attributes of buildings differ by size of the building.
Similarly, more energy-consuming households might choose to live in neighborhoods or
zip codes with more one-family or two-family homes and fewer multi-apartment buildings.
For these reasons, it will be important to condition on residing within a particular locale
(state or PLZ zip code) and building type. Conditional on the building size and residing in
a particular locale, the assignment of the billing cycle is plausibly exogenous to household
decisions or behaviour.
In Tables 3.3 to 3.5, I present the distribution of billing cycles by building size (up to 10
apartments) for properties fired with oil, natural gas, and district heating respectively.
Table 3.3 shows that calendar year billing (accounts that end in December) increases
significantly with building size, while the share of bills that end during April to June is
relatively stable. Table 3.4 gives information for properties fired with natural gas fuel
– the share of calendar year billing increases significantly with the billing size. Larger
buildings are more likely to have annual billing cycles that end during December, but
this is not the case of district heating properties as seen in Table 3.5. The share of
summer accounts is actually increasing with building size, while the share of calendar
year accounts stays constant. Generally, I find that the incidence of non-calendar year
billing is not stable as a function of building size.
I focus the main analysis on properties using heating oil, because the share of summer
billing accounts is significantly higher, irrespective of building size – minimizing selection
bias concerns10.
I test whether I observe (quasi-) random assignment on one of the main determinants
10In Section 3.9 I show that the results also hold for the other fuel types. In particular, I find that
natural gas buildings with calendar year billing are newer and thus more energy-efficient. After I control
for building-level thermal insulation standards, I confirm the results drawn from the sub-sample of heating
oil buildings.
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of heat energy consumption, price per unit of consumption (kWh) by heating energy
type. Table 3.6 reports t-tests of differences in means using simple regressions with fixed
effects for the starting year and building size. To check for differences in means by fuel
type, I regress fuel price (euro cents per kWh) on the starting month of billing assigned
for all buildings and also limit the sample to buildings with less than 11 apartments.
The omitted month is January, the starting month for calendar year billing, the control
group. The first row of coefficients reports the mean price per energy unit incurred by
the buildings in the control group.
For each of the fuel type considered, I find statistically significant differences in the mean
price of energy for the majority of billing account types in the treatment group, compared
to prices faced by buildings on the calendar year cycle. However, the reported coefficients
show that these differences are very small in magnitude. There does not seem to be any
economically significant variation in prices across billing cycles. Given the large number
of observations, it is perhaps not surprising that I am able to detect such small differences
in average prices.
For the main analysis in the next section, I use properties that use oil as heating fuel.
Table 3.7 presents mean values of variables of interest for all oil-fired properties. There
are clear statistical differences in the building attributes measured by the number of
apartments in column 4 and the size of apartments (average heated square meter living
space) for other billing cycles. Buildings with calendar year billing (January start) are
larger on average, with more than 7 apartments per building, compared to other billing
cycles. I measure the outcome variable (heat energy demand) using kWh units demanded
per heated square meter living space and estimate the salience effect within building size.
In the analysis that follows, I only consider heating bills measuring consumption for 365
or 366 days. I do not delete any observations that have missing values for any of the
variables used in the analysis or remove outliers for consumption, prices, living space, or
number of apartments. Nevertheless, repeating the empirical analysis after doing so does
not change the results11. Moreover the analysis can be replicated using an older billing
panel, spanning years 2003 to 201212.
11See Appendix: Figure 3.2 for a plot of the trimmed distribution of the dependent variable.




The main empirical approach identifies the heat energy demand response of buildings
that have summer billing accounts13 versus buildings that are billed for the more common
calendar year billing period ending in December. After conditioning for heating fuel type
and building size, whether a building receives the summer billing account is seemingly
random – I will put this to the test.
I use the following baseline regression to estimate the average treatment effect of summer
billing on heat energy demand:
yit = α0 + α1Mayit + α2Juneit + α3Julyit + δpriceit + γsize + λt + εit (3.4)
where yit denotes natural log of annual energy units consumed (kWh) per sqm by building
i during the billing periods that started in year t.
• Mayi = 1, Junei = 1, and Julyi = 1 indicate that that a building has a billing
account that starts in May, June, or July respectively.
• priceit captures the fuel specific-price per kWh unit of energy consumed.
• γsize captures the fixed effects for the size of buildings (number of living units or
apartments)
• λt are fixed effects for the year in which billing starts and εit the error term, clustered
at the building level.
To improve upon the baseline estimates, I will further include two weather covariates:
(1) the sum heating degree days (HDD) experienced in each zip-code for the 12 months
during each billing period, and (2) the number of heating degree days experienced in each
zip code in the first three month of the billing period. I include the 12 month HDD as
a control because, by design, heating bills from different billing cycles do not cover the
exact same 12 months. Although heating bills from different billing cycles do not cover
the exact same 12 months, the 12-month rolling sum does not vary significantly across
billing cycles as compared to the 3-month rolling sum.
In the last two columns of Table 3.1, I show that the 12-month rolling sum of heating
13I focus on the consumption response of billing cycles that start during the specific months of May,
June, and July because of the high incidence of billing during these months as shown in Table 3.3. The
months in Table 3.3 correspond to the month in which billing ends. Thus, if the bill ends in April, the
next bill for the same building starts in May.
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degree days do not differ significantly across billing cycles, but half the share of the total
12-month sum is experienced in the first three months when billing starts in November,
December, and January. More importantly, the share of annual heating degree days
experienced in the first 3 months post-billing is close to zero for billing cycles that start
in May, June, and July. For this reason, I also include the 3-month intensity of heating
degrees days after the receipt of a bill as a covariate. This controls for the fact that the
salience of costs may be lower (higher) if the three months following billing are particularly
warm (cold) in a given year.
In a nutshell, I identify the salience effect of costs or bills on energy consumption by
analysing differences in energy consumed per unit of space between buildings using oil as
heating fuel that (naturally) received different billing cycle treatments.
3.5.2 Results
Results reported in Table 3.8 show the average response of heat energy consumption for
oil-fired buildings treated with May to July billing accounts, relative to calendar year
billing. All specifications include fixed effects for building size. Column 2 controls for
the price of heat energy per kWh. Column 3 adds year fixed effects to control for any
annual shocks to consumption that are common to all buildings. Column 4 adds the 12
month HDD weather covariate. Column 5 estimates the effect within the same building
size in the same German state, while Column 6 adds differences in purchasing power per
household at the zip-code level. The model in Column 7 estimates using zip-code level
fixed effects and Column 8 adds the 12 month HDD covariate.
The estimated coefficients are consistently between 2 and 4 percent approximately and
highly statistically significant. Table 3.9 repeats the exercise in Table 3.8, after limiting
the sample to oil-fired buildings with up to 10 apartments. The magnitudes and the
significance of the estimated average treatment effects appear to be stable, and thus
not sensitive to the inclusion of larger buildings that are less common in the German
population of buildings using heating oil. These findings already provide strong evidence
that consumers billed during summer months over-consume energy, likely because of
consumer inattention to heating costs.
3.5.3 What drives (in)attention?
I probe whether the degree of salience bias in consumption is sensitive to recorded heating
degree days, which is a baseline measure of how much heat energy a building requires. In
Table 3.10, I estimate how the salience effect varies with an increase of 100 heating degree
days recorded in the starting first to six months of the billing cycle. The coefficients
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on the interaction terms are highly statistically significant in the first three columns,
highlighting that the sum of heating degree days in the first three months matter the
most. An increase of 100 heating degree days experienced in the first month, immediately
after billing, causes the rate of over-consumption to fall by 1.8 percentage points. The
coefficients on the interactions indicate that salience of bills improves with heating degree
days, but at a rate that is highest in the first month and decreasing as time since billing
elapses.
In Table 3.11, I disaggregate the interaction effect with the annual sum of heating degree
days to show exactly how the salience of heating costs varies over the 12 month heating
period. Coefficients on the first three interaction terms show that attention to the heating
bill is effective in the first three months. In contrast, more heating needs after the third
month of the billing cycle leads to more salience bias in energy consumption.
This section provides supporting evidence that (1) households are indeed more attentive
to costs when heating needs increase, and (2) attention takes place in the first three
months (of the billing cycle), after which salience of costs has faded significantly. This
suggests further that to maximize energy-savings, calendar year billing may still be sub-
optimal as the benchmark. Given that the heating season lasts longer than three months,
households that are informed of energy expenses at least twice during the winter heating
season may be comparatively better off.
3.5.4 Cost Salience
Why do billing cycles make such a significant difference to annual heat energy demand?
Given that attention diminishes with time, the temporal gap between the receipt of the
heating bill and the heating season would lead to insalience of energy costs. I ascertain
that the results for all billing cycles are indeed consistent with this insight, particularly
affecting those households billed during the summer.
I use the most conservative model in column 8 from Tables 3.8 and 3.9, and now include
a dummy for each possible billing cycle observed in the sample. Table 3.12 shows in the
first column that the estimated effects on energy consumption for buildings assigned to
the peak summer months of May, June, and July billing accounts remain positive and
statistically significant. Controlling for the three-month sum of heating degree days post-
billing in the second column, the salience effects almost double in size to between 5 and 7
percent. Now above-optimal energy consumption is not only limited to summer months
of May to July. Relative to the calendar year billing period, buildings that are billed
during the spring and autumn months of April, August, and September, also consume
on average significantly more than those with calendar year billing. This implies that
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consumer attention to billing is highest during billing months that are followed closely by
cold-weather months that require heating, when households can react to cost signals. On
the other hand, responsiveness to heating expenses are low during off-heating months,
because salience is diminished considerably.
Coefficients on energy demand for the other treatment billing cycles (February, March,
October, November, and December) are not statistically significant. Given the dearth
of observations for accounts billed during non-summer months, this result may be due
to lack of statistical power in estimation. Nonetheless, the pattern consistently indicate
that insalience of energy costs is less of a concern during months that require heating.
See Figure 3.3: Plot A for a visual representation of the regression results in columns 1
and 2.
Overall, the results suggest that households are most inattentive to annual heating bills
that are received during the summer. They tend to react to costs in the few months
post-billing and unable to respond to the heating costs billed during the summer because
heating choices take place during the winter – by then, the heating bill has become less
relevant to household expenses. I further address the strength of this mechanism in the
next subsection.
3.5.5 Water Heating
For the majority of the buildings, heating bills cover costs incurred for water heating, in
addition to space heating. Although energy consumed for hot water is a smaller share of
total annual energy costs, households could react to costs on bills by adjusting the use of
hot water instead. Residential demand for energy to heat water is less seasonal than that
for space heating, however. Households that are indeed paying attention to bills during
the summer months may react by adjusting (disproportionately) the amount of energy
they consume for water heating, in the shower and in the kitchen, for example. This would
potentially bias the main results had I considered total energy consumption. To test for
consumer inattention, I considered energy consumed for space heating independently.
Now I check the extent of consumption adjustments via water heating. I limit the sample
of buildings to only those that are billed for both space and water heating, and estimate
the preferred equation on energy demand for both space and water heating (in kilowatt
hours per square meter of living space). In the third column of Table 3.12, I confirm the
main quantitative findings for space heating.
In the fourth column of Table 3.12, I directly investigate whether the timing of bills affects
energy consumed for heating water. Indeed, I find evidence that households billed during
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the off-heating months reduce energy demand for heating water. More importantly, this
serves as a placebo test for the presumed salience mechanism in determining annual heat
energy demand. I interpret this as providing strong evidence that the temporal distance
between bills and the winter season is the main driver behind the salience bias in energy
consumption for space heating – leading consumers to demand more energy on net. See
Figure 3.3: Plot B for a visual representation of the regression results in columns 3 and
4.
In the last column of Table 3.12, I estimate the preferred equation for buildings billed
only for space heating. As expected, I find that salience bias in heat energy consumption
is more prevalent. Without the option to adjust water heating, results suggest that
households consume significantly more heat energy than the control group when billed in
the spring months of March and April as well.
3.6 Distributional Effects
Often we are interested not only in the average treatment effect (ATE) for a population,
but also the conditional average treatment effects (CATE). More specifically, we may
also be interested in the spatial disaggregation of the average effect to understand the
socioeconomic distribution of the costs and benefits of policy recommendations.
In this section, I take advantage of this empirical setting to investigate whether salience
effects of heating bills varies with the regional heterogeneity in Germany. It is possible to
do so because the natural experiment of billing cycles applied nationwide. Here I consider
specifically whether the magnitude of the average treatment effect varies meaningfully
with the rate of unemployment, measured at the zip code level.
3.6.1 Unemployment Disparities
Is the treatment effect higher for communities that experience higher unemployment
rates?14 To estimate the heterogeneity in the ATE with respect to the unemployment
rate, I first create terciles of the unemployment rate distribution and then proceed to
estimate the preferred specification for oil buildings separately for the terciles.
Table 3.13 presents descriptive statistics of key variables discussed in this paper by terciles
of the unemployment rate in 2009 for houses using oil for heating fuel. As expected the
communities in the top tercile have on average lower purchasing power per household,
more likely to be living in the East of Germany, and in larger multi-apartment buildings.
14Here I make the implicit assumption that buildings located in zip codes with high (low) unemploy-
ment rates are home to households that experience high (low) unemployment.
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3.6.2 Subgroup Treatment Effects
Under the reasonable assumption that poorer households with cash constraints tend to
be more attentive year-round to costs and billing information, I would expect that the
receipt of bills during low-usage months (when salience of energy consumption costs is
diminished) would not induce poorer households to over-consume as much as households
that are economically more secure (lower unemployment rates).
Table 3.14 may suggest the opposite of my hypothesis. The first column estimates the
conditional average treatment effects for buildings that are located in zipcodes in the
first tercile with mean unemployment rate of 2.7%. The second column estimates the
CATE for the second tercile with mean unemployment rate of 5.0%. The third column
presents the findings for the top third of the unemployment rate distribution with mean
unemployment rate of 9.9%. Finally, the last column produces the average treatment
effect for the full distribution of the unemployment rate for comparison purposes. In
general, there is suggestive evidence for treatment effect heterogeneity – salience bias
during the summer months is higher in poorer socioeconomic neighborhoods. However,
this effect heterogeneity seems to be driven by fixed differences between the terciles15.
At any rate, heating costs are a higher share of disposable income for households with
tighter budgets and thus there exists distributional concerns as a consequence of billing
cycles that end during the summer. If it is indeed the case that they are more affected
by consumer inattention to heating bills, then the adverse welfare implication of salience
bias is compounded.
3.7 Robustness
In the next paragraphs, I test the robustness of the main results for building using heating
oil. In particular, I want to rule out the possibility that the results are driven by an
unobserved confounding factor. That is, it should not be the case that buildings that are
on the calendar year billing cycle are somehow different from the other buildings in some
unobserved dimension that may be correlated with energy consumption. For example,
there may be concerns that calendar year billing cycles apply to more energy-efficient
buildings and/or are chosen by more energy-saving households.
15Poorer households tend to live in more energy-inefficient buildings and have cash-constraints, for
instance. Based on data from energy performance certificates for the sub-sample of buildings using
heating oil, buildings observed in zip codes with higher unemployment rates were on average older and
less likely to meet the 1995 thermal insulation standards.
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3.7.1 Heating vs. Non-Heating Months
To check this, I exclude buildings billed for the calendar year from the sample of buildings
using oil. Then I pool non-heating (summer) and heating months to redefine treatment
and control groups more flexibly. Now the control group contains all buildings with billing
periods that start in September, October, November, December, February, and March.
Note that now I cluster the standards errors at the zip code level to further allay concerns.
Table 3.15 presents evidence on the robustness of the main results. The first two column
report the average treatment effect for buildings billed during the summer months of
May to July. In the last two columns, I add April and August to the treatment group.
The average treatment effect is about 4 percent over-consumption due to poor salience of
heating bills during the summer. These results support the validity of the main estimation
results.
3.7.2 Energy Performance Scores
There might still remain the concern that for some reason, buildings that are newer and
thus more energy-efficient (due to building codes or simply better technology, for instance)
are billed during the winter heating season. I limit the sample of buildings using heating
oil to a subset, for which I have information on energy performance certificates. These
certificates were issued to the buildings from 2008 to 2018, largely issued in 2008, and I
matched them to the primary data on consumption bills (about 40% of the observations).
I further split the sample into classes of building codes16 and report the average year of
construction by billing cycles. Table 3.16 shows that the mean age of buildings are
almost identical across billing cycles except for buildings built before the building codes
were introduced. For building built before 1919, buildings with calendar year billing are
newer than average. However, this is not the case for buildings built from 1919 to 1977.
Note that the sample of buildings reporting energy performance scores is possibly more
energy-efficient than the full sample, because the building owner’s decision to produce the
EPC is likely correlated with recent energetic-renovations in the past that affect energy
consumption of these buildings. And therefore, the building year is not a precise or
complete measure to learn about the energy performance of these buildings.
Moreover, the energy performance score is likely an endogenous explanatory variable
in this setting, because majority of energy performance scores (“Verbrauchsausweis”) are
16Energy efficiency regulation in Germany has largely taken the form of building codes, defining the
building-aggregate maximum annual energy requirement per square meter of living space for newly
constructed homes. The Heat Insulation Ordinance was first introduced in 1977, amended and made
progressively more stringent in 1984 and 1995. It was replaced by the Energy Saving Ordinance in 2002.
Note that there were no minimum energy standards for buildings built before 1978.
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measured using building-level consumption that took place in the past years (which would
include the any effect of consumer inattention to costs and bills due to intermittent and
untimely billing – the main thesis of this paper.)
Notwithstanding these important caveats, I redo the main estimation for buildings using
heating oil using fixed effects for building codes, and year of construction and reported
energy performance score as further controls to check whether average treatment effects
are sensitive to the inclusion.
Table 3.17 shows that differences in these energy-performance metrics measured across
billing cycles do make a difference in the magnitude of the results, but the conclusions
of the main results are robust to these conservative specifications. Column 1 shows
the preferred model on the subsample of buildings with energy performance certificates.
Column 2 adds fixed effects for building code regulation which controls for differences in
the efficiency standards based on the date of construction. The model in Column 3 further
includes the year of construction as a covariate. Column 4 uses the minimum reported
performance score irrespective of the year when the EPC was issued, while in column 5
the sample is limited to only those buildings with performance certificates issued in the
year 2008.
3.7.3 Buildings Built Before 1978
In order to further limit any bias arising from differences in energy-efficiency of buildings
on different billing cycles, I focus only on the subset of observed buildings that were built
before 1978, and therefore did not fall under any thermal insulation standards during
construction.
Table 3.18 reports the ATE by type of buildings (two-family houses, 3 to 6 multi-family
buildings, 7 to 12 multi-apartment buildings, and buildings with 13 apartments units
or more). Results indicate the energy consumption by two-family homes is even more
sensitive to the timing of bills – with salience bias up to 15 percent for bills starting in
the summer month of June. This may be a particularly noteworthy result because close
to half the building stock (owned and rented) by German families are one-to-two family
unit buildings (Destatis, 2016).
3.7.4 Munich and Stuttgart
Here I limit the analysis to buildings using heating oil in the large urban cities of Munich
and Stuttgart for two main reasons:
• the share of buildings with calendar year billing cycles is less than 50 % (41%
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in Stuttgart and 46 % in Munich). The corresponding share in the other major
German cities of Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Frankfurt (Frankfurt am Main) are
much larger (60 to 70 %).
• the housing supply shortages are particularly acute in Stuttgart and Munich, and
the associated market tightness means that any bias arising due to household se-
lection into different billing cycles is plausibly absent.
To identify the urban regions of Stuttgart and Munich, I limit the sample to buildings
located in their respective regional planning regions (“Raumordnungsregionen” or ROR).
Number 810 represents Stuttgart (3,850 buildings) and number 910 (3,417 buildings)
represents Munich).
Table 3.19 presents the results for buildings located in these regions. Estimates indicate
a large salience effect of 6 percent for buildings billed during the summer. Stuttgart and
Munich fall in the lowest tercile of unemployment rates and over-consumption of heat
energy exists, when billing occurs during months that are marked by the lowest share of
total annual heating degree days in the 3 months post-billing.
3.8 Long-term Investments
Thus far, I have remained silent on how building-level investments in energy-efficiency
technology (thermal insulation or heating fuel efficiency in this context) may have been
affected over the long-run by enduring differences in the salience of heating bills and thus
energy cost expenditures. I address this topic directly in this section and identify the
relative importance of inattention to energy-efficiency decisions for residential apartment
buildings - one of the first estimates in the literature (Gerarden et al., 2017).
Keeping all else equal, I expect that homes that incur annual higher expenditures for
energy consumption to have higher incentives to invest in thermal efficiency to save on
energy costs. In the previous sections, I show that apartment buildings that are billed dur-
ing the summer season are prone to above-optimal consumption levels, which translates
into higher annual costs of home heating. Given this backdrop, I empirically test whether
persistent positive exogenous shocks to energy costs and thus financial incentives, led to
statistically significant differences in investments by building owners in energy-efficiency
technology.
I perform this test using data from energy performance certificates that were issued be-
tween 2014 and 2019 to buildings using heating oil and constructed before 1978, i.e. they
were not subject to building standards. This allows me to plausibly argue that any de-
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tectable differences in thermal insulation standards are due to investments in renovations
post-construction and not due to federal building codes.
Table 3.20 provides summary statistics of the sample. Using energy performance certifi-
cates issued starting 2014, I observe data on (1) the year of construction or year of latest
renovation of key building component that are associated with heat energy efficiency, and
(2) whether the building component meets efficiency standards regulated under WSVO
1995 (building-level thermal insulation standards).
Panel A shows that the mean age of building is statistically identical (p-value 0.1774)
across treatment and control groups. This is also true for the basement ceiling, but fails
for all other thermal-insulation features of the roof, loft, outer wall surface, and windows.
Panel B shows even more interesting descriptive statistics. The first column under “Over-
all” indicates how may of the five building components (roof, loft ceiling, outer wall,
windows, and basement ceiling) were certified to meet thermal insulation standards un-
der WSVO 1995. On average, buildings with summer billing accounts were associated
with a higher share of key building components that met the 1995 thermal-insulation
standards.
Now I test my hypotheses of differences in energy-efficiency investments in a more sys-
tematic manner – using a regression model that controls for observable characteristics
of buildings and zip code/location. I use the following baseline linear probability model
with fixed effects to estimate differences in heating-efficiency investments across billing
cycles:
yi = α + βMay to Julyi + δYear Builti + γSize + θPLZ + λt + εi (3.5)
where yi in an indicator for whether each of the seven measures (overall, heater, roof, outer
wall, loft, windows, and basement) of building i meets the thermal insulation standards
set out in WSVO 1995 regulation, at the time of certification. For the heating system, I
use the indicator for whether the year of heating system installed is greater or equal to
1995.
• May to Julyi indicates whether the billing cycle (the starting month) associated
with the building i started in May, June, or July. The control group is buildings
with calendar year accounts.
• Year Builtit captures the year in which the building was newly constructed.
• γSize and θPLZ capture the building size and zip code fixed effects respectively.
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• λt are fixed effects for the year in which the EPC was issued and εi the error term,
clustered at the zip code level.
Table 3.21 demonstrates that building owners treated with summer billing cycles invested
to retrofit a higher share of the building envelope to meet the 1995 thermal insulation
standards, captured by the variable “overall”. The estimate of 0.231 translates to a 4.3
percent increase in the share of building components receiving an insulation upgrade that
met the 1995 standards. This estimate was likely powered by higher investments in in-
sulating the roof, exterior wall, and windows. The windows components was particularly
affected – with an increase of 9 percent share of buildings that received renovation meet-
ing the 1995 insulation standard. I do not find any statistically significant differences in
the shares for the loft and basement ceiling, however.
Although the economic significance of these differences in investment rates across billing
cycles may not be high, the results in this section do provide some evidence that long-
term financial incentives for energy-efficiency do matter, and owners of multi-apartment
buildings responded to differences in expected returns to investments in energy-efficiency
– at least for buildings built before 1978, associated with low rates of renovation (Ray
and Sunikka-Blank, 2013).
These results show that salience of costs affect not only short-term consumption behaviour
of tenants/residents, but also feed into long-run investment decisions of building owners.
Any energy-efficiency gaps, due to lack of investments into heat energy efficiency, for
instance, can be optimally bridged by drawing the user’s attention to true energy costs
– by improving the salience of billing information.
With respect to salience bias in energy consumption, the results in this section further
imply that the short-run estimates are likely even higher, all else equal. The results
captured in this paper capture the effect of attention bias over the long-run, after learning
and investment adjustments have taken place as result of the treatment. I confirm this
in Section 3.9.3 by considering a sample of buildings that are as similar as possible in
meeting thermal-insulation standards.
3.9 Other Energy Sources
In this section, I show that the results are not limited to buildings using heating oil.
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3.9.1 Natural Gas
I consider buildings that use natural gas as the main heating fuel. Interestingly, I find
that newer buildings using natural gas were more likely to be on the calendar year billing
cycle. In Table 3.22, I estimate the preferred model on the full sample and find that all
billing accounts were associated with higher heat energy demand relative to the control
group of calendar year billing. This pattern re-emerges once I limit the sample to those
buildings with energy performance certificates in column 2.
I account for this bias in treatment assignment using fixed effects for building codes that
were applicable by year of construction17. In Columns 3 and 4, I show that buildings
billed during the off-heating season are subject to consumer inattention to costs during
the winter. The results are robust to controlling for the minimum energy performance
scores. There may still exist a positive likelihood for selection bias if older buildings
that were renovated and switched to natural gas fuel were more likely to be assigned the
calendar year billing cycle. For this reason, I consider a sample of buildings that are
comparable on all observable energy efficiency measures in Section 3.9.3.
3.9.2 District Heating
I further consider buildings that used district heating and to improve precision of my
estimates I pool the non-heating months of May, June, and July. Note that the control
group includes only calendar year billing. Similar to buildings heated with natural gas, I
find some bias in billing cycle assignment by age of the building (see Table 3.23). After
adding in the fixed effects for building codes, however, the estimate for salience bias in
energy consumption is robust to further controls.
3.9.3 Buildings with WSVO 1995 Standard
Finally, I construct a subsample of buildings that meet the building standards mandated
under the thermal insulation regulation of 1995 (WSVO 1995). Because the average age
of buildings in the full sample is 1967 and over 80 % of the buildings were built before
1995 (“Altbau”), achieving the 1995 standard is arguably a suitable benchmark for good
energy performance of buildings18.
I classify a building to meet WSVO 1995, if it was certified that all five building com-
17Alternatively: I limit the sample of buildings to those built before 1978 and recover a pattern of
overconsumption, consistent with non-salience of energy costs during the non-heating months. The
estimates (available by request) are of higher magnitudes compared to estimated treatment effects for all
buildings. More importantly, Table 3.22 show that salience bias in heat consumption exists, irrespective
of building age.
18I am unable to consider stricter thermal insulation standards due to lack of data.
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ponents (the roof, loft ceiling, outer wall, windows, and basement ceiling) meet the 1995
minimum energy-saving standards. Using this subsample, I seek to examine buildings
that are as comparable as possible in terms of energy-efficiency investments and insula-
tion performance. I pool non-heating billing months of May to July to form the treatment
group, while calendar year billing remains the control group. The result that follow are
robust to clustering at the zip code level.
Table 3.24 presents the findings. In column 1, I estimate the preferred equation for
buildings using natural gas that meet the 1995 thermal insulation standards. In the next
column, I further account for any remaining differences in energy performance of buildings
by controlling for the year of construction, year of the heating system, along with fixed
effects for building energy-standards. The rate of over-consumption due to non-salience
stays close to 9 percent. In the last column, I expand the sample by including buildings
using heating oil and district heating, while adding fixed effects for fuel type, and find
approximately the same quantitative result.
I interpret these results as strong evidence that over-consumption due to poor salience of
heating bills is pervasive and not limited to buildings that use heating oil or to buildings
with poor energy-efficiency standards. I conclude that there exists economically signifi-
cant potential to conserve energy via behavioural changes using appropriately-timed bills
to improve salience of energy costs.
3.10 Qualifications and Extensions
Following are some caveats to the empirical results:
I do not observe directly the level of attention households pay to bills and how this differs
by month of bill receipt. Moreover, I do not know the exact date building managers
distribute the bills to the residents - this is less of an issue, however, for small apartment
buildings and homes that use heating oil.
The belief about the exogeneity of billing periods or cycles is central to removing unob-
served selection bias in estimating treatment effects. The setup does not allow to fully
control for household-specific factors. However, given that I measure building-level con-
sumption, I do not expect households living in buildings with summer accounts versus
winter accounts to be systematically different on the aggregate (in income and preferences
for heating, for example), conditioning for building characteristics and location.
One important area of future research would be to quantify the extent to which split
incentives between landlords and tenants led to differences in long-term efficiency invest-
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ments. Do landlords with tenants underinvest compared to home-owners, all else equal?
To answer this question, one can replicate the analysis in this paper for a data sample of
single-family homes, distinguishing between owner-occupied and rented-homes.
3.11 Conclusion
By exploiting the billing cycle assignment in a large scale natural experiment in Germany,
I estimate a causal over-consumption of heating energy by buildings that are billed during
the summer months, and thus are treated with low salience of energy costs. Empirical
results in this paper are theory consistent. Effective attention to costs take place in the
few months immediately after billing. Consequently, consumers billed for heating during
off-winter months are subject to consumer inattention, leading to their perceived cost
of consumption to be lower – resulting in above optimal heat energy demand. Results
demonstrate that buildings that are billed for space heating during the summer consume
on average up to 9 percent more than those that are billed for the more common calendar
year billing cycle.
This research highlights the importance of improving the salience of information on energy
prices and consumption to encourage consumer attention and alter household behaviour.
Engaging energy users with bills during high-consumption events has significant potential
to achieve energy savings in the building sector, both in the short- and long-run, without
additional investments for technical building efficiency.
This paper further examines whether differences in consumer inattention to energy costs
had a long-term impact on technology choices and investments. I find evidence that
building owners reacted to higher annual heating expenditures by investing in long-term
thermal insulation of buildings. This result is evidence that under-investment (the energy-
efficiency gap) in heat energy-efficiency due to the split-incentive problem between land-
lords and tenants may not be as high as previously thought. These decisions to retrofit
were driven by distortions in financial incentives, due to salience bias in household con-
sumption, rather than energy-efficiency shortcomings of buildings billed during the sum-
mer. Notwithstanding, these results illustrate that investments in energy upgrades for
existing buildings did respond to energy cost shocks.
In Germany, the heating sector is primarily powered by fossil-fuels and accounts for 25%
of the final energy consumed, of which about 70% is consumed by the residential sector
(AGEB, 2018). The results in this paper indicate that the current billing system that is
used for the vast majority of buildings in Germany is not optimal for reaching energy and
environmental policy targets. Ultimately, those households that want to save on bills or
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conserve heating energy must know the heating costs, with timely information or costs
of attention to be as low as possible. This is likely to be increasingly important given the
recent discussion of a CO2 price on the heating sector (mainly for buildings) in Germany.
Providing homes with heating bills during the peak of winter (relevant information at
the relevant time) is arguably not more costly than status-quo, but it does have the high
potential to reduce energy consumption from the household sector.
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Table 3.1: Heating Needs During the Year
Heating Degree Days (HDD)
Month Mean Temperature Monthly 12-month sum 3-month sum
January 0.52 449.0 2426.2 1184.1
February 0.68 404.2 2424.5 911.4
March 4.33 330.9 2414.3 590.1
April 9.26 176.3 2412.0 284.9
May 13.23 82.9 2409.8 118.5
June 16.59 25.7 2414.3 48.2
July 18.60 9.9 2414.3 79.1
August 17.82 12.6 2414.5 245.2
September 14.09 56.6 2414.4 529.0
October 9.40 176.0 2413.6 878.1
November 5.12 296.4 2404.6 1149.3
December 1.92 405.6 2405.8 1247.0
Total 9.30 202.2 2414.0 605.4
Notes: The second column reports heating degree days during each month, calculated as the total sum of differences
between the daily mean temperature and the heating limit of 15 degree Celsius on days with recorded mean temperatures
less than 15 degrees. The values are calculated by the author using daily observations from 20030101 to 20181231 at
204 nearest weather stations to 8303 zipcodes in Germany. In the mapping used, average distance between zip code and
nearest weather station is 18.3 km, with standard deviation of 10.4 km, minimum and maximum distance of 0.076 km and
59.86 km respectively. Source: Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD).
Table 3.2: Incidence of Billing Accounts by Fuel Type
Fuel Type March - July August - February December Share
Natural Gas H 0.16 0.84 0.68 0.59
Oil 0.39 0.61 0.49 0.32
District Heating 0.15 0.85 0.76 0.08
Natural Gas L 0.00 1.00 0.21 0
Other 0.24 0.76 0.64 0.01
Total 23 % 77 % 62 %
Notes: The first two columns show the share of buildings in year 2008 with annual heating bills ending in March to
July and August to February. The December column indicates the share of buildings with accounts ending in December
(calendar year billing). The last column reports the share of buildings by heating fuel type observed in 2008, sample of over
250,000 buildings. “Other” fuel types consist of LPG, pellets, electricity, wood, coal, brown coal, steam, coke, and others.
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Table 3.3: Billing Cycles by Building Size – Heating Oil Homes
Number of Apartments/HH
End of Billing 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
January 2.2 1.6 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.6
February 2.3 1.6 1.6 1.4 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4
March 3.6 3.1 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.2 0.7
April 5.3 5.0 4.3 4.1 3.7 4.3 4.0 5.3 5.3
May 23.2 27.5 26.4 22.9 22.2 19.7 17.9 18.3 14.5
June 8.2 8.1 7.2 7.0 6.2 6.3 6.6 6.7 6.6
July 3.3 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.0
August 3.2 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.2
September 5.2 4.3 3.6 3.8 2.6 2.8 1.6 2.4 1.5
October 2.6 2.0 1.7 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.6
November 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.5
December 39.3 40.4 45.9 51.5 57.6 59.2 62.7 61.2 66.9
April to June 36.6 40.6 38.0 34.0 32.1 30.3 28.6 30.3 26.5
Notes: The table shows the distribution of billing cycles observed in 2008 for all buildings
with up to 10 apartments that use heating oil as fuel.
Table 3.4: Billing Cycles by Building Size – Natural Gas Homes
Number of Apartments/HH
End of Billing 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
January 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.6 0.9
February 2.9 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.8
March 4.0 3.7 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.1
April 4.4 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.5
May 7.0 7.3 6.0 5.5 4.3 5.0 4.2 3.5 3.6
June 5.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 4.1 3.6 3.8 3.3
July 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9
August 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.2
September 8.2 7.0 6.6 5.4 5.3 4.8 4.5 3.7 3.9
October 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.0 2.1 2.1
November 3.7 3.5 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.0 2.0 1.3
December 52.4 56.2 61.3 66.4 70.9 69.2 73.6 75.4 76.5
April to June 16.5 16.4 14.3 12.6 10.8 11.7 10.0 9.5 9.3
Notes: The table shows the distribution of billing cycles observed in 2008 for all buildings
with up to 10 apartments that use natural gas as fuel.
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Table 3.5: Billing Cycles by Building Size – District Heating Homes
Number of Apartments/HH
End of Billing 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
January 1.7 3. 2.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.6
February 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.0 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.7
March 3.1 3.3 3.1 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.3 1.6
April 2.4 3.3 4.6 2.2 1.8 1.8 2.8 1.7 2.7
May 4.1 4.6 3.0 5.6 5.3 3.2 4.4 5.1 3.6
June 8.0 6.5 8.7 8.0 6.8 9.8 10.4 11.7 12.0
July 1.7 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.7
August 2.2 2.9 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6
September 3.1 3.5 2.9 2.8 3.8 2.5 3.7 3.6 4.9
October 2.0 2.4 1.5 2.1 2.5 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.0
November 2.6 1.5 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.7
December 67.8 64.8 68.9 69.9 71.8 73.7 70.6 68.2 66.8
April to June 14.5 14.4 16.3 15.8 13.9 14.9 17.6 18.5 18.3
Notes: The table shows the distribution of billing cycles observed in 2008 for all buildings
with up to 10 apartments that have district heating.
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Table 3.6: Balance Test - Differences in Mean Price
Euros per kWh by Month of Billing Start
Heating Oil Natural Gas H District Heating
Bill Start All Apts<11 All Apts<11 All Apts<11
Constant 0.0643 0.0643 0.0670 0.0674 0.0961 0.0952
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
February -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0014 0.0016 -0.0047 -0.0037
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
March -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0010 -0.0055 -0.0056
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
April 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0008 -0.0078 -0.0071
(0.89) (0.96) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
May 0.0010 0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0035 -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.97)
June 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 0.0013 -0.0049 -0.0051
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
July 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0091 -0.0068
(0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
August -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0051 0.0026
(0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00)
September 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0059 -0.0065
(0.34) (0.54) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
October -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0030 0.0004
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65)
November -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0089 -0.0075
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00)
December -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0042 0.0021
(0.01) (0.00) (0.53) (0.47) (0.00) (0.08)
Observations 809,754 725,829 1,630,852 1,270,465 287,809 102,721
Adj R2 0.416 0.414 0.028 0.032 0.026 0.023
Notes: Table reports coefficients from simple regressions of heating costs incurred per unit of energy (kWh) on the
starting month of the billing period, with fixed effects for the year and building size, and robust standard errors. The
omitted month is January which corresponds to the calendar year billing cycle, the control group. I discard observations
with yearly consumption below 1 kWh/m2 and price per kWh above 1 Euro (0.1% of total). Constant reports the average
price per kWh that was paid by buildings in the control group. p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics - Oil Units
Bill Start kWh/m2 Price # of Apts Apt Size PP per HH # of Bills
January 126.31 6.47 7.21 90.04 45.15 488,921
February 120.43 6.46 3.51 89.32 46.36 11,422
March 119.68 6.49 3.49 91.23 46.61 12,344
April 122.08 6.54 3.99 89.51 46.49 22,495
May 130.22 6.64 6.20 85.10 44.97 41,157
June 127.15 6.62 4.40 83.95 45.60 167,029
July 126.76 6.63 5.47 88.44 45.77 57,592
August 124.79 6.53 3.81 89.84 46.79 17,104
September 121.79 6.59 3.79 91.00 46.22 17,892
October 122.52 6.57 4.12 91.11 46.07 30,972
November 121.55 6.54 3.95 88.89 46.26 15,349
December 121.93 6.57 4.13 89.56 45.86 10,778
All Bills 126.02 6.53 6.01 88.59 45.46 893,055
Notes: The table reports average values calculated using bills from 200801 to 201806 for buildings using heating oil
as the main fuel. The first column reports the annual heat energy consumption per square meter of living space. I discard
bills that report yearly consumption below 1 kWh/m2. Price of heating fuel is given in euro cents per kWh. Building size
is given by the column indicating the number of apartments. Apartment size reports the average size of the apartment
in a building in heated living space in square meters. PP per HH is the purchasing power per households at the zip code
level (Source: RWI and microm 2020).
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Table 3.8: Response of Heat Energy Consumption to Summer Billing I
Oil Units & All Building Types
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
May 0.0455*** 0.0463*** 0.0404*** 0.0402*** 0.0249*** 0.0214*** 0.0215*** 0.0218***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
June 0.0476*** 0.0475*** 0.0389*** 0.0388*** 0.0441*** 0.0400*** 0.0386*** 0.0356***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
July 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0140** 0.0139** 0.0249*** 0.0210*** 0.0205*** 0.0196***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Costs per kWh -0.0261* -0.0259* -0.0259* -0.0259* -0.0227* -0.0225* -0.0225*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y
Purchasing Power per HH Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X State FE Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes
N 754,868 672,735 672,735 672,735 672,686 569,047 670,234 670,234
Adj R2 0.010 0.017 0.042 0.042 0.082 0.083 0.316 0.323
Notes: The omitted month is January (the most common starting month for billing), the control billing cycle. Standard
errors clustered at the building level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3.9: Response of Heat Energy Consumption to Summer Billing II
Oil Units & Buildings with up to 10 Apartments
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
May 0.0393*** 0.0382*** 0.0323*** 0.0319*** 0.0284*** 0.0254*** 0.0210*** 0.0215***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
June 0.0504*** 0.0502*** 0.0418*** 0.0416*** 0.0474*** 0.0433*** 0.0388*** 0.0360***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
July 0.0261*** 0.0264*** 0.0168*** 0.0166*** 0.0270*** 0.0226*** 0.0204*** 0.0196***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Costs per kWh -0.0184** -0.0182** -0.0182** -0.0185** -0.0178** -0.0185** -0.0186**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y
Purchasing Power per HH Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X State FE Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes
N 666,376 593,135 593,135 593,135 593,135 503,095 591,765 591,765
Adj R2 0.009 0.013 0.040 0.040 0.070 0.071 0.277 0.284
Notes: The omitted month is January (the most common starting month for billing), the control billing cycle. Standard
errors clustered at the building level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.10: Interaction with Heating Degree Days
Oil Buildings
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
May to July 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.018 0.038* 0.040**
(0.0062) (0.0090) (0.0116) (0.0146) (0.0149) (0.0127)
X (HDD/100) 1-month sum -0.018***
(0.0051)
X (HDD/100) 2-month sum -0.015***
(0.0038)
X (HDD/100) 3-month sum -0.014***
(0.0029)
X (HDD/100) 4-month sum -0.003
(0.0015)
X (HDD/100) 5-month sum -0.001
(0.0010)
X (HDD/100) 6-month sum -0.001
(0.0009)
N 670,234 670,234 670,234 670,234 670,234 670,234
Adj R2 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323
Notes: The control billing cycle is the calendar year. Each column reports coefficients on the interaction between
the pooled treatment group and the annual sum of heating degree days recorded 1 month to 6 months post-billing. In
addition to the X-month HDD covariate corresponding to the interaction term, all regressions controlled for heating costs
per kWh, 12-month HDD, building size by zip code fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the building level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.11: Dynamics of Salience
Oil Buildings
Bill Start ln (kWh/m2)
(1)
May to July -0.006
(0.0149)
X (HDD/100) 1st month -0.042***
(0.0054)
X (HDD/100) 2nd month -0.033***
(0.0072)
X (HDD/100) 3rd month -0.029***
(0.0051)
X (HDD/100) 4th to 6th month 0.009***
(0.0020)




Notes: The control billing cycle is the calendar year. Table reports coefficients on the interaction terms between the
pooled treatment group and the heating degree days recorded in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th to 6th, and 7th to last month of
the billing cycle. In addition to all HDD variables corresponding to the interaction terms, the control set included heating
costs per kWh, building size by zip code fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the
building level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.12: Response of Heat Energy Consumption to Billing Cycles
Oil Units - Cost Salience
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Space Space Space Water Space Only
February -0.014 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 0.013
(0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0115) (0.0169) (0.0232)
March -0.011 0.004 0.006 -0.013 0.053*
(0.0093) (0.0105) (0.0117) (0.0186) (0.0236)
April -0.003 0.020* 0.017 -0.038* 0.056**
(0.0074) (0.0102) (0.0116) (0.0176) (0.0202)
May 0.022*** 0.049*** 0.050*** -0.035 0.042*
(0.0054) (0.0099) (0.0115) (0.0184) (0.0175)
June 0.037*** 0.066*** 0.073*** -0.029 0.044**
(0.0030) (0.0092) (0.0107) (0.0168) (0.0158)
July 0.021*** 0.049*** 0.058*** -0.064*** 0.027
(0.0046) (0.0096) (0.0112) (0.0179) (0.0170)
August 0.009 0.033** 0.031* -0.040* 0.064**
(0.0081) (0.0108) (0.0123) (0.0187) (0.0245)
September 0.001 0.018 0.028** -0.050** -0.017
(0.0076) (0.0091) (0.0104) (0.0164) (0.0205)
October 0.003 0.010 0.005 -0.048*** 0.002
(0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0116) (0.0161)
November -0.012 -0.012 -0.001 0.004 -0.038
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0156) (0.0206)
December -0.009 -0.012 -0.021 -0.013 0.006
(0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0112) (0.0181) (0.0266)
Costs per kWh - Space -0.022** -0.022** -0.064** -0.020**
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0219) (0.0075)
Costs per kWh - Water -0.017**
(0.0062)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y Y
HDD 3 month sum Y Y Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts x PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 794,666 794,666 584,069 586,631 209,543
Adj R2 0.302 0.302 0.299 0.290 0.447
Notes: The omitted month is January (the most common starting month for billing), the control month group.
Standard errors clustered at the building level and robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.13: Descriptives by Terciles of the Unemployment Rate
Oil Units in 2009
Quantile T1 T2 T3 Full Sample
Unemployment % 2.72 5.03 9.94 5.55
Purchasing Power per HH 45.80 42.12 35.98 41.74
Annual kWh/m2 128.35 136.82 144.85 136.10
Costs per kWh 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
No. of Apartments 4.86 5.16 8.15 5.85
East Dummy 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.07
Calendar Year 0.39 0.45 0.51 0.45
May to July 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.38
Zip Codes 2,452 2,467 2,195 6,865
No. of Buildings 27,820 33,335 21,866 83,246
Notes: The table reports average values using the all building types in year 2009. Unemployment rate and purchasing
power per household are computed at the zipcode level using data from RWI and microm (2019). Price of heating fuel
is given in euro per kWh. East dummy indicates the share of buildings located in the following federal states: Berlin,
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Freistaat Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Freistaat Thüringen. Calendar year
reports the share of buildings that were treated with the January to December billing cycle. May to July reports the
proportion of buildings that billing cycles starting in those months.
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Table 3.14: Estimates of the Conditional Average Treatment Effects
Oil Units By Terciles of Unemployment Rate
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
T1 T2 T3 Full
April to August 0.0055 0.0273* 0.0470*** 0.0225**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007)
T1 T2 T3 Full
February -0.0249 0.0029 0.0076 -0.0084
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.011)
March -0.0097 0.0060 0.0148 0.0018
(0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.011)
April -0.0057 0.0223 0.0457* 0.0158
(0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.011)
May 0.0227 0.0476** 0.0680*** 0.0430***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.011)
June 0.0497** 0.0668*** 0.0657*** 0.0595***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.010)
July 0.0290 0.0605*** 0.0379 0.0439***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.011)
August 0.0052 0.0339 0.0695** 0.0272*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.012)
September 0.0264 0.0034 0.0086 0.0153
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.010)
October -0.0065 0.0264* 0.0066 0.0092
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007)
November -0.0094 -0.0033 -0.0229 -0.0095
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009)
December -0.0288 -0.0076 0.0319 -0.0086
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.010)
Costs per kWh -0.0118*** -0.0310*** -0.0582*** -0.0198**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y
HDD 3 month sum Y Y Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts x PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 228,296 264,933 182,392 677,700
Adj R2 0.281 0.268 0.359 0.304
Notes: Data on the unemployment rate was available from 2009 to 2017. The full sample in the last column covers
all terciles for 2009 to 2017. The first row reports CATE when treatment group consists of non-heating months April
to August and control group consists of September to March. For April to August, the pooled treatment group, the
differences between the coefficients by terciles are not statistically significant in a regression with interactions between
treatment and terciles. Using separate regressions, the rows below report estimates for each billing period, where the
omitted month is January, the control month group. Standard errors clustered at the building level and robust to
heteroskedasticity for all regressions. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.15: Heating vs. Non-Heating Months
Oil Buildings
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
May to July 0.0414*** 0.0416***
(0.00486) (0.00488)
April to August 0.0368*** 0.0369***
(0.00468) (0.00469)
Costs per kWh -0.0381*** -0.0361*** -0.0378*** -0.0358***
(0.00627) (0.00551) (0.00616) (0.00541)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All Apts<11 All Apts<11
N 326,338 309,930 362,210 344,790
Adj R2 0.351 0.331 0.338 0.318
Notes: The full sample now excludes the calendar year billing period. The control or omitted group consists of
buildings billed starting in September to December, February, and March. In the first two columns, I further exclude April
and August from the sample. Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.16: Year of Construction
Oil Buildings
Building Code Regulation
Bill Start Pre-1919 1919–1977 1978–1983 1984–1994 1995–2001 2002+
Jan 1892 1964 1980 1990 1997 2004
Feb 1878 1961 1980 1991 1997 2005
Mar 1902 1962 1980 1991 1997 2003
Apr 1893 1962 1980 1990 1997 2005
May 1893 1962 1980 1990 1996 2004
June 1888 1965 1980 1989 1997 2003
July 1887 1963 1981 1989 1997 2004
Aug 1885 1964 1980 1990 1997 2003
Sept 1878 1961 1980 1990 1997 2003
Oct 1885 1961 1981 1990 1997 2004
Nov 1887 1964 1980 1990 1997 2003
Dec 1892 1962 1981 1990 1997 2003
All Bills 1891 1964 1980 1990 1997 2004
# of Buildings 3,257 25,074 4,014 6,328 2,679 297
Notes: The table reports average values calculated using information reported on energy performance certificates,
observed from 2008 to 2018 for buildings using heating oil as the main fuel.
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Table 3.17: Oil Units with Energy Performance Certificates
Calendar Year Versus Other Billing Cycles
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
February -0.025 -0.036 -0.037 -0.026 -0.049*
(0.0205) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0146) (0.0244)
March 0.054** 0.054** 0.052** 0.045** 0.059*
(0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0151) (0.0257)
April 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.024 0.007
(0.0165) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0128) (0.0206)
May 0.057*** 0.047** 0.046** 0.054*** 0.051**
(0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0120) (0.0186)
June 0.063*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.047**
(0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0108) (0.0169)
July 0.045** 0.043** 0.043** 0.039*** 0.057**
(0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0186)
August 0.054** 0.046** 0.046** 0.034** 0.063*
(0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0132) (0.0260)
September 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.020 0.008
(0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0231)
October -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 0.005 0.002
(0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0090) (0.0162)
November 0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.008 -0.006
(0.0166) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0134) (0.0266)
December -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.048** -0.055*
(0.0198) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0149) (0.0262)
Costs per kWh -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.032***
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0038)
Year of Construction -0.0004***
(0.0001)
Minimum EPC score 0.005***
(0.0001)
2008 EPC score 0.004***
(0.0001)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y Y
HDD 3 month sum Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Building Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 315,298 315,298 315,298 315,298 129,703
Adj R2 0.442 0.457 0.457 0.539 0.548
Notes: The control or omitted group consists of buildings with calendar year billing.
Robust standard errors clustered at the building level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.18: Oil Units Constructed Before 1978
Calendar Year Versus Other Billing Cycles
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Types 2 HH 3 - 6 HH 7 - 12 HH 13+ HH
February -0.034 0.041 -0.047 -0.060 -0.330***
(0.0232) (0.0436) (0.0293) (0.0792) (0.0550)
March 0.056* 0.134** 0.066* -0.133 -0.056
(0.0245) (0.0473) (0.0314) (0.0872) (0.1246)
April 0.032 0.093 0.036 0.002 0.102
(0.0195) (0.0485) (0.0247) (0.0516) (0.0774)
May 0.065*** 0.125** 0.066** 0.088* -0.008
(0.0171) (0.0452) (0.0232) (0.0399) (0.0508)
June 0.051*** 0.153*** 0.049* 0.043 0.035
(0.0149) (0.0435) (0.0207) (0.0316) (0.0444)
July 0.044** 0.114** 0.051* 0.043 -0.089
(0.0165) (0.0441) (0.0223) (0.0382) (0.0675)
August 0.059** 0.125* 0.060* 0.071 -0.062
(0.0208) (0.0507) (0.0263) (0.0408) (0.0902)
September -0.018 0.090* -0.038 -0.015 -0.034
(0.0196) (0.0439) (0.0246) (0.0435) (0.1020)
October -0.009 0.027 -0.001 -0.035 -0.225
(0.0159) (0.0303) (0.0204) (0.0403) (0.1498)
November -0.006 -0.086 0.027 -0.006 -0.162**
(0.0221) (0.0602) (0.0270) (0.0408) (0.0543)
December -0.063** -0.118* -0.049 -0.035 -0.035
(0.0236) (0.0496) (0.0326) (0.0435) (0.0452)
Costs per kWh -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.027*** -0.092*** -0.100***
(0.0085) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0056) (0.0035)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y Y
HDD 3 month sum Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 209,141 25,717 110,145 41,293 31,986
Adj R2 0.468 0.402 0.397 0.538 0.654
Notes: The control or omitted group consists of buildings with calendar year billing.
Robust standard errors clustered at the building level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.19: Stuttgart and Munich
Oil Buildings
Bill Start ln (kWh/m2)
Stuttgart Munich
(ROR 810) (ROR 910)
May to July 0.0574*** 0.0529*** 0.0577*** 0.0581***
(0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0166) (0.0173)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All Apts<7 All Apts<7
N 36,157 27,933 32,597 25,480
Adj R2 0.224 0.180 0.267 0.218
Notes: The control group consists of other billing cycles. The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of heating
costs per kWh as a control variable. ROR stands for Raumordnungsregion (regional planning region). Robust standard
errors clustered at the building level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.20: Sample Means – Oil Buildings Built Pre-1978
Panel A: Year of Construction/Renovation
Year Built Heater Roof Loft Outer Wall Windows Basement
Calendar Year 1955.81 1996.12 1974.94 1968.35 1965.63 1976.99 1960.84
(SD) (29.35) (12.09) (26.94) (27.53) (27.51) (25.41) (26.46)
N 14,164 12,451 5,163 7,473 8,360 6,303 9,373
May to July 1956.33 1995.49 1979.76 1969.50 1966.16 1982.91 1960.61
(SD) (30.99) (12.50) (26.90) (28.13) (29.02) (29.66) (27.62)
N 10,554 8,878 3,257 5,089 5,850 4,081 6,738
Panel B: WSVO 1995 (=1 if meets standards)
Overall Heater Roof Loft Outer Wall Windows Basement
Calendar Year 1.299 0.611 0.326 0.343 0.196 0.360 0.074
(SD) (1.506) (0.488) (0.469) (0.475) (0.397) (0.480) (0.262)
N 5,741 12,451 5,741 5,741 5,741 5,741 5,741
May to July 1.705 0.599 0.425 0.438 0.239 0.522 0.081
(SD) (1.471) (0.490) (0.494) (0.496) (0.427) (0.500) (0.272)
N 3,584 8,878 3,584 3,584 3,584 3,584 3,584
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. “Overall” indicates the number of building components (roof, loft ceiling,
windows, outer wall, and basement ceiling) that meet thermal efficiency standards under WSVO 1995 building codes.
This information was only available from energy performance certificates issued from 2014 to 2019.
Table 3.21: Differences in Energy Efficiency Investments
Oil Buildings Built Before 1978
Bill Start Dependent variable: WSVO 1995 Standard
Overall Heater Roof Loft Outer Wall Windows Basement
May to July 0.231*** -0.00262 0.0596*** 0.0192 0.0546*** 0.0917*** 0.00560
(0.0435) (0.0123) (0.0151) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0144) (0.00789)
Year Built -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0007* 0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Year of EPC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,968 9,183 7,968 7,968 7,968 7,968 7,968
Adj R2 0.189 0.070 0.135 0.099 0.124 0.173 0.079
Notes: The omitted billing month is January (calendar year billing), the control group. Standard errors clustered
at the zip code level. Data is limited to energy performance certificates issued 2014 to 2019. Inclusion of controls such
as heating costs (total bill) and total living space does not change the results in the table. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001.
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Table 3.22: Natural Gas Building with Energy Performance Certificate
Calendar Year Versus Other Billing Cycles
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
February 0.077*** 0.061*** 0.019 0.019 0.012
(0.0076) (0.0125) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0089)
March 0.078*** 0.055*** 0.021 0.021 0.009
(0.0080) (0.0131) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0094)
April 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.050***
(0.0082) (0.0114) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0084)
May 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.042***
(0.0086) (0.0118) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0090)
June 0.128*** 0.117*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.042***
(0.0080) (0.0106) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0085)
July 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.044***
(0.0081) (0.0108) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0085)
August 0.083*** 0.094*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.041***
(0.0104) (0.0145) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0105)
September 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.020 0.020 0.022*
(0.0085) (0.0130) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0094)
October 0.063*** 0.042*** 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.0052) (0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0058)
November 0.050*** 0.040*** 0.010 0.010 0.013*
(0.0059) (0.0093) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0064)
December 0.038*** 0.029** 0.005 0.004 -0.009
(0.0066) (0.0108) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0077)
Costs per kWh -0.000* -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Year of Construction -0.0001*
(0.0001)
Minimum EPC score 0.005***
(0.0002)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y Y
HDD 3 month sum Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Building Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Sample All EPC EPC EPC EPC
N 1,605,802 752,629 752,629 752,629 752,629
Adj R2 0.314 0.434 0.495 0.495 0.591
Notes: The control or omitted group consists of buildings with calendar year billing.
Robust standard errors clustered at the building level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.23: District Heating Buildings with Energy Performance Certificates
Calendar Year Versus Other Billing Cycles
Bill Start Dependent variable: ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
May to July 0.080*** 0.090*** 0.074** 0.074** 0.074**
(0.0179) (0.0261) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0249)
Costs per kWh -0.000** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Year of Construction 0.000
(0.0002)
Minimum EPC score 0.006***
(0.0002)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Building Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Sample All EPC EPC EPC EPC
N 256,343 146,393 146,393 146,393 146,383
Adj R2 0.572 0.616 0.619 0.619 0.627
Notes: The control or omitted group consists of buildings with calendar year billing.
Robust standard errors clustered at the building level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.24: Buildings with WSVO 1995 Standards
Calendar Year Versus Non-Heating Months
Bill Start ln (kWh/m2)
(1) (2) (3)
May to July 0.0877** 0.0844** 0.0920**
(0.0334) (0.0312) (0.0306)
Costs per kWh -0.0740*** -0.0745*** -0.0827***
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0224)
HDD 12 month sum Y Y Y
HDD 3 month sum Y Y Y
Year of Construction Y Y
Heat System Year Y Y
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
# of Apts X PLZ FE Yes Yes Yes
Building Code FE Yes Yes
Fuel Type FE Yes
Fuel Type –Natural Gas– All
N 101,540 101,483 133,445
Adj R2 0.658 0.677 0.680
Notes: The control or omitted group consists of buildings with calendar year billing.
“All” fuel types refers to mineral oil, natural gas H, and district heating.
Robust standard errors clustered at the building level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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3.12 Appendix










2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Time
Heating Oil Natural Gas
Household Energy Prices
Notes: The heating oil series presents annual consumer prices for light heating oil (for consumption of 5000 liters) in
Euro cents per liter and natural gas series presents annual averages of biannual household prices in Euros per gigajoule.
Due to data limitations, the natural gas price index is calculated using a combination of two different time series: (1)
2003 to 2007 price data applies to consumption class between 20 and 200 GJ and (2) 2008 to 2018 price data applies to
consumption of 83.70 GJ. Both price series include all taxes and fees. For plotting, the raw data were indexed: heating
oil (2000=100) and natural gas (2003=100). Sources: Mineralöl Wirtschaftsverband e.V. for leichtes Heizöl and Eurostat
Datenbank for Preise Gas für Haushaltskunde.
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Notes: The histogram presents the distribution of annual heat energy consumed, limited to less than 300 kWh per
square meter.
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Figure 3.3: Rate of Overconsumption












-.05 0 .05 .1
Effect on Heat Consumption












-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Effect on Heat Consumption
Water Heating Space Heating
Notes on Plot B : Graph shows that bills that are settled during non-usage months (May to September) are subject to
over-consumption, relative to the calendar year billing cycle. 95% confidence intervals provided. Estimates for bills ending
in May, June, and July are highly precise. Controlling for differences in the annual sum of heating degree days in the first
3 months post-billing strengthens the pattern.
Notes on Plot B : Heating bills cover costs incurred for water heating, in addition to space heating. Residential demand
for fuel energy to heat water is less seasonal than that for space heating. Graph shows that HHs that are indeed paying
attention to bills during the summer months adjust (disproportionately) the amount of energy they consume for water
heating. 95% confidence intervals provided.
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Effect on Heat Consumption
Baseline Controlling 3-month HDD
Notes: The graph plots the treatment effect coefficients in Plot A of Figure 3.3, after discarding heating bills that
report heat demand greater than or equal to 300 kWh per square meter (approximately 0.7% of the observations) .
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Chapter 4
On Heat Demand and the Distribution
of Energy Efficiency
4.1 Introduction
Residential heating continues to be primarily powered with fossil-fuels1 and accounts
for one-fifth of the final energy consumed in Germany (BMWi, 2019). Energy-efficiency
programs are increasingly advocated as a key climate policy instrument for decarbonizing
the building sector – both to reduce energy bills and mitigate climate damaging carbon
emissions. However, evaluations have shown that actual savings realized from energy-
efficiency programs seldom achieve the level of energy savings that are predicted using
ex-ante engineering models (Fowlie et al. 2018, Allcott and Greenstone 2017).
Moreover, increasingly warmer heating seasons in Germany are prolonging the already
long pay-back periods for energy-efficiency investments in the housing sector. It has thus
become all the more important to target energy-efficiency funds and programs to homes
that have the highest potential for energy-efficiency improvements, keeping in mind that
energy savings may fall short of expected returns (Christensen et al. 2020, Giraudet et al.
2018).
Coupled with increasing energy efficiency, investments in housing may also have the ad-
ditional objective to contribute to equity such that the costs and benefits from retrofit
programs are allocated progressively across income groups (Bento, 2013). Although en-
ergy efficiency measures targeting the building sector play an increasing role in achieving
GHG emission reductions globally, evaluations of policy instruments such as building
181% of final energy consumed for space heating was produced using natural gas, heating oil, district
heating, and coal (AG Energiebilanzen e.V. 2018).
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codes, retrofit programs, or energy performance certificates seldom take into account the
long-term distribution of energy-savings achieved.
A few exceptional studies aim to cover this gap in the literature. Jacobsen (2019) shows
that financial incentives such as tax credits for energy-efficient appliances were more
concentrated for higher-income households. McCoy and Kotsch (2020) investigate the
returns to energy-efficiency investments by income group and find that the poorer house-
holds experience lower energy savings both in the short- and long-run. Similarly, Bruegge
et al. (2019) find that building codes in California led to energy-savings for the lower in-
come groups, but this was due to decrease in square footage rather than improvements
in building energy-efficiency attributes.
We add to this literature on the distributional impacts of energy policies in the residential
building sector. Here we take a long-term perspective and assess the net outcomes of
major policy efforts (building codes, tax incentives, and retrofit programs) that have
already take place in Germany and come to a more nuanced conclusion. In line with
the previous literature, the distribution of energy-efficiency is regressive2 in the West of
Germany. However, the poorest regions of Germany, the states in the East benefit from
both the use of less carbon-intensive heating fuel type and energy-efficient buildings.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold.
First, we provide a methodological improvement over consumption-based energy perfor-
mance ratings to measure energy-efficiency of buildings. We make use of heating bills for
a large sample of the existing building stock in Germany and temperature data from 204
weather stations to underpin the causal response heat energy demand to short-run fluctu-
ations in the total annual sum of heating degree days. Using this building-level response
of heat energy consumption to temperature as an overall measure of energy-efficiency, we
find that buildings in Bavaria and Baden Württermberg outperform those from all other
states.
Second, we document that temperature change is an increasingly dominant factor in ex-
plaining the observed decline in heat energy use by the German housing sector in the
last decade, and discuss potential implications for energy efficiency investment incen-
tives. Global surface temperatures have been rising steadily relative to historical average
temperatures (NASA). Germany, in particular, experienced an unwavering increase in
average temperatures in the past decade from 2010 to 20193. Unsurprisingly, the heat-
2By regressive, we mean that zipcodes that are associated with low unemployment rates or high
incomes are home to a disproportionately higher share of energy-efficient buildings.
3The German Weather Service (DWD) reported 2018 to be the warmest year in its 138-year temper-
ature records, and 2019 tied with 2014 were the second-warmest years in German history.
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ing sector is particularly affected by global warming because the demand for energy to
heat homes falls, cetris paribus. We quantify the fall in heat energy demand for heating
due to climate change in the last decade, and thus the weakening financial incentives for
homeowners to invest in thermal-efficiency of the existing building stock.
Third, we provide new evidence on the distribution of realized energy efficiency out-
comes. We investigate comprehensively the main drivers of the heterogeneous response
to temperature shocks, allowing us to gain insight into the mechanisms driving estimated
differences in energy-efficiency. To this end, we employ machine learning to explore all
observable dimensions in a systematic manner. We shed light on the heterogeneity in
outcomes by socioeconomic disparities, in particular the East-West divide in Germany.
By focusing on the existing building stock with average year of construction in 1967,
we also circumvent the problem of measuring energy-efficiency outcomes in a short-time
frame as highlighted by Kotchen (2017).
Given that the retrofit rate of existing buildings has been abysmally low over the last
two decades (Ray and Sunikka-Blank, 2013), the main candidate to have improved the
energy-performance of buildings are building codes, that have been rising in stringency
since 1978, when they were first introduced. We do not quantify the causal link in this
paper, but using precise measures we provide evidence on the strong negative association
between realized heat energy-requirements of buildings and the stringency of federally-
enforced building codes in Germany.
Our results provide insight into potential distributional effects of climate policy targeting
the residential sector in Germany. Assuming that all carbon-costs are passed on to end-
users of heat energy, the findings in this paper suggest that a carbon price on heating
fuel supply is likely to improve distributional outcomes in Germany. This is in large part
because buildings located in zip codes at the lower end of the unemployment distribution
and richest states of Bavaria and Baden Württemberg have a significantly higher share of
homes using heating oil, which is more carbon-intensive than natural gas (see Figure 4.1
and Tables 4.9). At the same time, buildings connected to district heating are located
in the East and the upper end of the unemployment distribution – regions marked with
poor socioeconomic status.
Compounding these regional differences in the carbon-intensity of heating fuel used is the
distribution of the energy-efficiency attributes of buildings. We show that although the
newer and more energy-efficient building are located in the South of Germany, buildings
in the poorest East regions of Germany are surprisingly energy-efficient, owing to larger
buildings, renovation efforts, and efficient construction that took place post-reunification
in the between 1990 and 2001. For instance, we document that the older building stock
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(built before 1975) in the East of Germany is significantly more energy-efficient than the
comparable group in the West. At the same time, East buildings are on average larger
than those in the West of Germany and this further associated with less energy per square
meter of living space for each heating degree day.
The next section provides some context for the analysis via a description of the residential
building sector in Germany and how energy ratings on energy performance certificates
are calculated. Section 4.3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 4.4 reports on
the underlying trends in heat demand and heating degree days. Section 4.5 explains the
identification strategy and estimates the average response of energy demand to temper-
ature. Section 4.6 considers the heterogeneous treatment responses. Section 4.7 offers
a forest-based machine learning method to understand the sources and corresponding




Space heating accounted for approximately 70% of the final energy consumed by the
private housing sector in 2017, and residential heating is almost one-fifth of Germany’s
total final energy consumption (AGEB 2018 and BMWi 2019).
The German Federal Statistical office conducts a special census survey every four years
to report on the current housing situation in Germany. Based on the 2014 Microcensus
results (Destatis 2016), 50% of the rented German housing units were using natural gas
for home heating, 22% were using district heating, another 19% using heating oil, and only
about 2% using electricity. These figures were approximately the same in the 2010 and
2018 Microcensus reports. In this paper, we study buildings that were using natural gas
(high calorific or low calorific), district heating, and mineral oil to heat their homes from
2008 to 2018. This amounts to excluding those buildings using LPG, pellets, electricity,
wood, coal, brown coal, steam, and coke as main heat fuel energy.
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of buildings represented in the sample by fuel type and
number of housing units. Compared to the 2014 Microcensus survey results, district
heating as the main fuel type is under-represented in the sample, while natural gas and
heating oil are both over-represented. In the billing data sample, we observe all residential
building types except those with only one housing unit – single-family homes. The
Microcensus survey in 2014 reports that more than two-thirds of German households
were living in buildings with 2 or more apartments or housing units, however. Relative
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to the population, the sample has a higher share of buildings with 3 to 6 apartment units
and large housing blocks (with 13 or more apartments). At the same, building type with
7 to 12 apartments are underrepresented.
Table 4.2 shows the regional distribution of the full sample. The sample used has regional
coverage that mirrors how the population of buildings is distributed (Destatis 2016). In
total, we observe buildings from 7769 zip codes, in all sixteen Federal States of Germany.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of main fuel types used by buildings in the sample by
terciles of the unemployment rate. In the Appendix (Tables 4.9 and 4.10), by comparing
the data sample with statistics from the Microcensus 2010 for owner-occupied and rented
buildings with 2 or more housing units, we show some evidence that this distribution is
likely representative of the population.
4.2.2 Problem with Energy Performance Certificates
In this section, we explain why energy performance scores that use past consumption to
measure the energy-efficiency rating of buildings are inadequate as measures of energy-
efficiency. We start with a brief description of how energy performance scores based on
consumption (as opposed to theoretical energy-requirements using engineering calcula-
tions) are calculated:
In accordance with the official guidelines4, energy performance ratings on consumption-
based (“Verbrauchsausweis”) energy performance certificates (EPC) are calculated using
building-level consumption in the past three years (in kWh per square meter of usable
living space) and a climate factor to adjust for weather and climate differences. The
climate factor anchors “typical climate” to the reference location of Potsdam, taking the
average of annual heating degree days recorded from 1995 to 2012. Thus, in any given
year if the local weather is warmer (colder) than “typical climate” in Potsdam, then
consumption is adjusted upwards (downwards) accordingly by multiplying the annual
consumption in kWh in square meters by the ratio of the annual sum total of heating
degree days recorded in Potsdam and at the local weather station. This allows buildings
nation-wide to be compared to each other in terms of energy performance.
Using this method, however, does not give a transparent rating of the heat energy require-
ments of a building because the performance scores are not independent of the behaviour
of tenants vs. residents, energy prices by fuel type, and other demographic and socio-
economic factors. More importantly, correcting consumption for temperature and climate
4“Bekanntmachung der Regeln für Energieverbrauchswerte im Wohngebäudebestand Vom 7. April
2015”
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change to determine the “true” trend in heat demand may require much more than multi-
plicative climate factors. It requires us to consider heterogeneous response to changes in
temperature that vary by regions, income, tastes, building attributes, and other energy-
efficiency parameters. In comparison, the energy demand certificate (“Bedarfsausweis”) is
a more objective measure because it is the theoretical energy-requirement of a building.
In absence of sufficient data on energy-demand certificates for buildings, it is useful to
consider how consumption responds to temperature as an improvement over consumption-
based energy performance scores on EPCs. As we will show in the results sections, the
strong response of heat energy demand to the decline in average temperatures allows us to
precisely estimate the energy performance of the existing building stock in a fixed-effects
framework and detect even very small differences in energy efficiency between buildings
and regions using machine learning.
4.3 Data
The analysis in this paper is based on data combined from three sources: (1) data on
building-level heating bills and energy performance certificates from a leading energy-
metering company, (2) weather station data from the GermanWeather Service (Deutscher
Wetterdienst), and (3) socio-demographic data from RWI-GEO-GRID (Breidenbach and
Eilers, 2018).
4.3.1 Heating Bills
The primary data used come from a large panel of building-level heating bills for 420,573
residential buildings (3,215,800 bills) in Germany, with 12-month billing cycles that start
during January 2008 to June 2018. 12-month billing means that all heating bills are for
either 365 or 366 days, but the billing start and end dates vary.
The billing dataset contains information on the actual units of energy consumed for
space heating and water heating, along with yearly costs incurred. The billing data also
contains important building characteristics that help determine the energy requirements
of buildings: living space (in square meters), building size (in number of apartments),
location by zip code, heating fuel type.
The main dependent variable is calculated as the annual quantity of heating energy
consumed in relation to the per square meter heated living space of a building. This took
several steps: first, building-specific consumption values are limited to the amounts of
energy used for heating space (excluding warm water). Second, the consumption value is
multiplied by the heating value corresponding to the buildingâs energy fuel type, giving
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us the absolute heating energy consumption in kilowatt-hours (kWh) for a building during
the billing period. Fourth, we divide total kilowatt-hours consumed by the amount of
heated living space in the building. The units are therefore, kilowatt-hours per square
meter of heated living space per year (kWh/sqm).
We calculate heating costs used for the heating energy consumed by first deducting costs
of heating water from the total energy costs reported in each bill. Then dividing total
costs for space heating by the amount of heated living space in the building gives us the
cost per kWh of heat energy billed.
To create my estimation sample, we only consider heating bills from buildings that use
either natural gas, heating oil, or district heating as the main fuel type, which is 98
percent of all buildings observed. We trim the sample further by removing the top and
bottom 1% tails from the distribution of heat energy consumption, used as the main
dependent variable: such that kWh consumption is above 30 kWh/sqm and below 400
kWh/sqm of heated living space.
Finally, we only consider only those buildings observed at least two times in the (unbal-
anced) panel. After these steps, the full sample consists of 384,223 buildings with a total
of 3,030,063 observed heating bills. On average we observe a building 9 times, minimum
number of 2 times, and a maximum number of 11 times.
4.3.2 Energy Performance Certificates
For about 40 percent of the buildings, we observe energy performance certificates issued
from 2008 to 2019 that give us important measures for the thermal-efficiency attributes of
the buildings, including the energy performance score, construction year of the building,
year (or renewal year) of the heating system, roof, loft ceiling, exterior wall, windows,
and basement ceiling. For energy performance certificates issued from 2014 to 2019
(about 20% of the sample), I further observe whether individual building components
meet thermal insulation standards set out in the national thermal insulation ordinance
from 1995 (Wärmeschutzverordnung 1995 or WSVO 1995).
4.3.3 Supplementary Data
We supplement the energy-related data with data from local weather stations collected by
the German meteorological service (Deutscher Wetterdienst). To construct variables that
capture the number heating degree days, we find the nearest available weather station to
8303 geocoded zip codes of Germany, provided that there is not more than one consecutive
daily observation record missing for mean temperature for each weather station from 2003
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to 2019. For the few missing values, we impute using the average of mean temperatures
recorded for the previous and next day. This procedure amounts to using daily mean
temperatures from 204 weather stations scattered across Germany to calculate heating
degree days corresponding to each billing month and cycle.
The socio-economic variables used in this paper are the unemployment rate, housing
density, and the purchasing power5 per household computed using high-resolution grid
level (1x1 kilometer cells) data (RWI and microm 2020, Breidenbach and Eilers 2018),
aggregated to the zip code level and matched to the billing sample. The data is available
for 2005 and 2009 to 2017.
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we describe aggregate trends in key variables observed from the data.
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for the full sample at the yearly level for important
determinants of heat energy demand. We report averages for the East of Germany in
parentheses.
Based on this table, there is evidence that financial incentives for heat energy-efficiency
investments have been falling. Along with warmer heating seasons, costs of heating
fuel (cents per kWh) have not risen significantly, resulting in declining annual heating
expenditures per square meter (energy use x price) since 2008. Meanwhile, information
from the sample of energy performance certificates suggests that thermal-efficiency and
insulation standards have not increased noticeably for the existing housing stock.
These trends are also true for the East of Germany. However, there is a noteworthy
exception. Although the buildings in the East of Germany are on average older, a higher
share of buildings (about half) observed with energy performance certificates from 2014
to 2019 met thermal insulation standards set out in WSVO 1995.
To make this distinction clearer, we split up the sample to those buildings built prior to
1995 and those built starting 1995, and then look at the shares that meet the WSVO 1995
standard or not. Figure 4.2 shows that a significantly higher share of the East building
stock built before 1995 meet thermal insulation standards under WSVO 1995. In order to
meet the WSVO 1995 standards, buildings built before 1995 likely underwent higher rates
of retrofitting. At the same time, we do not detect a noticeable share of buildings built
1995 onwards that were in non-compliance with the building regulation. In Figure 4.14,
5A measure of disposable income – “[t]he variable purchasing power reflects the household income.
It comprises information on labour supply, capital wealth, rental and leasing income minus taxes and
social security contributions, including social transfers such as unemployment benefits, child-allowances
and pensions.” (Breidenbach and Eilers, 2018)
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we further graph the differences in certification rates by individual building component.
What may explain this stark difference between the East and the rest of Germany? Since
reunification of Germany in 1990, there had been a concerted political and financial effort
(via subsidies for renovation and new construction) to improve the quality of the housing
stock in East, at least until 2001 (Weiß and Michelsen, 2011). Using identical data on
energy performance certificates, Singhal and Stede (2019) document that the thermal
retrofit rate was significantly higher for East German buildings during the 90s until 2001.
Renovation investments made in the East housing sector in the 1990s are likely driving
the improved energy performance of the building stock we observe today.
4.4 Trends in Heat Demand
Figure 4.3 plots yearly averages for the two main variables of interest in this paper:
local heating degree days and kWh per sqm of heat energy consumed by buildings. We
demonstrate that the correlation between average heat energy demand and annual sum
total of heating degree days increased from 2003 - 2012 to 2008 - 2018.
It is further noteworthy that the aggregated time series from 2008 to 2018 exhibit near
identical movements over time. Although the downward linear trends (see fitted values)
are similar, heat energy demand appears to be decreasing at a slightly faster rate than
heating degree days.
Figure 4.3 suggests that (1) temperature plays an increasingly dominant role in determin-
ing heat energy demand, (2) during 2008 - 2018, renovations, demographic changes, and
economic factors such as prices played a smaller role (at least on net) in predicting heat
energy demand. This is strong suggestive evidence that policies targeting CO2 emission
reductions via technical efficiency of the building sector may not have had the desired
effect for the sample population.
Moreover, thermal retrofitting of the existing housing stock is widely considered among
German policymakers to be cost-effective in reducing heat energy consumption (Ray and
Sunikka-Blank 2013). But given the declining trend in heating degree days and thus
heat demand, the pay-back period for thermal-efficiency investments continues to get
longer, and we expect fewer (rather than more) renovation projects to be economically
feasible due to climate change. In short, the potential for cost-efficient carbon savings
from residential energy efficiency have been declining in the last decade. It remains an
empirical question, however, how the currently falling financial incentives for a more
energy-efficient housing stock will be altered in response to a carbon-pricing scheme on
the residential heating sector.
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4.5 Temperature Response of Heat Demand
The primary aim of this paper is use precise estimates of the effect of temperature fluc-
tuations on heat energy consumption to understand the heat energy requirements of the
existing building stock. As discussed already, the estimation sample period covers 8 of the
10 warmest years ever recorded in Germany’s history, lending us high statistical power
in estimating the response of energy demand to temperature.
4.5.1 Identification
We seek to isolate the underlying heat-energy requirements (a measure of energy ef-
ficiency) at the building level by estimating the direct response of building-level heat
demand to temperature variability. The main advantage of the empirical approach is
that we control for all time-invariant characteristics of buildings that could affect heat
demand of buildings in response to temperature. Furthermore, we can control for im-
portant time-varying observables that determine heat demand and are correlated with
energy-efficiency.
We use the following baseline regression to estimate the average response of heat energy
requirements to temperature:
yis = α + βHDDis + γi + φs + λt + κf + εis (4.1)
where yis denotes annual energy units consumed (kWh) per sqm by building i with billing
cycle starting in year s.
• HDD captures the numbers of heating degree days in any given 12-month billing
period, calculated as the total sum of differences between the daily mean temper-
ature and the heating threshold of 15°C on days with recorded mean temperatures




(TH − td)× 1(td < TH) (4.2)
We considered different heating thresholds of TH from 10°C to 20°C and chose the
heating threshold of 15°C because it minimizes Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE).
• γi captures the building-level fixed characteristics such as vintage, building type,
number of apartments, number of floors, quality of building components associated
with thermal insulation, aggregate characteristics of residents, ownership status,
and fixed-factors related to geographic location.
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• φs are fixed effects for the year (s) in which annual billing cycle starts. This controls
for any aggregate time trend in consumer behavior or preferences for heating, in-
fluenced by gradually decreasing heating degree days, measured for each building’s
billing period.
• λt are fixed effects for the year (t) in which the majority of billing took place. Note
that s 6= t for bills starting late in the second half of the year (August to December).
This may capture year-specific economic shocks that are common to all buildings.
• σf are fixed effects for the fuel type, which may or not be fully captured by building
fixed effects.
• εis the error term, clustered at the zip code level.
The coefficient of interest is β on HDD. β reports the change in annual kWh of heat
energy demand per square meter in response to a unit increase in the annual sum total of
heating degree days, after controlling for fixed factors associated with buildings, residents,
and geographic location.
4.5.2 Results
Table 4.4 presents results for the full estimation sample. We present four variations of
the baseline regression model and consistently estimate that heat energy consumed by a
building per annum fell on average by 3.1 kWh/m2 of heated living space in response to
a decrease of 100 degree days in the annual sum total of local heating degree days (with
mean outside temperature below 15 degree Celsius).
After controlling for fixed characteristics of buildings, the results generally confirm the ex-
ogenous nature of short-run temperature changes with respect to important determinants
of heat energy demand. In the first column, after controlling for fixed characteristics of
buildings and yearly shocks common to all homes in their respective billing periods, we
arrive at a coefficient that is more or less insensitive to more conservative specifications.
In the second column, we add fixed effects for majority billing year interacted with fuel
type, which capture fuel price shocks. In the third column, we add time-varying covari-
ates at the building level (price per kWh of energy, building size, and average apartment
size) and zip code level (unemployment rate, purchasing power per household, and build-
ing density). Finally, in the fourth column we control for any time-varying factors at
the zip-code level that may affect building-level energy efficiency. We also considered
other weather parameters and show that the average estimate is robust to the inclusion
of precipitation and relative humidity (see Appendix Table 4.12).
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Holding a slew of factors constant, the average heat energy requirement of buildings is
approximately 0.031 kWh per sqm for each heating degree day – which corresponds to an
average yearly energy requirement of 79.7 kWh per sqm per building, assuming linearity
in temperature response and total heating degree days of 2414, which is the average 12-
month sum of heating degree days recorded at 204 weather stations in Germany from
2003 to 20186. Compared to “typical” climate, the decline in the annual sum of heating
degree days measured in the last five years (2014 to 2018) translates this estimate to an
average reduction of 8 percent in annual heat energy demand. For a household living in
a 100 square meter apartment, expenses in 2018 for space heating fell by approximately
60 euros due to change in climate (HDD relative to “typical”).
4.5.3 Heat Demand Adjusted for HDD
The main disadvantage of the method outlined above is that we only consider the linear
response of energy demand to changes in annual heating degree days. In the appendix,
we considered annual sum of heating degree days in distinct temperature bins below the
heating threshold of 15°C for each 12-month billing period. This allowed us to flexibly
detect any non-linear response of building-level heat demand to changes in small ver-
sus large changes in local weather conditions (see Table 4.11). The results are largely
consistent – for temperatures lower than the heating threshold, every 1 °C decrease in
temperature in colder temperature bins require relatively more heat energy. The coeffi-
cient on “HDD if (°C < -5)” is significantly lower than what we expect. This is driven by
the fact that observations from buildings in the East are over-represented in the coldest
temperature bin and buildings in the East are on average more energy-efficient.
Using this more precise specification, which controls for the non-linear and heterogeneous
response of heat energy consumption to temperature variation, we show how heat demand
from the building sample has evolved since 2008. Figure 4.4 shows that heat demand
was declining until 2014, after which the trend is ambiguous, given the wide confidence
intervals. On average, the estimates suggest that heat energy demand has plateaued.
4.6 Effect Heterogeneity
Now we go beyond estimating the average treatment effects. We expect there to exist
considerable heterogeneity in temperature response, not least because newer buildings
6The values are calculated by the author using daily observations from 20030101 to 20181231 at 204
nearest weather stations to 8303 zipcodes in Germany. In the mapping used, average distance between
zip code and nearest weather station is 18.3 km, with standard deviation of 10.4 km, minimum and
maximum distance of 0.076 km and 59.86 km respectively. Source: Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD)
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were subject to stricter building energy codes. In this section, we explore which sub-
groups of buildings response less or more to temperature, and thus seek to uncover the
heterogeneity in heat energy requirements of the existing building stock. We consider
those variables that are most likely related to treatment effect heterogeneity: year of
construction, size of building, the unemployment rate, and federal states with the West
of Germany.
4.6.1 Building Vintage
To start, we consider energy-efficiency outcomes by building vintage grouped such that
they correspond to different energy efficiency codes. Energy efficiency regulation in Ger-
many has largely taken the form of building codes, that define the building-aggregate
maximum annual energy requirement per square meter of living space for newly con-
structed homes. Table 4.5 summarizes the time development of building codes in Ger-
many. The Heat Insulation Ordinance was first introduced in 1978, amended and made
progressively more stringent in 1984 and 1995. It was replaced by the Energy Saving Or-
dinance in 2002 and subsequently amended in 2009. Note that there were no minimum
energy standards for buildings built before 1978.
In Table 4.6, we estimate the response of energy requirements to temperature separately
for buildings in the West and East of Germany7. For the West, the average heating
requirement per heating degree day is monotonically decreasing with each successive
revision (tightening) of building codes, until 2009. For instance, the difference in the
average temperature response between buildings built in 1984–1994 and those built in
1995-2001 is 32%. Nevertheless, compared to buildings built from 2009 onwards, buildings
built before 1978 are on average less energy-efficient by a factor of 2.
This decreasing pattern is less clear, however, when we consider only the buildings located
in the East of Germany. These results are a strong indication that other factors such
as renovations targeting energy-efficiency of older buildings, other building attributes,
or state-level policy efforts could be important in explaining the differences in energy
requirements of buildings in the East.
Comparing across the regions, the coefficients in the first column shows that that buildings
built before 1984 in the East perform comparatively well, while the energy-requirements
are lower for buildings built from 1995 in the West. Interestingly, pre-1978 (before build-
ing regulation) buildings in the East are significantly older, but on average demand less
heat energy per heating degree Celsius.
7East is located in the following federal states: Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Freistaat Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Freistaat Thüringen.
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4.6.2 Building Size
Now we explore how the energy requirements of buildings differ by the size of buildings,
separately still for buildings in the West and East of Germany. The results in Table
4.7 demonstrate that for both regions, larger buildings require less heating energy per
heating degree day. Specifically, the largest subgroup of buildings in the West (with more
than 20 apartments or households) demand on average 26% less kWh per sqm in response
to each heating degree day compared to two-family homes. Interestingly, relative to the
West, buildings located in the East consistently demand on average less heat energy per
heating degree for each building size category. Taken all together, these results strongly
suggest that larger buildings are more energy-efficient.
4.6.3 By Unemployment Rates
Is the distribution of energy-efficiency outcomes regressive? Here we consider effect het-
erogeneity by the spatial distribution of unemployment rates, an important dimension in
socio-economic disparities. Specifically, we seek to answer whether less energy-efficient
houses are located in localities marked with higher unemployment rates. In other words,
do less economically-secure households live in buildings that do not perform as well in
terms of energy-efficiency?
Results in Table 4.8 paint an interesting picture. The majority of the buildings in the East
of Germany fall into the top tercile of the unemployment rate distribution, with average
unemployment rate of 9.67%. However, we estimate the lowest heat energy requirement
per heating degree day for this subgroup of buildings. In contrast, households in the West
of Germany living in buildings that are more energy-efficient are located in the zip codes
that fall in the lowest tercile of the unemployment rate distribution. The conditional
average treatment effects estimated for the West of Germany also highlight potentially
larger socio-economic gaps in energy-efficiency outcomes, compared to the localities in
the East.
4.6.4 Regional Energy Efficiency
In addition to the East-West divide in Germany, we further expect that differences be-
tween states in the West could arise for a number of reasons such as differences in retrofit
financing initiatives and take-up, state level mandates such as the 2015 Renewable Heat
Act (EWärmeG) in Baden Württermberg that was intended to increase the share of
renewable energy in heat supply, or even greener preferences of households.
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In this section, we show that states in the East are indeed endowed with more energy-
efficient buildings compared to almost all buildings located in the West of Germany.
However, there are two large and thus important exceptions - namely, the states of Bavaria
and Baden Württermberg.
Figure 4.5 plots the average treatment effects for buildings located in each of the states
in West Germany and East defined as one bloc. The differences are ordered in magnitude
and associated 95% confidence intervals are shown. We highlight that buildings observed
in Baden Württermberg and Bavaria are more energy-efficient compared to the East –
demanding less heat energy per square meter on average for each heating degree day.
This is in contrast to the conclusion one would draw from energy performance scores
from consumption-based EPCs. Scores on energy-performance certificates are unable to
purge the effect of factors such as consumer behaviour, energy prices, and socio-economic
factor on the estimated energy performance of buildings. Indeed, households residing in
East of Germany are significantly poorer than those in the South (Bavaria and Baden
Württermberg). Low energy scores on performance certificates, thus, indicate both that
buildings in the East are relatively energy-efficient buildings and the fact that energy
consumption is dampened due to low incomes. Indeed, energy performance scores would
lead us to conclude that buildings in the East are more energy-efficient than those in the
rich states of the South. Using our methodological improvement over the use of energy
performance certificates, we are closer to estimating the true potential of buildings –
buildings in the South are in fact performing better than those in the East once we
account for fixed differences.
4.7 Machine Learning - Causal Forests
The causal forests approach proposed by Wager and Athey (2018) makes it possible to
estimate building-specific treatment effects, providing a much more detailed picture of
the full extent of heterogeneity in energy-efficiency outcomes.
Causal forests are an extension of the widely used random forest machine learning al-
gorithm described by Breiman (2001) that provide consistent treatment effect estimates
conditional on covariates at the individual level. In simplified terms, the method works
by splitting the dataset into parts, one of which is used to determine a set of subgroups
for estimating heterogeneous effects and the other of which is used to estimate the effects.
Causal forests can fit very flexible nonlinear functions and uncover nonlinear interactions
between variables, generating individual treatment effect estimates for each observation.
As discussed above, in this case, the treatment effect measures the impact of heating
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degree days on energy consumed per square meter.
Figure 4.6 is a histogram showing the full distribution of estimated building-specific
marginal effects. The average marginal effect is 0.0314, which is similar to the results from
the linear regressions reported above. The distribution is slightly negatively skewed; there
are more outliers on the efficient (non-responsive to temperature) end of the spectrum
than at the other extreme, perhaps because building standards and retrofits have been
effective in ensuring a minimum level of energy efficiency.
Examining East and West Germany separately yields an even more interesting picture,
as shown in Figure 4.7. The negative skewness is particularly pronounced in the East
and much less noticeable in the West, perhaps because of intensive retrofit programs in
Eastern states. By further breaking down the distributions by fuel type in Figure 4.12,
we can see that an important driver of the greater average efficiency in East Germany
is greater efficiency of its district heated buildings - retrofit programs likely explain the
significant mass on the left side of the distribution, which is markedly different from the
distribution for district heated buildings in West Germany.
Plotting the estimated effects of HDD on energy consumption on a map in Figure 4.13
allows for even more detailed study of geographical patterns - rural buildings appear to
be somewhat more efficient than buildings in urban areas on average.
We can also examine how building efficiency varies based on when they were built. As
shown in Figure 4.8, newer buildings are more energy efficient. In particular, efficiency
seems to start increasing around 1960 and then increases dramatically around 1990. This
can also help us understand the East/West distributions we studied below; as shown
in 4.9, a much larger share of buildings in East Germany were built after the efficiency
improvements of 1990. But more interestingly, significant efficiency improvements had
already been made for buildings built before 1975 in the East.
Finally, we can take a more direct look at how estimated effects vary with economic
conditions by plotting estimates against unemployment rates. Figure 4.10 shows that zip
codes with higher unemployment rates appear to have less efficient buildings on average.
However, as shown in Figure 4.11, this effect is much more pronounced in West Germany
than in East Germany, again likely due to East German retrofit efforts in the 1990s.
4.8 Discussion
An important limitation of the data we use is that we do not observe detailed infor-
mation on household or building level socio-economic characteristics that may play an
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economically significant role in the incentives to improve the energy-efficiency attributes
of houses. We resort to using zip-code level information and make the assumption that
the location of the building is strongly correlated with the socio-economic background of
the tenants - poorer zip codes tend to accommodate poorer households.
We have also considered crucially the non-linear response to temperature shocks in the
last decade, in addition to controlling for changes in precipitation and wind conditions.
Thus far, we have not examined how effect heterogeneity (by construction year or size
of building, for example) varies with heating degree days in different temperature bins.
It remains a very interesting extension to the paper, given that the warming climate
brings milder winters, leading to the shift of heating degree days from colder to relatively
warmer temperature intervals.
Barring these caveats, the main strength of the empirical approach in this paper vis-a-vis
ratings on consumption-based energy performance ratings is that by accounting for fixed
differences between buildings we are closer to approximating the true energy performance
potential of homes. We are able to produce ratings that are more of less consistent with
ratings on energy performance certificates with the added benefit that we control for
preferences and incomes of users that differ across buildings, for example.
By combining panel data of over 3 million yearly heating bills with daily temperature
data at local weather stations, we examine the (historical) realization of energy-efficiency
outcomes in the existing building stock. Findings highlight a difference between the dis-
tribution of outcomes between the West and the East. In particular, we show that early
investments in retrofitting has had a lasting impact in the East of Germany – which is
largely missing for the poorer zipcodes in the West of Germany. Results show that the
distribution of energy-efficiency is not equitable in the West of Germany, with buildings
located in Bavaria and Baden Württemberg attaining the best energy performance stan-
dards nationwide. A targeted EE policy should aim to close this energy-efficiency gap,
which may be an important dimension of economic inequality.
Finally, our results suggest that the gradual fall in heating degree days due to global
warming may be undermining financial incentives for energy-efficiency in the housing
sector. We find strong evidence that heat demand declined up until 2014, after which
gains in energy-efficiency are not statistically significant. In the absence of interventions
such as a carbon price on heating fuel and tax incentives for retrofit programs, climate
targets in the housing sector are increasingly out of reach for the German government.
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Table 4.1: Buildings by Fuel Type and Number of Apartments
Building Size by Number of Apts
Fuel Type All 2 3 - 6 7 - 12 13 - 20 21 +
Natural Gas H 60% 6.4 28.6 15.1 5.0 4.6
Natural Gas L 1.2% 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2
District Heating 10% 0.2 1.8 2.4 1.6 4.1
Oil 29% 6.4 16.3 4.1 1.1 1.1
Total 100% 13% 47% 22% 8% 10%
Notes: This table show the distribution of the 3,030,063 sample of heating bills by fuel type and building size. The
sample covers buildings that were billed starting from January 2008 to June 2018.
Table 4.2: Regional Shares
State Observations Percent # of Zip Codes Buildings
Schleswig-Holstein 56,792 1.9 361 7,245
Hamburg 56,900 1.9 97 8,101
Niedersachsen 291,197 9.6 782 36,623
Bremen 27,147 0.9 34 3,314
Nordrhein-Westfalen 769,198 25.4 864 100,811
Hessen 303,301 10.0 535 38,287
Rheinland-Pfalz 127,026 4.2 627 15,580
Baden-Württemberg 379,418 12.5 1146 46,072
Bayern 427,125 14.1 1864 52,366
Saarland 22,590 0.8 68 2,799
Berlin 117,986 3.9 189 15,538
Brandenburg 63,946 2.1 210 7,913
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 61,771 2.0 186 7,932
Sachsen 194,499 6.4 388 24,230
Sachsen-Anhalt 80,564 2.7 207 10,712
Thüringen 50,603 1.7 211 6,404
Total 3,030,063 100 7,769 384,223
Notes: This table shows the number of heating bills observed in the full sample for each of the 16 states.
121
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
Energy Use, Price, Building Size Heating Degree Days Energy Performance Certificates
Bill Start kWh/m2 Cents/kWh # of Apts Local ∆ from“Typical” Vintage WSVO 1995 Heat System
2008 128.5 (116.7) 6.8 (7.6) 9.1 (15.8) 2283.8 -110.3 1966.6 (1949.2) 0.36 (0.52) 1996.5 (1996.7)
2009 128.6 (119.2) 6.4 (7.2) 9.6 (17.1) 2362.4 -31.8 1966.4 (1949.9) 0.37 (0.51) 1996.5 (1996.7)
2010 128.6 (132.4) 6.0 (6.7) 9.8 (17.2) 2652.7 258.5 1966.9 (1950.3) 0.37 (0.52) 1996.6 (1996.8)
2011 118.3 (112.6) 6.7 (7.7) 9.6 (17.1) 2137.6 -256.6 1966.5 (1950.1) 0.37 (0.52) 1996.6 (1996.9)
2012 125.0 (117.2) 7.3 (8.2) 9.7 (17.3) 2405.1 10.9 1966.6 (1950.3) 0.37 (0.52) 1996.7 (1996.8)
2013 122.8 (119.0) 7.5 (8.4) 9.9 (17.4) 2336.9 -57.2 1966.5 (1950.4) 0.38 (0.52) 1996.8 (1996.9)
2014 106.9 (99.8) 7.4 (8.6) 10.1 (17.3) 1947.0 -447.2 1966.2 (1950.4) 0.38 (0.52) 1996.8 (1997.0)
2015 112.5 (105.1) 6.6 (7.3) 10.0 (17.2) 2071.1 -323.0 1966.5 (1950.6) 0.38 (0.52) 1996.9 (1997.0)
2016 118.8 (111.2) 5.9 (6.7) 10.2 (17.7) 2261.0 -133.2 1966.9 (1950.9) 0.38 (0.51) 1996.9 (1997.0)
2017 117.6 (109.9) 5.6 (6.3) 10.4 (18.1) 2159.5 -234.6 1967.6 (1951.5) 0.38 (0.52) 1997.1 (1997.2)
2018 111.4 (103.2) 5.6 (6.4) 11.0 (18.6) 2066.0 -328.2 1969.3 (1953.3) 0.39 (0.53) 1997.2 (1997.2)
All Years 120.7 (113.3) 6.6 (7.4) 9.9 (17.4) 2248.2 -146.0 1966.8 (1950.6) 0.37 (0.52) 1996.8 (1996.9)
Notes: The table reports statistics for the full sample. All values are averages, calculated for each year in which the 12-month billing period
starts for the observed building. The values in parentheses are average for the East of Germany located in Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Thüringen. The second and third columns report on building-level energy use and heating costs for
the full sample of buildings described in section 3.1. Energy use is measured as the annual heat energy consumption per square meter of heated
living space. Price of heating fuel is given in euro cents per kWh. Building size is given by the column indicating the number of apartments. The
“Local” column reports the average annual sum of heating degree days (with daily mean temperature below 15 degree Celsius) recorded at the
nearest weather station from 20080101 to 20181231, while the second column under “Typical” reports the difference in the annual sum of heating
degree days recorded at the local station compared to that recorded from 1995 to 2012 at Potsdam. The last three columns report data from
energy performance certificates. The WSVO 1995 column reports the share of buildings reporting energy performance certificates from 2014 to
2019 that meet thermal insulation standards effective in 1995.
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Figure 4.1: Fuel Type by Terciles of the Unemployment Rate







Notes: This figure shows the distribution of main fuel types used by buildings in the sample by terciles of the
unemployment rate, defined using data from RWI-GEO-GRID.










































































































Not (<1995) WSVO 1995 (<1995)
Not (>=1995) WSVO 1995 (>=1995)
Notes: The graph summarizes the share of buildings that are certified to meet the thermal insulation standards of
1995 (WSVO 1995) by year of construction (built before or after 1995). A building is defined to meet the 1995 insulation
standards, if it is certified that all five building components (the roof, top ceiling, outer wall, windows, and basement) meet
the 1995 minimum energy standards. The grey colored area indicates the share of buildings by state that were built before
1995 and do not meet WSVO 1995 insulation standards. Here we clearly show that buildings, built before 1995, in the
East German states were much more likely to be renovated to meet the WSVO 1995 standard. We also show that there
almost all buildings built 1995 onwards did pass certification for WSVO 1995.
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2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Year
Heat Demand (kWh/sqm) Fitted values
Local HDD Fitted values
Notes: The graph plots simple averages of annual heat energy consumption for the full sample against the starting
year of each billing or heating period (rolling 12-months). The left y-axis measures the annual kWh per square meter
of heated living space per building, while the right y-axis measures the number of heating degree days – heating degrees
recorded on days with temperatures below 15 Celsius, recorded at the nearest weather station to each building’s zip code.
Source: authors’ calculations using data described in Section 3.
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Table 4.4: Response of Heat Energy Demand to Temperature
Full Sample of Buildings
Dependent variable: kWh/m2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local HDD 0.0312*** 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 0.0303***











Zip Code Density -0.0176***
(0.00304)
Building FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fuel Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bill Start Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fuel Type x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code x Year FE Yes
N 3,030,063 3,030,063 2,252,758 3,023,892
Adj R2 0.776 0.776 0.790 0.780
Notes:The full sample covers all buildings using natural gas (high or low calorific), district heating, and oil. The
dependent variable is kilowatt hours consumed per square meter of heated living space. Standards errors are clustered at
the zip code level for all specifications. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Start of Billing
Notes: The graph illustrates how annual heat demand has changed relative to the base
year of 2008. These are coefficient estimates drawn from a regression of heat demand on
HDD, disaggregated by 5 temperature bins in the interval (−∞, 15), controlling for
heating costs, along with fixed effects for building, fuel type, (majority) year of billing
and fuel type by year of billing. 95% confidence intervals provided. Standards errors were
clustered at the zip-code level.
Table 4.5: Standards for New Construction
Year Regulation Max. per annum
Pre-1978 No regulation
1978 Heat insulation (WSchV) 250 kWh/m2
1984 Amendment of WSchV 220 kWh/m2
1995 Amendment of WSchV 150 kWh/m2
2002 Energy saving (EnEV) 100 kWh/m2
2009 Amendment of EnEV 60 kWh/m2
2016 Amendment of EnEV 45 kWh/m2
2021 Amendment of EnEV 0 kWh/m2
Notes: The first column indicates the year in which the regulation became effective.
Sources: Ray and Sunikka-Blank (2013), El-Shagi et al. (2017)
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Table 4.6: Temperature Response By Year of Construction
West Germany
Response of kWh/m2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-1978 1978-1983 1984-1994 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009+
Local HDD 0.0367*** 0.0309*** 0.0248*** 0.0169*** 0.0109*** 0.0176**
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0018)
N = 1, 045, 616
Adj R2 = 0.7706
Share 0.50 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.04 0.001
Avg. Vintage 1952 1981 1990 1997 2004 2010
East Germany
Response of kWh/m2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-1978 1978-1983 1984-1994 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009+
Local HDD 0.0300*** 0.0237*** 0.0238*** 0.0207*** 0.0171*** 0.0303***
(0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0077)
N = 317, 401
Adj R2 = 0.8301
Share 0.66 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.01 0.001
Avg. Vintage 1929 1980 1990 1997 2004 2010
Notes: Table presents coefficients on the interactions between Local HDD and Building Codes. The specification
includes fixed effects for building, fuel type, (majority) year of billing, the starting year of each billing period, and fuel type
by year. The sample covers all buildings using natural gas (high or low calorific), district heating, and oil. The dependent
variable is kilowatt hours consumed per square meter of heated living space. Standards errors are clustered at the zip code
level for all specifications. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.7: Temperature Response By Size of Building (# of Apartments)
West Germany
Response of kWh/m2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2 HH 3 - 6 HH 7 - 12 HH 13 - 20 HH 21+ HH
Local HDD 0.0354*** 0.0314*** 0.0285*** 0.0271*** 0.0261***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
N = 2, 460, 694
Adj R2 = 0.9667
Share 0.15 0.51 0.21 0.07 0.07
Avg. Building Size 2 Apts 4.22 8.99 15.98 42.97
East Germany
Response of kWh/m2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2 HH 3 - 6 HH 7 - 12 HH 13 - 20 HH 21+ HH
Local HDD 0.0325*** 0.0287*** 0.0267*** 0.0256*** 0.0243***
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
N = 569, 369
Adj R2 = 0.8184
Share 0.04 0.31 0.27 0.13 0.25
Avg. Building Size 2 Apts 4.64 9.23 16.23 45.57
Notes: Table presents coefficients on the interactions between Local HDD and Building Size. The specification includes
fixed effects for building, fuel type, (majority) year of billing, the starting year of each billing period, and fuel type by year.
The sample covers all buildings using natural gas (high or low calorific), district heating, and oil. The dependent variable
is kilowatt hours consumed per square meter of heated living space. Standards errors are clustered at the zip code level for
all specifications. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Local HDD 0.0279*** 0.0306*** 0.0332***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
N = 2, 107, 369
Adj R2 = 0.7737
Share 0.25 0.39 0.36




Local HDD 0.0309*** 0.0275*** 0.0270***
(0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0006)
N = 569, 369
Adj R2 = 0.8184
Share 0.01 0.09 0.90
Avg. Unemployment % 2.14 4.46 9.67
Notes: Table presents coefficients on the interactions between Local HDD and indicators for terciles of the unem-
ployment rate distribution. The specification includes fixed effects for building, fuel type, (majority) year of billing, the
starting year of each billing period, and fuel type by year. The sample was limited to years 2009 to 2017, for which the un-
employment rates were available. The last row reports the average unemployment rate for each tercile. The sample covers
all buildings using natural gas (high or low calorific), district heating, and oil. The dependent variable is kilowatt hours
consumed per square meter of heated living space. Standards errors are clustered at the zip code level for all specifications.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Figure 4.5: Energy Efficiency by States
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Notes: The graph presents the differences in the average treatment effect for each state in West Germany and states in
the East pooled in one group. Corresponding 95 % confidence intervals are shown. The coefficients come from a regression
that include fixed effects for building, fuel type, (majority) year of billing, the starting year of each billing period, and fuel
type by year. The sample covers all buildings using natural gas (high or low calorific), district heating, and oil. Standards
errors were clustered at the zip code level.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of Marginal Effects
Notes: The graph is a histogram showing the full distribution of building-specific marginal effects, generated using
causal forests. In this case, the marginal effect measures the impact of heating degree days on energy consumed per square
meter.
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Figure 4.7: Distribution by East and West Germany
Notes: The graph shows the full distribution of building-specific marginal effects for East and West Germany generated
using causal forests.
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Figure 4.8: Marginal Effects by Construction Year
.
Notes: The graph shows how the marginal effects generated using causal forests vary over construction year, holding
all other variables constant at the sample mean.
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of Buildings by Construction Year
.
Notes: The graph plots the frequency of buildings observed by construction year, separately for East and West
Germany.
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Figure 4.10: Marginal Effects By Unemployment Rates
Notes: The graph shows how ML-based building-specific marginal effects vary with the corresponding zipcode’s average
unemployment rate.
Figure 4.11: Marginal Effects By Unemployment Rates: East & West
Notes: The graph shows how ML-based building-specific marginal effects vary with the corresponding zipcode’s average
unemployment rate, separately for East and West Germany.
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Figure 4.12: Marginal Effects by Fuel Type




Table 4.9: Shares of Fuel Type by Planning Regions (ROR) - Tercile 1
T1 of the Unemployment Rate
Microcensus 2010 Building Sample
State ROR No. District Heat Oil Natural Gas District Heat Oil Natural Gas
Bayern 907 0.08 0.44 0.48 0.05 0.54 0.41
Bayern 908 0.00 0.59 0.41 0.02 0.49 0.48
Bayern 901 0.05 0.60 0.35 0.03 0.53 0.44
Bayern 915 0.00 0.63 0.37 0.02 0.52 0.46
Bayern 904 0.05 0.58 0.37 0.04 0.52 0.44
Bayern 917 0.00 0.63 0.37 0.01 0.59 0.40
Bayern 910 0.23 0.32 0.45 0.12 0.37 0.52
Average 0.06 0.54 0.40 0.04 0.51 0.45
Notes: The table compares the shares of main fuel types by planning regions
from the official Microcensus statistics from 2010 and the data sample used in the
paper. A planning region falls into the tercile (T1) with the lowest unemployment
rates, if more than 75 % of the zipcodes fall into T1. The data for the unemploy-
ment rate come from RWI and microm (2020) and Microcensus data from Destatis (2012).
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Table 4.10: Shares of Fuel Type by Planning Regions (ROR) - Tercile 3
T3 of the Unemployment Rate
Microcensus 2010 Building Sample
State ROR No. District Heat Oil Natural Gas District Heat Oil Natural Gas
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1301 0.58 0.15 0.27 0.15 0.32 0.53
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1303 0.58 0.11 0.30 0.34 0.08 0.58
Sachsen-Anhalt 1502 0.41 0.18 0.41 0.23 0.11 0.67
Sachsen-Anhalt 1503 0.43 0.16 0.40 0.27 0.13 0.60
Sachsen-Anhalt 1501 0.40 0.15 0.44 0.30 0.04 0.65
Sachsen 1404 0.41 0.09 0.50 0.20 0.07 0.73
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1302 0.64 0.04 0.32 0.43 0.03 0.54
Brandenburg 1205 0.54 0.10 0.35 0.33 0.16 0.51
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1304 0.46 0.09 0.45 0.31 0.06 0.63
Sachsen 1401 0.45 0.08 0.47 0.40 0.05 0.55
Brandenburg 1202 0.51 0.13 0.36 0.23 0.12 0.66
Sachsen-Anhalt 1504 0.37 0.10 0.54 0.17 0.07 0.76
Brandenburg 1203 0.47 0.04 0.49 0.42 0.03 0.55
Nordrhein-Westfalen 509 0.23 0.13 0.65 0.21 0.13 0.65
Sachsen 1402 0.34 0.18 0.48 0.25 0.10 0.65
Thueringen 1603 0.37 0.17 0.46 0.18 0.09 0.73
Berlin 1101 0.44 0.21 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.48
Bremen 401 0.27 0.18 0.55 0.04 0.27 0.68
Sachsen 1403 0.29 0.14 0.57 0.16 0.09 0.76
Niedersachsen 312 0.05 0.02 0.93 0.04 0.05 0.91
Thueringen 1601 0.38 0.11 0.52 0.20 0.05 0.75
Nordrhein-Westfalen 506 0.10 0.15 0.75 0.10 0.18 0.72
Schleswig-Holstein 103 0.20 0.21 0.59 0.05 0.25 0.70
Thueringen 1602 0.34 0.15 0.51 0.13 0.06 0.81
Nordrhein-Westfalen 507 0.27 0.15 0.57 0.18 0.16 0.66
Brandenburg 1204 0.42 0.15 0.44 0.35 0.10 0.56
Average 0.38 0.13 0.49 0.23 0.12 0.65
Notes: The table compares the shares of main fuel types by planning regions
from the official Microcensus statistics from 2010 and the data sample used in the
paper. A planning region falls into the tercile (T3) with the highest unemployment
rates, if more than 75 % of the zipcodes fall into T3. The data for the unemploy-
ment rate come from RWI and microm (2020) and Microcensus data from Destatis (2012).
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Figure 4.13: Geographical Distribution of Buildings & Treatment Effects
Notes: The graph maps the location of each building used in the main analysis. Each
dot represents a building in the sample.
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Table 4.11: Non-Linearities in Temperature Response
Dependent variable: kWh/m2
(1) (2) (3)
Full “Altbau” Not WSVO1995
HDD if (°C < -5) 0.0255*** 0.0280*** 0.0279***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006)
HDD if (-5 ≤ °C < 0) 0.0307*** 0.0330*** 0.0322***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
HDD if (0 ≤ °C < 5) 0.0266*** 0.0284*** 0.0282***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008)
HDD if (5 ≤ °C < 10) 0.0232*** 0.0253*** 0.0255***
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0011)
HDD if (10 ≤ °C < 15) 0.0210*** 0.0259*** 0.0275***
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0021)
Interaction Terms
X “Neubau” X WSVO1995
HDD if (°C < -5) -0.0125*** -0.00681***
(0.0005) (0.0009)
HDD if (-5 ≤ °C < 0) -0.0149*** -0.0105***
(0.0004) (0.0005)
HDD if (0 ≤ °C < 5) -0.0123*** -0.00887***
(0.0005) (0.0008)
HDD if (5 ≤ °C < 10) -0.0139*** -0.0102***
0.0007) (0.0010)
HDD if (10 ≤ °C < 15) -0.0182*** -0.0123***
(0.0014) (0.0024)
N 3,030,063 1,363,017 439,126
Adj R2 0.777 0.785 0.800
Zip Codes 7,769 6,860 5,340
Notes: The full sample covers all buildings using natural gas (high or low calorific),
district heating, and oil. The dependent variable is kilowatt hours consumed per square
meter of heated living space. “Altbau” equals 1 if the building was constructed before
1995. “Neubau” are buildings built starting 1995. WSVO 1995 is a composite measure
indicating whether the roof, loft ceiling, windows, outer wall, and basement ceiling met
thermal insulation standards under the 1995 building codes. This information was only
available from energy performance certificates issued from 2014 to 2019. Standards errors
are clustered at the zip code level for all specifications. All regressions include fixed effects
for building, fuel type, (majority) year of billing, the starting year of each billing period,
and fuel type by year. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.12: Accounting for Other Weather Variation
Dependent variable: kWh/m2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HDD 0.0306*** 0.0306***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
HDD if (°C < -5) 0.0255*** 0.0253***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
HDD if (-5 ≤ °C < 0) 0.0307*** 0.0305***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
HDD if (0 ≤ °C < 5) 0.0266*** 0.0262***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
HDD if (5 ≤ °C < 10) 0.0232*** 0.0227***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
HDD if (10 ≤ °C < 15) 0.0210*** 0.0197***
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Precipitation (mm) -0.0565** -0.0547**
(0.0212) (0.0200)
Humidity (%) 0.691*** 0.907***
(0.112) (0.105)
N 3,030,063 3,030,063 3,030,063 3,030,063
Adj R2 0.776 0.777 0.776 0.777
Notes: The full sample covers all buildings using natural gas (high or low calorific),
district heating, and oil. The coefficient on the HDD should be interpreted as the in-
crease in kWh per square meter living space for each 1°C increase in the annual sum of
heating degree days, with mean temperatures below 15°C. Similarly in the sixth row, the
coefficient should be interpreted as the increase in kWh per square meter for each 1°C
increase in the annual sum of heating degree days, with mean temperatures inside the
interval (10 ≥ °C < 15). Precipitation is the average of total precipitation height (mm) on
days with mean temperatures below 15°C. Relative humidity is the average of the mean
relative humidity (%) on days with mean temperatures below 15°C. Standards errors are
clustered at the zip code level for all specifications. All regressions include fixed effects
for building, fuel type, (majority) year of billing, the starting year of each billing period,
and fuel type by year. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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(e) Basement (f) Heating System
Notes: The graphs summarize the share of buildings that are certified to meet the minimum thermal insulation




AGEB (2018). Anwendungsbilanzen für die Endenergiesektoren in Deutschland in den
Jahren 2013 bis 2017. Report, AG Energiebilanzen e.V. (available online, in German).
Allcott, H. and Greenstone, M. (2017). Measuring the welfare effects of residential energy
efficiency programs. NBER Working Paper, 23386.
Becker, R. and Henderson, V. (2000). Effects of air quality regulations on polluting
industries. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2):379–421.
Bento, A. M. (2013). Equity impacts of environmental policy. Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ.,
5(1):181–196.
BMWi (2019). Zahlen und Fakten, Energiedaten. Report, Federal Ministry for Economic
Affairs and Energy. (available online, in German).
Breidenbach, P. and Eilers, L. (2018). RWI-GEO-GRID: Socio-economic data on grid
level. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 238(6):609–616.
Breiman, L. (2001). Random forests. Machine learning, 45(1):5–32.
Bruegge, C., Deryugina, T., and Myers, E. (2019). The distributional effects of building
energy codes. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists,
6(2):95–127.
Bushnell, J. B. and Wolfram, C. D. (2012). Enforcement of vintage-differentiated reg-
ulations: The case of new source review. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 64:137–152.
Chay, K. Y. and Greenstone, M. (2003). Air Quality, Infant Mortality, and the Clean Air
Act of 1970. NBER Working Paper, 10053.
Chetty, R., Looney, A., and Kroft, K. (2009). Salience and taxation: Theory and evidence.
American Economic Review, 99(4):1145–1177.
Christensen, P., Francisco, P., Myers, E., and Souza, M. (2020). Decomposing the wedge
143
between projected and realized returns in energy efficiency programs. E2e Working
Paper, 046.
DellaVigna, S. (2009). Psychology and economics: Evidence from the field. Journal of
Economic Literature, 47(2):315–372.
DellaVigna, S. and Pollet, J. (2009). Investor inattention and friday earnings announce-
ments. The Journal of Finance, 64(2):709–749.
Destatis (2012). Bauen und Wohnen. Mikrozensus - Zusatzerhebung 2010. Report, Statis-
tisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. (available online, in German).
Destatis (2016). Bauen und Wohnen. Mikrozensus - Zusatzerhebung 2014. Report, Statis-
tisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. (available online, in German).
EEA (2016). Reported information under Directive 2001/80/EC on large combustion
plants. European Environmental Agency. Database Version 3.1. Accessed 20.12.2017.
EEA (2017). Air quality in Europe â 2017 report. Report No. 13/2017.
EEA (2018a). Reported data on large combustion plants covered by the Industrial Emis-
sions Directive (2010/75/EU). European Environmental Agency. Database Version 4.0.
Accessed 14.05.2018.
EEA (2018b). Reported data on large combustion plants covered by the Industrial Emis-
sions Directive (2010/75/EU). European Environmental Agency. Database Version 4.2.
Accessed 07.01.2019.
El-Shagi, M., Michelsen, C., and Rosenschon, S. (2017). Empirics on the long-run effects
of building energy codes in the housing market. Land Economics, 93(4):585–607.
Finkelstein, A. (2009). E-ztax: Tax salience and tax rates. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 124(3):969–1010.
Fowlie, M., Greenstone, M., and Wolfram, C. (2018). Do energy efficiency investments
deliver? evidence from the weatherization assistance program. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 133(3):1597–1644.
Gerarden, T. R., Newell, R. G., and Stavins, R. N. (2017). Assessing the energy-efficiency
gap. Journal of Economic Literature, 55(4):1486–1525.
Gilbert, B. and Zivin, J. G. (2014). Dynamic salience with intermittent billing: Evidence
from smart electricity meters. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 107:179–
190.
144
Giraudet, L.-G., Houde, S., and Maher, J. (2018). Moral hazard and the energy efficiency
gap: Theory and evidence. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists, 5(4):755–790.
Greenstone, M. (2004). Did the clean air act cause the remarkable decline in sulfur dioxide
concentrations? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47:585–611.
Greenstone, M. and Hanna, R. (2014). Environmental regulations, air and water pollu-
tion, and infant mortality in india. American Economic Review, 104(10):3038–72.
Harrison, A. E., Hyman, B., Martin, L. A., and Nataraj, S. (2015). When do firms go
green? Comparing price incentives with command and control regulations in India.
NBER Working Paper, 21763.
Henderson, V. (1996). Effects of air quality regulation. American Economic Review,
86(4):789 – 813.
Jacobsen, G. D. (2019). An examination of how energy efficiency incentives are distributed
across income groups. The Energy Journal, 40(6):171–198.
Jessoe, K. and Rapson, D. (2014). Knowledge is (less) power: Experimental evidence
from residential energy use. American Economic Review, 104(4):1417–1438.
Karplus, V., Zhang, S., and Almond, D. (2018). Quantifying coal power plant responses
to tighter so2 emissions standards in china. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 115(27):7004–7009.
Kotchen, M. J. (2017). Longer-run evidence on whether building energy codes reduce resi-
dential energy consumption. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists, 4(1):135–153.
Martin, R., Muûls, M., and Wagner, U. J. (2016). The impact of the european union
emissions trading scheme on regulated firms: What is the evidence after ten years?
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 10(1):129–148.
McCoy, D. and Kotsch, R. (2020). Quantifying the distributional impact of energy effi-
ciency measures. GRI Working Paper, 306.
Meyer, A. and Pac, G. (2017). Analyzing the characteristics of plants choosing to opt-out
of the large combustion plant directive. Utilities Policy, 45:61–68.
Pon, S. (2017). The effect of information on TOU electricity use: an irish residential
study. The Energy Journal, 38(6):55–79.
145
Prest, B. C. (2020). Peaking interest: How awareness drives the effectiveness of time-
of-use electricity pricing. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists, 7(1):103–143.
Ray, G. and Sunikka-Blank, M. (2013). A Critical Appraisal of Germany’s Thermal
Retrofit Policy: Turning Down the Heat. London: Springer.
RWI and microm (2020). RWI-GEO-GRID: Socio-economic data on grid level
(wave 9). Version: 1. RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research. Dataset.
http://doi.org/10.7807/microm:V8.
Schmitt, S. and Schulze, K. (2011). Choosing environmental policy instruments: An
assessment of the environmental dimension of EU energy policy. In Tosun, Jale, and
Israel Solorio (eds). Energy and Environment in Europe: Assessing a Complex Rela-
tionship? European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Mini-Issue 1, Vol. 15,
Article 9, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2011-009a.htm.
Sexton, S. (2015). Automatic bill payment and salience effects: Evidence from electricity
consumption. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(2):229–241.
Singhal, P. (2019). Are Emission Performance Standards Effective in Pollution Control?
Evidence from the EU’s Large Combustion Plant Directive. DIW Berlin Discussion
Paper, No. 1773.
Singhal, P. and Stede, J. (2019). Heat monitor 2018: Rising heating energy demand,
thermal retrofit rate must increase. DIW Weekly Report, Volume 9, Issue 35/36, 303–
312.
Stavins, R. N. (2006). Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation. Stanford Envi-
ronmental Law Journal, 25(1):29–63.
Tiefenbeck, V., Götte, L., Degen, K., Tasic, V., Fleisch, E., Lalive, R., and Staake, T.
(2018). Overcoming salience bias: How real-time feedback fosters resource conservation.
Management Science, 64(3):1458–1476.
Wager, S. and Athey, S. (2018). Estimation and inference of heterogeneous treat-
ment effects using random forests. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
113(523):1228–1242.
Wätzold, F. (2004). SO2 Emissions in Germany: Regulations to Fight Waldsterben. In W.
Harrington, R. D. Morgenstern and T. Sterner (eds): Choosing Environmental Policies.
Comparing Instruments and Outcomes in the United States and Europe. Washington
DC: Resources for the Future, pp 23 - 40.
146
Weiß, D. and Michelsen, C. (2011). The improvement of housing conditions in post
communist germany - market mechanisms and subsidy impacts. Conference paper.
51st Congress of the ERSA: 30 August - 3 September 2011, Barcelona, Spain.
Wichman, C. (2017). Information provision and consumer behavior: A natural experi-
ment in billing frequency. Journal of Public Economics, 152:13–33.
Wynn, G. and Coghe, P. (2017). Europe’s Coal-Fired Power Plant: Rough Times Ahead.
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
147
Erklärung
Erklärung gemäß §4 Abs. 2
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich mich noch keinem Promotionsverfahren unterzogen oder
um Zulassung zu einem solchen beworben habe, und die Dissertation in der gleichen
oder einer anderen Fassung bzw. Überarbeitung einer anderen Fakultät, einem Prü-
fungsausschuss oder einem Fachvertreter an einer anderen Hochschule nicht bereits zur
Überprüfung vorgelegen hat.
(Unterschrift, Ort, Datum)
Erklärung gemäß §10 Abs. 3
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich für die Dissertation folgende Hilfsmittel und Hilfen ver-
wendet habe:
• STATA, R, Excel, LATEX
• DeepL Übersetzer
Auf dieser Grundlage habe ich die Arbeit selbstständig verfasst.
(Unterschrift, Ort, Datum)
148
